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I.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MODERN CRITICISM.

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In view of the many conflicting claims made for and against modern criticism it is not an easy task to point out the lessons to be learned from it. For, on the one hand, it is claimed that it breeds infidelity and scatters the seeds of doubt, while, on the other, it is maintained that modern criticism removes the remnants of superstition and implants into the mind of the persevering student a fullness of hope and trust and a firmness of faith unattainable in the old school of thought. All that is needed is that search after truth be continued beyond the elementary stage. What one student sees as lessons learned may be very repugnant to another. For this reason we venture to make a few preliminary observations.

(1) No one school of thought has a monopoly of revelation or of the truth. This should lead to more general liberality and less spirited antagonism, as we may be as far out of the way as those we condemn. (2) Modern criticism has gained its right to live. This is an axiom, and not a proposition to be proved. In the light of history it were as preposterous to attempt to either prove or deny that the whole is greater than any of its parts as to venture to prove or deny the legitimacy

of modern criticism. The one is an axiom in mathematics, the other is philosophy. (3) Criticism is practiced by the conservatives as well as the liberals. Original investigation is impossible without criticism. (4) Modern criticism, as we take it in this paper, stands for a more advanced school of religious thought. (5) The subject needs be approached from a sympathetic point of view. To study criticism as the infidel studies the Bible is neither manly nor honest. Our minds must be open and sufficiently unbiased to see any merit and truth there may exist in modern criticism. (6) To sympathize with modern criticism does not mean to accept all its conclusions.

Among the lessons learned from modern criticism we would mention the following:

1. The contents of Christian faith need be constantly tested.

In an age when there is no scientific inquiry and no searching after the real cause and for the real reason of things, inquiry into matters of faith *may* possibly be out of place, because then the mind is not as ready to grasp the real import of an assigned reason as it is when more wide awake and astute by reason of its constant activity. But we must not expect, in an age like ours when the air is full of interrogation points, that the contents of Christian faith should escape the most searching inquiry. That faith is said to relate itself to the eternal destinies of man. On it depend the highest hopes. By it are guided the purest and the noblest aspirations. The highest development of the human soul are claimed to hinge on that faith. If then it is a matter of such supreme importance for man to have faith, it is of the supremest importance to know the basis of that faith, and also to be sure that one's faith will stand the test to which it may be liable. This is not only one of the problems of modern criticism, but it is one of its lessons that stands out in bold relief.

In so far as the Bible forms the contents of Christian faith, we need to approach it with interrogation points. It may be settled as a fact that the fewer the inquiries concerning the

truth of God's word, the weaker the faith and the stronger the credulity. But where there is an ever-present searching, a constant inquiry into the reason for this or that particular claim, faith becomes established so that it is not so easily shaken. In the Bible we need constantly inquire into the essential and the accidental, so that we may be sure of a proper biblical content of our faith.

In so far as Christ is the content of faith we need to know the true Christ of revelation. The Christ of the creed and the Christ of revelation are not necessarily the same. To inquire into the true Christ is the mission of the believer. To do this it is often necessary to question that which was formerly considered established, often to overthrow that which may have been cherished, and it may be to disclose that which has been regarded as sacrilegious and set it up as an element of the Christ. The Christian conception of the Christ is not a narrow one, at any rate it should not be narrow. And for this very reason we need be the more cautious concerning the elements that enter into this conception, so that the unworthy of the Christ be eliminated and the worthy retained. This cannot be done without a testing and a sifting.

It should also be remembered that not all doubts arise from atheism or disbelief. Let this be fully realized in dealing with doubts that arise in one's own soul as well as with those doubts which we meet in others. Do not condemn the doubter wholesale. It is because of these very doubts that have harassed the soul for so long a time and the diligent search after the truth that the light of truth shines so brightly into many a soul now. To doubt is often the way to truth. On the other hand, to question that which you hold as an essential part of revelation is not necessarily to doubt truth or to doubt revelation. That particular aspect may not be an essential factor. Hence the value of the lesson taught by modern criticism concerning the necessity of constantly testing matters of faith, so that shortsightedness may be removed, the clouds of doubt dispelled, and a clearer apprehension of God and His truth gained.

2. Revelation needs be viewed as a part of history.

The older method of separating revelation from history has all but been abandoned. We find remnants of it here and there. Modern criticism has taught us a better way of understanding God in His relation with man. The every-day life and circumstances of the individual to whom revelation was made needs be studied, as the revelation was made in those peculiar surroundings and has a value in its historical setting which it cannot be made to have independently thereof. The social and the political situation of a nation condition, to a very large extent, the character of the disclosure to be made, and the manner or method of procedure. This is plain on every page of the history of Israel. To understand the injunctions given, we need to know the practices prior to this time. The one is the sequel of the other. The prophecies of Hosea have a value in their historic setting which cannot be attributed to them in any other way. To separate the man or the message from the history of the times is to do violence to both and also to misconceive God's message to the ages through the prophet. The sequence of ordinary events form a factor in that revelation. To eliminate this factor, human though it be, is to pervert the whole. It is an integral part of the message or a condition for the proper understanding of the same. For this reason higher criticism is laying so much stress upon the historic situation of prophecies and studying the development of national life so closely.

It need hardly be claimed, further, that it is impossible for a prophet to refrain from reflecting the tendency of thought and the spirit of his times, as this is generally acknowledged in our day, not only by higher critics, but also by men who represent very conservative views. The prophet lives in a certain environment. The people to whom he delivers the message hold certain views on the subject in regard to which the prophet desires to enlighten them. The form of the discourse, as well as the matter, is conditioned by these views. Man can only comprehend new knowledge in the light of that

already possessed. The teaching of Jesus must be studied with these limitations, as only on this basis will His doctrine have symmetry and beauty and grandeur. The sooner we come to understand the apocalyptic utterances of the Bible from the historic point of view, the sooner will they have more meaning and appeal with more power and force to the thoughtful student. As long as we persist in separating them from the thought-tendencies of the times, they cannot fail to provoke doubt in the mind of the modern student who studies every other subject in the light of history.

The historic method is the only rational method to approach the Bible. Yet we cannot refrain from uttering a caution. In certain quarters the historic method does not mean a candid historical examination of the facts and a careful consideration of all the data obtainable that bear on the point under investigation, but it has come to stand for certain definite results which have been reached by others than the investigator. This is seen in the subjective construction of Old Testament history, the history of the Apostolic Age and in the early period of church history. Against this we protest. But the abuse of a good thing is no reason why it should be discarded. If the historic method be discarded, what have we to put in place of it? On the other hand, history must not only exist subjectively in the mind of the student. The voice of history needs be heard. We must have our ears open to hear what it has to say on any subject that claims the attention of man, whether in the domain of philosophy or theology. But we must be sure that it is the voice of history and not our own subjective ideas which we project into the historic field. Modern criticism insists on the true historic method as a method, and not as results attained. The result needs constant modification as we come to understand history better. The method followed must be such as to give the voice of history proper recognition in theology.

3. The supremacy and authority of the human reason in matters of faith.

There has been a great deal of unnecessary discussion on this phase of our subject since modern criticism has been advancing its claims and impressing its lessons concerning the supremacy and authority of reason in matters of religion. In other domains this is axiomatic. Why such a stir should have been created, when we enter the religious life of man, is scarcely comprehensible. But we are now settling down to a more quiet contemplation of the matter and are beginning to take it for granted. Matters of faith are being more and more brought to the test of reason, and those phases eliminated which cannot stand the test. Those that endure have then a better standing and claim recognition.

It is very difficult to understand why reason should ever have been so subordinated as it has already been. Revelation even can have no authority unless it appeals to reason as reasonable. The theological world has about given up the idea that revelation and reason are contradictory terms and must stand as inconsistencies, that we must give heed to revelation and let reason have sway in other matters. There is no such contradiction between the two. Criticism enforces the lesson that all things, whether in science or philosophy or theology, must submit to the test of reason. If any doctrine is advanced claiming the attention of man, it must be tested by the reason.

This becomes clear when we come to understand the place of reason in man and for man and its relation to revelation. Reason is a God-given faculty. It was given to use. We cannot think without using our reason. Avoiding it we come under the sway of demagogues, or feeling is exalted to an unnatural relation to the spiritual activities. Feeling cannot be a test in religious matters. If it is, it has as much authority in the Buddhist as in the Christian. Exalting feeling degrades revelation to the fluctuating sentimentalism of man. But, when we subject it to reason, the whole situation changes, since reason is the ruling power in man. And man cannot always reason at will. He may will to disregard reason. He can

never reason away his convictions, because these are the fruit of reason.

One of the postulates of revelation is that it can be tested by reason. This is a fundamental idea underlying the whole of revealed religion. The only difference between sanity and idiocy is reason which actually is in authority, and reason dethroned. So when God comes to man He does not choose to reveal Himself to the idiot and the insane, but to the sober-minded and the rational. This is one of the elements which is in common between man and God. God, as the Supreme Reason, discloses Himself to the finite reason of man, and every disclosure must be made through this faculty. This is not only a matter of speculation, but a matter of fact. In order that a disclosure of God may be intelligible to man, it is presented to his understanding so that he can intellectually cognize the disclosure and appropriate it to himself and be benefited thereby.

When God revealed Himself to Abraham, Abraham by virtue of his reason comprehended a real significance of that revelation. The promises made by God to this patriarch were intellectually apprehended, and were promises that stood the test of reason, and, though he could not see the method of the fulfillment, he grasped the possibility because it was within the domain of reason; he acted in accordance with this possibility and thereby manifested the strength of his faith. When the prophet delivered his discourse to Israel concerning the suffering servant, there was a definite idea in his mind and not a hazy dream. The term "servant" stood for something definite both in his own mind and in the minds of his hearers, although the theological world to-day is perplexed, and various views are advanced. When Isaiah spoke concerning the virgin bearing the son, there was something that appealed to his own reason, an idea that the people of his time could comprehend if they would only take time to think. But this is the complaint. They did not think; they did not reason. They were guided by feeling and inclination, and spurned the au-

thority of reason. Therefore they turned aside and followed the lies of Assyria and Egypt.

When Ezekiel saw those wonderful visions, he was not out of his reason, nor in a trance bearing him beyond his reason, but his reason was stirred to greater activity; and therefore he could comprehend the message for his time and people, and record the visions as a message to all times. But they must be tested by the authority of human reason. They could not be a message of God to man unless they appealed to his understanding.

The mysteries of which Paul speaks are mysteries because revelation has not been made so as to explain certain facts and forces. Mysteries as such are not and cannot be matters of revelation. From the very nature of the case every revelation must come within the comprehension of the person to whom it is made. Otherwise it is no revelation. A revelation brings that which the human reason could not of its own ability or resources grasp, but once within reach it must submit to the activities of that reason. The fourteenth chapter of I. Cor. enforces this lesson. The understanding is the only medium through which any communications can be made to man, and that same understanding must test the value of this communication.

Reason is the balancing power of man. Revelations of the past are neither unreasonable nor beyond reason, though they may lie beyond our comprehension; because we are ignorant of many factors that enter into the problem, therefore we are not sure of the solution. Because of the former, matters of faith should be carefully examined so that we are sure of the points of revelation, and do not lay ourselves open to the charge of subjectivism. Because of the latter, we should be cautious in our exegetical work. While modern criticism says a great many things that are displeasing to many minds, this is a very valuable lesson it teaches us, that the supremacy and authority of human reason should not be impeached. The value of the lesson is heightened by the fact that some men will appeal to reason to prove that reason is not a court of final appeal.

4. The limitations of human reason.

Much as we value reason and exalt the authority of it in matters secular and sacred, there are limitations beyond which it cannot go and which need be recognized. Modern criticism has enlarged the legitimate sphere of reason to such an extent that it now grapples with difficulties which were formerly thought to lie beyond its abilities. In the future we may expect still more progress in this direction. Yet, notwithstanding the progress that has been made in the past, modern criticism teaches the lesson of the limitations of that reason on which it relies and which it constantly uses. The more the progress made, the more forcibly will these lessons be taught. There are a great many perplexing questions, questions that have not yet been solved. There is a vast store of possible information not yet explored. There are difficulties within the legitimate sphere of criticism which await adjustment. And all this points to limitations, not only in knowledge but in reason itself. Let it be here distinctly understood that we are speaking of human reason, reason as a finite power.

Reason cannot manufacture any facts. It cognizes relations which exist between facts that are brought to its notice. The imperfect knowledge, which man has of facts and their possibilities, limits the action of the reasoning faculties. This explains why such varied conclusions are drawn from the same series of facts. When it comes to the sphere of the spiritual this truth is more potent than in the physical. Reason has no right to assert what sort of a revelation we should expect under certain known conditions, because we do not know what other conditions, not known to us, enter into vital relations and necessarily modify the action needed to accomplish a given purpose. Or, on the other hand, we may have such a limited conception of the object aimed at and the results desired that we are not in a position to subordinate and correlate facts and conditions so as to be sure of what is needed. All that we can say is that, if no unknown factor or relation enters or needs consideration, then we should expect such and such to have occurred. This

is too precarious a procedure for any philosophy of religion. It makes the development too subjective. Thus the whole structure becomes dwarfed and unreliable. It is not the province of criticism to say what we should have expected, nor to philosophize on the probable or possible contingencies not known to us, but to sift the genuine from the spurious so that we may be sure of a solid foundation for our faith and be enabled to build wisely and intelligently.

There are depths which reason cannot fathom. But, when a disclosure of such a character is made, reason can relate it to already known facts and experiences. Reason could never have discovered God's love as an uplifting and purifying power, nor the fact of the Atonement. But, when these are made known to man in terms of human experiences and placed at his disposal as a renewing power, the reason can comprehend and grasp the necessity for such a course on the part of God, if the highest end of man is to be accomplished. But here is a limitation of reason that is as real as can be. There is a domain where it reigns supreme, but there is also a domain where it cannot enter unless it receive help and enlightenment from without. In spiritual matters we are dependent on revelation for the fundamentals. These always give the intelligence of man more material to use. God can only be comprehended as He has disclosed Himself. That self-disclosure of God enlarges the activities of reason and at the same time clearly states limitations.

CONCLUSION.

These are some of the lessons which modern criticism teaches. Those who desire to learn have abundant material at their disposal. But these are not the only lessons taught us. The necessity of communion with God in prayer, the impotence of man without a revelation from God, the necessity of following the truth wherever it may lead us, are some of the further lessons reenforced by modern criticism. We must not approach the subject with preconceived prejudices against

criticism, if we desire to ascertain, either its value as an aid in faith, or its power as a destructive force. Without admitting all of the claims made for it, it must be admitted that modern criticism has given the Christian Church new weapons for defensive warfare into its hand, which will eventually prove themselves of incalculable service for the advancement of the kingdom of God. It has cast aside many things that were formerly held in high esteem. It is now overthrowing some ideas, some of us cherish. It is often attempting to do more than its legitimate work. But it is a fair question how much of that which we consider essential is only of secondary importance. Our fathers have erred in the past, erred both in the direction of the liberal, and in the direction of the conservative, tendencies. May we not be erring to-day? Is not much of that we call truth perhaps only fiction? Some ideas held in the past have rendered mankind a noble service, but their race may be run; and opportunity bids us go forward studying closely what the past and the present teach so that we may profit by their lessons. Truth will conquer in the end. It is not necessary for us to call fire from heaven to destroy the modern critics, for the vast majority of them are laboring in the interest of God's kingdom. It is wise to avoid their errors, while we profit by the noble lessons they teach us.

II.

PHILIPPINE FACTS.

BY WM. G. SEIPLE.

The Philippines form the northernmost part of the Malayan Archipelago. There are one thousand or more islands in the group, which is about the size of New Mexico or Arizona, 113,000 square miles. Luzon, the largest island, is about the size of Kentucky, 40,000 square miles, and Mindanao, which is next in size, covers about the area of Indiana, 35,000 square miles. All of these islands are more or less mountainous. Many active and extinct volcanoes are found. Earthquakes are very frequent. The rivers are noted for their navigability. The Rio Pasig, at whose mouth Manila is located, is best known. On Luzon we have basins, called *pinag*, which contain water only during the rainy season. The Pinag de Candaba is a large basin near Manila. The Philippines are swept by monsoons and typhoons. The climate is healthy, although the coast regions of the southern islands, notably Mindanao, bear a bad reputation.

In January and February the temperature is 77°, in other months, 84° F. In May and June violent thunderstorms occur. There were two hundred and three rainy days in 1882. Malarial fevers are most prevalent. Smallpox is one of the permanent diseases. Cholera is frequent. Leprosy and *bari-bari*, a swelling of the limbs, are also found. The bubonic plague has never been established in the Philippines. The climate is especially serious on women and children.

Rich gold mines exist on the island of Luzon. Copper, iron and coal are also found. Tobacco, sugar, hemp and coffee constitute the chief products. Rice is the principal food. Not enough, however, is raised by the natives to supply their

own wants, so it is imported from French Cochin-China. The forests abound in valuable woods. Beeswax is the principal animal product. *Repang*, or sea-cucumber, is dried and sent to China.

The inhabitants of the Philippines are divided into three groups: (1) The Negritos, or blacks; (2) the Malays; (3) the foreigners—Spanish, Chinese, and mixed breeds or mestizos. The Negritos are the remnant of the aboriginal inhabitants. They have woolly hair and darker skin than the rest of the Filipinos. In habits they are nomadic, but their roaming is limited to a definite area. They are not found in the eastern Visayans, in the Sulus, nor in the Batanes islands, and are scattered only in small tribes through the other islands. There is a large area of them in northern Luzon and another in northeastern Mindanao. Their total number is 20,000. They are pagans, though scarcely anything is known of their religion or language. They subsist on hunting, fishing, and wild fruits.

The second group is made up of the heathen Malays, or Infieles, who inhabit the mountainous interior of all the largest islands, except Samar, Leyte, and Bohol; the Mohammedan Malays, or Moros, who live in the Sulu or Jolo Archipelago; and the Christian and long-civilized Malays, or Indios, who dwell on the coasts of Luzon, the Visayans, and the northern and eastern parts of Mindanao.

There are two types of heathen Malays: (1) The warlike Igorrotes in northern Luzon, and (2) tribes forming a transitional stage, as the Tinguianes. The religion of the pagan Malays is ancestor-worship. They live on rice and by hunting and fishing. They number from 6,000 to 1,000,000, according to different estimates.

Among the Moros the two most prominent racial groups are the Sulus and the Magindanaos. The former inhabit the Sulu sub-archipelago. The Magindanaos are settled at the mouth of the Rio Grande and on the southwestern coast of Mindanao. The ancestors of the Sulus came from Borneo and of the others

from the Moluccas. The pagan natives were subdued by the Moros. The Moros are a mixed breed. Piracy contributed to this mixing process. Hunting, fishing, and agriculture are their chief pursuits. Rice and maize are the chief products. Their social system rests on feudalism. A mild form of slavery prevails, though even this has been somewhat mitigated under United States rule. Below the Sultan stand the *dattos* with their sub-vassals or slaves. The Sultan of Sulu, the most important ruler among them, has the entire Sulu Archipelago subject to him. Since the extirpation of piracy in 1863 by the introduction of light-draught gunboats by the Spanish, the *dattos* have lost their income. The Malays are all born pirates. Their religion is Mohammedan but superficial. There are about 500,000 Moros.

The Christian Malays, or Indios, form the most important part of the population. It is they who have opposed the United States. The Tagals or Tagalogs, who are noted for their general education, the Ilocoans for their enterprise, and the Visayans for their large numbers, are the most prominent tribes. The Zambales and the Pangasinans are found in western Luzon, the Pampangos in central Luzon, and the Ilocoans in northwestern Luzon.

All the Filipinos are passionately fond of music. The main features of their character are quiet docility and ambition, vanity and pride. The population of the Philippines is from six million five hundred thousand to eight millions. Of this, the Tagalogs form about one third, the Visayans about one half, and the Ilocoans three tenths. The percentage of Spaniards is insignificant. The Chinese, who form about two and one half per cent. of the total population, are the traders and merchants. There are two kinds of mixed breeds—Spanish and Chinese mestizos. The creoles, those born of foreign parents on the islands, are not distinguished from Spanish mestizos. The Chinese mestizos, who are the most active and enterprising class in the islands, form three and one half per cent. of the whole population and are Roman Catholics.

The dialects spoken in the Philippines belong to the Malayo-Polynesian group of languages. These dialects readily fall into two classes, the Negrito and the Malay. Little is known of the Negrito language. The Malay dialects are related to the Malay of the Malay Peninsula and Dutch East India. There is an admixture of Sanskrit and Arabic words. "Son" and "daughter" and "king" (*raja*) are from the Sanskrit. The Arabic words came in at the time of the conversion of the southern Malays to Islam. The Arabic words are learned, relating to law, theology, and religion.

One of the prominent characteristics of the Malay languages is the great use of particles. The roots are dissyllabic. To form a word, a root is taken and combined with particles. Abstract nouns are formed by prefixing *ka* to the root and affixing *an*, as, *kaharian*, kingdom, from *hari*, king. There are very few verbs that have no particle. There is no sharp distinction between the noun and the verb. That the verbs are practically nouns may be seen in the construction of the sentences. In noun-formation there is no inflection for case or number. To indicate number, a special word is used before the noun. In pronouns, we have two cases, nominative and oblique. In verb-formation, there is no inflection for person or number. Particles show whether the verb is active or passive, intransitive, causative, frequentative, reciprocal, etc. For tenses we get different stems by combining particles with roots and by reduplicating the particles or the roots. The prefix *ka* and the suffix *an* are common to all these languages. The passive voice is more frequently used than the active. This is due to the native mode of thought. There is a similarity of construction in the passive of all these languages.

It is the purpose of the present paper to treat the Tagalog dialect in particular. The name *Tagalog* is said to be derived from the prefix *taga*, which, when prefixed to the name of a place, signifies a native of that place, and the noun *ilog*, river, hence, "an inhabitant of the river," i. e., probably the Pasi

River. Hence the Tagalogs are the dwellers in the lowlands.

The Tagalog alphabet has three vowels, *a*, *i*, and *o*, and fourteen consonants, *b*, *c*, *d*, *g*, *ng*, *h*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *p*, *s*, *t*, *u*, and *y*. *O* or *qu* has the sound of *k*, as in *cahoy*, tree or wood. In the case of *d*, there is an interchange of *d* and *r*. Initial *d* is usually pronounced *d* as in *dito*, here; final *d*, as *r*, as in *capatid*, brother or sister. When medial after a vowel, it is pronounced like *r*, as in *sida*. After *n* or consonants, medial *d* is pronounced like *d*, as in *hindi*, not. *G* is always hard, as in *ga*, like. Before *i*, *g* is often written *gu*, as *ginto* or *guinto*, gold. *Nî* is a sound peculiar to Tagalog, as in *nîalan*, name. The Tagalogs are particularly fond of nasal and snuffling sounds, so we have *m* and *n* in a great majority of their words. The pronunciation of *nî* is effected by ejecting the air towards the beginning of the arch of the palate, so that a large part of the air goes out through the nose. It is best, however, to learn the pronunciation from the natives. *U* is something between *u* and *w* in pronunciation, as in *uala*, he has not. *Y* is practically our *y*. It is sometimes written *y* or *i*, as in *hayop*, animal.

To form the plural of nouns, there is no inflectional change in the word itself, but an external plural sign, *manîa*, is prefixed to the word, as *ang lalaki*, the man (vir), plur. *ang manîa lalaki*, the men.

There are three forms of the Tagalog article: (1) The article with common nouns; (2) the article with proper names; and (3) the inclusive article. The article with common nouns is declined as follows:

	Singular.	Plural.
Nom.,	<i>ang</i> ,	<i>ang manîa</i> .
Gen.,	<i>sa</i> or <i>nang</i> ,	<i>sa manîa</i> or <i>nang manîa</i> .
Prepositional,	<i>sa</i> ,	<i>sa manîa</i> .

The article with proper names, *e. g.*, *si Pedro*, Pedro, has the following declension:

	Singular.
Nom.,	<i>si.</i>
Gen.,	<i>cay</i> or <i>ni.</i>
Prepositional,	<i>cay.</i>

The plural of the personal article is the same as the ordinary article, *ang mangâ*, etc.

The inclusive article is declined as follows:

Nom.,	<i>sina.</i>
Gen.,	<i>nina.</i>
Prepositional,	<i>kana.</i>

It is used only with personal and proper names. "Russell and Company" would be *sina Russell*.

Ligatures (in Spanish, *ligazones*) are employed to join the adjective and the noun, and sometimes the verb and adverb. The ligature *ng* is used after vowels, and *na* after consonants, except *n* where simply *g* is added. Examples are: *Ang mabuti-ng lalaki*, the good man, *ang malacas-na babayi*, the strong woman, and *ang akin-g bata*, my boy.

Some adjectives are formed by prefixing *ma* to the noun, as *mabuti*, good, and *malacas*, strong. The plural of these adjectives is formed by reduplicating the first syllable of the root, as *mabubuti*.

There are two forms of the plural of the first personal pronoun *ako*. *Tayo*, the first form, includes the speaker and those to whom he speaks (we all). *Kami*, the second form, is exclusive (we, not you), and denotes the speaker and those with whom he is associated.

If I were to say "We are readers of the Review," the inclusive form *tayo* would have to be used. For "we live in Baltimore" (referring to myself and my fellow university students); the exclusive form *kami* would be necessary, as excluding the person addressed.

Of the demonstrative pronouns, *yeri*, this, is used when the object spoken of is very near to the speaker, *iyân*, that, as

referring to something nearer the person spoken to, and *yaon*, that, as indicating something in the distance, away from the speaker and the one spoken to.

"To be" or "to exist" is expressed by the verbal ligature *ay*, as, John is good, *si Juan ay magaling*. "To have" is expressed by the particle *may*, as, Pedro has intelligence, *si Pedro'y may bait*. The particle *ay* is here used in connection with *may*.

The verb in Tagalog consists of the root with separate particles prefixed, infix, or affixed for the active and passive voices. There are seventeen different conjugations, of which the first ten are the most important. *Um* is the principal active particle of the first conjugation. Let us take the root *sulat*, which may mean either "to write" or "a letter." There are four tense-forms of the verb both in the active and passive, viz., the imperative and infinitive, which are identical in form, the future, the preterite, and the present. In the active of the first conjugation, *um* is inserted between the first and second letters of the root to form the imperative and infinitive, as, *s-um-ulat*. The future is formed by reduplicating the first syllable of the root, as, *su-sulat*. In the preterite *ng* is inserted between *u* and *m* of the imperative-infinitive form *s-um-ulat*, thus, *s-u-ng-m-ulat*. In the present, we have the same reduplication of the first syllable of the root, as in the future *su-sulat*, with the infixing of *ngm* (*um* with an inserted *ng*), thus, *s-u-ng-m-usulat*. These rules for the formation of the tenses are purely arbitrary devices to aid the memory and must not be taken as indicating the genesis of any of these forms.

To recapitulate, then, we have:

Active particle *um*. Root *sulat*, to write or a letter.

Imp. and inf., *s-um-ulat*.

Fut., *su-sulat*.

Pret., *s-u-ng-m-ulat*.

Pres., *s-u-ng-m-usulat*.

It is not difficult to trace a close morphological relation between the imperative and infinitive on the one hand and the preterite and present on the other.

There are three types of passive particles: *in*, *i*, and *an*. Verbs with active in *um* (i. e., verbs of the first conjugation) are conjugated with *in*, *i*, or *an* in the passive.

Root *sulat*. Passive particle *in*.

Imp. and inf., *sulat-in*.

Fut., *susulat-in*.

Pret., *s-in-ulat*.

Pres., *s-in-usulat*.

Passive particles *i* and *an*.

Imp. and infin., *i-sulat*, *sulat-an*.

Fut., *i-susulat*, *susulat-an*.

Pret., *i-s-in-ulat*, *s-in-ulat-an*.

Pres., *i-s-in-usulat*, *s-in-usulat-an*.

Notice that the particle *in* is always inserted in the pret. and pres. passive, no matter what other particles are used. If the verb forms the active with any other particle than *um*, it has, in addition to the particles *in*, *i*, and *an* another particle to form the passive. Verbs having the particle *mag* in the active form the passive with *pag*.

Root *laro*, to play.

Active.

Passive (with *in*).

Imp. and infin., *maglaro*, *pag-laro-in*.

Fut., *maglalaro*, *pag-lalaro-in*.

Pret., *naglaro*, *p-in-ag-laro*.

Pres., *naglalaro*, *p-in-ag-lalaro*.

Note the forms beginning with *n* in the pret. and pres. of the active. The pret. and pres. of all verbs conjugated with any particle beginning with *m* change *m* to *n* for the active.

The passive with *in* is used to denote the action of the agent towards himself. The passive of "to call" would be *in*-passive. If the subject of the sentence denotes the material

of which anything is made, then the passive with *in* is used. The *an*-passive is used to denote place. The *i*-passive denotes the action of the agent away from himself. It is also used when the subject of the sentence is the instrument, cause, or motive.

If the object of an action is indeterminate, the active is used, as in the sentence, Call a boy (*i. e.*, any boy) for me, *Tumawag ka nang isang bata* (literally, be-caller thou of-the one boy). *Isang* is the numeral *one* used as indefinite article, with the ligature. *Tumawag* is active imperative I. conjugation of the root *tawag*, to call. *Ka* is the post-positive form of the nominative of the second personal pronoun *ikao*.

If the object of the action is determinate, the passive is used, as in the sentence, Call my boy, *Tawagin mo ang aking bata* (literally, thy calling-object is my boy). *Tawagin* is the imperative of the *in*-passive of *tawag*, to call, denoting the action of the agent towards himself. *Mo* is the post-positive form of the genitive of the second personal pronoun *ikao*. *Aking* is the genitive of the first personal pronoun, here used, with the article *ang* and the ligature *g*, as a possessive pronoun. To turn a foreign verb into Tagalog, the prefix *mag* is used, thus, *mag-missa*, to say mass (Span. *missa*, mass), *mag-para*, to be a priest (Span. *para*, priest).

A verb can also be made from a prepositional phrase: *bukid*, a field, *sa bukid*, in the field. The prepositional phrase, *sa bukid*, in the field, is treated as a root, like *sulat*, and *pa* is prefixed to form a verb, *e. g.*, *pasabukid*, to go to the field, *pasabahay*, to go to the house, from *bahay*, house.

Inf. and imp.,	<i>pasabukid</i> .
Fut.,	<i>papasabukid</i> or <i>pasasabukid</i> .
Pret.,	<i>napasabukid</i> .
Pres.,	<i>napapasabukid</i> or <i>napasasabukid</i> .

In the future and present we have alternate reduplicated forms. The following is the general rule for the reduplication of the particle or the root.

If the particle is simple, the first syllable of the root is reduplicated. If the verbal particle is compound, it may have two or three syllables. If it consists of two syllables, the second syllable of the particle is reduplicated instead of the first syllable of the root. If the particle consists of three syllables, only the syllable *pa*, whether it stands second or third, is reduplicated. All the trisyllabic particles used to form the passive of the XIV., XV., and XVI. conjugations contain the syllable *pa*, as *pagpaka* (XIV.), *pagpati* (XV.), and *pagkapa* (XVI.).

To express repetition or continuance of an action, certain verbal forms are repeated, connected by the genitive particle *nang*: *Iyak nang iyak siya*, He doesn't do anything but weep, he cries and cries, where *iyak* signifies to weep, and *siya* is the masculine of the third personal pronoun.

When the subject precedes the verb, it is joined to the verb by the particle *ay*, as *ako'y sungmulat*, I wrote. The direct object of an active verb is put in the genitive case, as, *Ang panginoong Dios gungmawa nang lanâit*, the Lord God created the heavens. *Panginoon* is lord or master, *Dios* is a Spanish loan-word for God, *gungmawa* is preterite active I. conjugation of *gawa*, to create, and *nang lanâit* is genitive of *ang lanâit*, the heavens. The indirect object often stands after the preposition *sa*, as, *Siya'y tungmakbo sa akin*, he ran to me. *Tungmakbo* is pret. act. I. Conj. of *takbo*, to run, and *akin* is genitive of the first personal pronoun *ako*, governed by the preposition *sa*.

The article can be prefixed to any tense-stem and form a noun, as, *ang sungmulat* (pret.), the one who has written.

In the formation of nouns, a certain peculiarity of the particle *mag* must be noted. When joined to nouns of relationship, it forms nouns including both extremes of the relationship, so to speak. These are termed *relative nouns* in logic. *Ama*, father, forms *magama*, father and son or father and daughter; *panginoon*, master, forms *magpanginoon*, master and slave. By doubling the first syllable of the root or

stem after *mag*, you get a noun that means that you have one of the extremes of the relationship pluralized, as, *magaama*, father and sons.

The Tagalog dialect has next to no literature. The only writer of any note is Dr. José Rizal, who was executed during the Filipino rebellion in 1896. He has written two novels, *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*, in which he has thrown a searchlight on the political conditions of the country. The former has been translated into English. The rest of the literature is confined to translations into the vernacular of certain formulas of the Roman Catholic ritual, as the formulas for baptism and extreme unction and the Lord's Prayer. Neither the Bible nor any portion of it has ever been translated into the native dialect.

It may be of interest to the readers of this REVIEW to see the Lord's Prayer in Tagalog:

1. *Ama namin-g nungma-sa-langit ka sambahin ang ngalan*
Father our-which art-in-heaven Thou let-be-adored the name
2. *mo, mapa-sa-amin ang kaharian mo, sundin ang loob mo*
of-Thee, let-come-to-us the kingdom of-Thee, let-be-followed the will of-Thee
3. *dito sa lupa para nang sa langit, bigyan mo kami*
here on earth likeness of-that in heaven, give (lit. giving-place of-Thee) us
4. *ngayon nang amin-g kanin sa arau arau at*
to-day the of us food in day day (i. e., for every day), and
5. *patawidin mo kami nang amin-g mangá utang*
forgive (lit. forgiving-object of-Thee) us the of us (plur. sign) debt
para
likeness
6. *nang pagpatawad namin sa na-nga-gkakautang sa amin*
of-the forgiveness of-us in-respect-to those-who-are-indebted to us
7. *at howag mo kami-ng ipahintolot sa toka, at*
and not of-Thee we leading-object into temptation, but
iadya
defending-object
8. *mo kami sa dilan-g masama. Siya nawa.*
of-Thee we from all-kinds-of evil. It may-it-be.

NOTES.

1. The ligature *g* in *namin-g* here performs its original function as a relative. *Namin* is we (exclusive), showing that

God, the person addressed, is the Father of Christ and His followers, but cannot be His own Father, since God is uncaused, therefore He is excluded from the term "our"—*sung-masalanġit* is present of the verb *salanġit*, to be in heaven, a verb made up of the phrase *sa lanġit*, in heaven. This verb is conjugated with the particle *um* of the I. conjugation.—*sambahin* is imp. of the *in*-passive of *samba*, with epenthetic *h*.

2. *mapasaamin* is imp. of the verb *saamin*, come to us, made up of the phrase *sa amin*, to us, treated as a verb of the VII. Conj., and conjugated with *pa* (VII.) and then *ma* (VIII.)—*kaharian*, abstract noun, kingdom, from *hari*, king, with prefix *ka* and suffix *an*. *sundin*, imp. from *sunod*, to follow. *sundin*, *in*-passive, with syncope, for *sunodin*.—*loob*, interior, will.

3. *dito*, adv. here.—*para*, noun, likeness.—*bigyan* for *bigayan*, syncopated imperative of the *an*-passive from *bigay*, to give. That the verb *bigyan* partakes also of the nature of a noun may be seen from the modifying genitive *mo* of the second personal pronoun *ikao*.

4. *kanin*, syncope for *kayanin* from *kayin*, to eat. Infinitive of *in*-passive used as a noun. *kanin* is the native word for boiled rice, the chief means of subsistence.

5. *patawadin*, imp. of *in*-passive of *tawa*, to forgive, conjugated with *pa* (VII.).

6. *na-nga-gkakautang*. Root *utang*, a debt or to owe. Particle *magka*. Pres. *nagkaka-utang*. *ang nagkaka-utang*, the debtor. The particle *nga* inserted in it gives it a plural signification.

7. *howag*, prohibitive negative. It never takes the ligature itself, but if one or more words are inserted between it and the verb, the one immediately preceding the verb takes the ligature.—*ipahintolot*, infin. or imp. of *i*-passive of *pahintolot* (*pa* (VII.)-*hin-tolot*) from *tolot*, to let, allow.—*iadya*, imp. of *i*-passive of *adya*, to defend.

8. *nawa*, may it be, an optative particle.

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III.

THE OXFORD IDEA OF EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN SMALL COLLEGE.

BY SAMUEL H. RANCK.

Mr. John Corbin has written a very interesting book entitled "An American at Oxford" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1902). The author, a native of Chicago, who, after graduation from Harvard, studied a year at Balliol College, Oxford, was well equipped with a knowledge of American college life before he undertook his study of the life at the oldest university in England. The book has a special timeliness (unpremeditated on the part of Mr. Corbin) on account of the provisions of the will of the late Cecil Rhodes, that each state of the United States is to be represented forever at Oxford by two carefully selected undergraduate students.

Mr. Rhodes felt the charm of Oxford in his young manhood and the memory of it never left him, absorbed though he was in most far-reaching schemes for wealth and empire. Knowing, and even giving expression to, the great defects of Oxford, he nevertheless believed that there was something in the life at the university that was a powerful factor in the education of young men; and he backed up that belief with what is virtually an endowment of several million dollars. In his judgment Oxford stands for the training of men—all-round men, something more than intellectual machines—men who can do.

"The peculiarity of the English ideal of education is that it aims to develop the moral and social virtues, no less than the mental—to train up boys to be men among men. Only by understanding this is it possible to sympathize with the system of instruction, its peculiar excellences, and its almost incredible defects. * * * The colleges of England have manned the British Empire." It will be noticed, in this quotation,

that Mr. Corbin speaks of the development of the moral and social virtues as "peculiar." They are peculiar because so often they are left to shift for themselves in systems of education, and especially college education.

It is not the purpose of this article to review Mr. Corbin's book. It is merely mentioned, because it is a recent discussion of the Oxford idea of education from the point of view of an American. Half the volume is devoted to the social side of Oxford life, and this includes athletics; for athletics are a part of the social life. It is this side of college life that develops the powers of leadership in men, the power to bring things to pass, the power that makes a man a force among his fellows; in short, the kind of man who makes history. And this training for leadership was the thing that appealed especially to Cecil Rhodes.

For a generation or more "university reform"—the bringing of the two old universities, Oxford and Cambridge, into line with modern scientific discovery and thought—has been agitated in England, but to little purpose. Oxford to-day has no relation to the industrial life of the English people. This is a very great loss, both to the university and to the British Empire. The organization of the system of instruction is against it. It is so bad that for "modern sciences and mechanic arts few systems could be worse."

The colleges at Oxford and Cambridge exercise the teaching function; the university the examining function. The colleges are richly endowed; the university is relatively poor. The university maintains the laboratories, but, as complete apparatus is expensive, the laboratories suffer from the poverty of the university. It is manifestly impossible for each of the twenty colleges of Oxford to have a well-equipped laboratory of its own. And besides, there is little demand for such training on the part of the undergraduate students. The Bodleian Library is not for them, except as a place to show visitors—their sisters and other fellows'. There are university professors, to be sure, but the students who attend their lectures

are few indeed, inasmuch as the great mass of the undergraduates depend upon the college tutors for their instruction. There are many things at Oxford that seem absurd, many things that would not be tolerated in America, but of all these, Mr. Corbin declares that the university professors are the crowning absurdity.

What is it, then, in the Oxford training that gives her men the stamp that is recognized all the world over? It does not come from the course of study, from the laboratories or from the methods of instruction. For the industrial, or so-called practical work of life, all these are woefully inadequate. The ruling idea of the university is wholly different: it is to form character rather than the ability, as Mr. Gladstone once expressed it, to construct machines of so many horse-power. Therefore residence at Oxford in one of the colleges is the chief thing. To get his degree a man must reside there, take his meals with his fellows, and participate in the social life (not to be confounded with "society"), at least three years. He may take his final examinations before the end of three years, but he must complete his residence to become an ordinary passman. Indeed, men frequently enter who have taken nearly all the studies for the pass degree before they come to Oxford. This gives them more time for the social side of life (and sometimes dissipation) or for loafing, and it has given rise to the saying that Oxford is such a learned institution because so much knowledge is brought there and so little is taken away.

In the daily life within the college the students are constantly thrown into intimate relationship with men who, as a student once expressed it to me, "are somebodies," and this is a source of constant inspiration. Then, too, as many know, a body of young men living together have ways and means of disciplining themselves that are generally most effective. At Oxford the system of "ragging," which is a combination of "guying" and mild hazing, is likely, during the three years a man is in residence, to take out of him most of the "yellow streaks" of his nature.

It is doubtful if the educational value of the living together of young men at college is fully realized in America. During the last few years this matter has been strongly impressed upon me. As editor of a college obituary record I have carefully studied the lives of a good many hundreds of college men, successes and failures alike; for the men were taken as they died and the sources of information in almost every instance were the people who actually knew them. The men who succeeded, who were able to accomplish things and live reasonably happy lives, were often men of the most ordinary ability, but they knew how to deal with their fellows. The men who failed were of two kinds: those who failed from a lack of self mastery—from laziness or vice—and those who failed through their inability to get along with their fellow men. The latter were by far the more numerous and their cases were usually the most pathetic, for the hardship that ensued to themselves and families was the greatest; and, moreover, one could not help but feel that somehow they did not deserve it. To me the most striking thing in the study of the lives of these college men is the fact that few of the latter type of failures were members of college fraternities or similar social organizations while in college. The fraternity men who failed, failed because they could not master themselves. There can be no doubt that these social organizations in our American colleges, especially where there are no dormitories, develop in young men a marked ability to associate successfully with their fellows, one of the first requisites for telling work in any department of life. It may be added that this conclusion has been reached without prejudice, for I myself never belonged to a college fraternity.

In an American college the success of a teacher is measured in different ways—by the number of students he draws to his lectures, if the course is elective, by the number of his men who can pass certain examinations, by his personal popularity, and sometimes by the fact that he is a great teacher who is moulding the lives of all who come under his influence. One

of the chief measures of the success of the tutor in the colleges at Oxford is the excellence of the papers his pupils write. How many teachers are striving for such success in America? How many teachers are judged by that standard? One need only to compare half a dozen of the leading magazines in America with the same number published in England to notice the difference in training on the part of writers generally in the two countries. In the literary quality of its articles there is only one magazine in America that can compare with half a dozen or more published in England. The reason is that more articles of the desired excellence simply cannot be had in this country—a fact that has been confessed more than once by our magazine editors. As one of them recently said, few men who can write interestingly have anything in particular to say and those who have something to say can seldom present it in an interesting way. The fault is that most of our colleges lay little stress on the literary character of the papers written by the students.

There never was a time in the history of the world when the man who has something to say and can say it well has had such a splendid opportunity for a hearing, for influence, and for power. Two conspicuous modern examples are Jacob A. Riis and Booker T. Washington. Both compelled the attention of the world because they had a message and could tell it well. The one is driving out the slum and rebuilding the homes of the poor of our greatest city, where he is recognized as her most useful citizen; the other is the leader of the millions of his race in the work of making them really free from the bonds of industrial and intellectual slavery.

Our colleges and universities are altogether too neglectful in training men to write forcefully or even intelligently. Recently I have seen an article by a college man in a journal edited by college men where almost every other sentence contains one or more violations of the commonest rules of English composition. I have seen something almost as bad in theses for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, where men had spent

three years in university study after graduation from college. Few colleges are doing their whole duty towards their students or towards the nation in training up men to have something to say and to say it well. In this respect also we need something of the Oxford idea of education.

During the past few years much has been said in America of the "small college," that it is about to be swallowed up by our great universities. In its organization, its social life, and in the number of its students, the "small college" has many points in common with the colleges of Oxford. There will always be a place for the small college in America as long as it does its full duty—teaching a comparatively few things well, training its men for social life, and not expending its wealth and the energies of its professors in trying to be a university. If wealth and opportunity come to it let it become a university if it so desires; but first of all let it be true to its students, and not pretend to give them what it knows it cannot give well. In selecting a professor or an instructor let it seek "first a man and next a man to teach." Everywhere the cry of the world is for *men*, and so it has been and will be always.

In the social training of men the large American university never can compete with the so-called small college; unless the college deliberately determines to have it so. A large number of students means social exclusiveness on the one hand, and on the other an ever-increasing number of men, the unaffiliated (because there are not enough undergraduate organizations to go round), who go through college with absolutely no social training.

The fact that a college is small makes it possible for teacher and students to know each other in a way that is impossible where the number of students is large. In the training of men to say something well the small college has every advantage possessed by the great university; for it is not fine buildings, large libraries, or great laboratories, that give a man the power to express his ideas clearly and forcefully. He can be

taught these things in college only through the teacher. It is the chief business of the governing powers of the college to provide the teacher who is a man and who can really teach.

The small college has no reason to be discouraged. Its future is full of hope. On this point, in concluding this article, we can do no better than to quote from the concluding paragraph of Mr. Corbin's book: "The merit of the large colleges [American] is that those fortunately placed in them gain greater familiarity with the ways of the world and of men, while for those who wish it, they offer more advanced instruction—the instruction characteristic of German universities. But to the increasing number of undergraduates who are not fortunately placed, their very size is the source of unhappiness; and for those undergraduates who wish anything else than scientific instruction, their virtues become merely a detriment. It is for this reason that many wise parents still prefer to intrust the education of their sons to the small colleges. These small colleges possess many of the virtues of the English universities; they train the mind and cultivate it, and at the same time develop the social man."

IV.

TRUTH AND EXPERIENCE.

REV. GEO. B. SMITH, KUTZTOWN, PA.

There is convincing evidence, at the present time, from all sides of a great desire for knowledge. This desire has never before, in the history of human strivings after truth, been more intense and all-consuming. The spirit of man can truthfully and conscientiously join with the psalmist of old in singing to the glory of God, "The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up." In a general way this is true of all persons in all walks of life. The almost universal cry is for truth. The heart desires to know for it desires to believe, to hope and to love. Nor is this desire satisfied with a simple introduction to existing realities, nor even with a bare acquaintance with the things of the universe and of life. Mere acquaintance is not knowledge. To be brought face to face with phenomena is not to know phenomena, much less the source of them. The soul of man cannot rest until it has come to the possession and enjoyment of the light of truth, until it rests in a perfect knowledge of God and His truth.

In this mighty effort towards knowledge man is but true to tendencies and requirements that are inherent in his own nature. The desire to know, the effort to know, yea, the being ill-at-ease till he does know, are characteristics which are very becoming to man. They are the products of a natural growth under the benign influences of cultivation. They actually belong to man's nature; they form a part and parcel of his spiritual constitution. An expression of satisfaction with ignorance, or even with imperfect knowledge of truth, would be an injustice to human nature, a serious harm to humanity and a grave insult against the perfect God. The man who appreciates, in any measure, the intellectual, moral, and spir-

itual gifts he possesses potentially through the love of the Infinite Father, will not be satisfied until he can truly call these his own because of real and actual possession. In the various spheres of lower creations even, we may easily see the value and need of light. Even here it is the condition not only of growth but also of life. The plant turns towards the light; the tree grows towards it; the animal can not do without it. In a far deeper sense may we say that man is created for the light, not only for the natural, but also for the intellectual, moral and spiritual. He has the powers to perceive, to understand, and to know. Christians are by St. Paul declared Children of the Light. To them is given the ability to see and to know the truth within and without, and also the God of all truth.

This unmistakable yearning in the soul of mankind for truth is one of the most promising signs of the present age. This is an indication and a prophecy of blessed results in the future. Of all the incidents in the New Testament there is none so applicable to present day conditions nor so illustrative of present day longings as the opening of the eyes of the blind beggar along the way side. There is no petition that embodies so beautifully and well the cry and inner longing of the present generation as the earnest appeal of this blind Bartimæus, "Lord, that I may receive my sight." This has become the daily prayer of an innumerable multitude of sincere and earnest souls. The search after truth, the effort to deepen and widen our knowledge of reality, has been made the sacred business of an unnumbered host. When Bishop Butler was yet a young man and had just begun to study divinity, he wrote to a theologian, "I design the search after truth as the business of my life." What this young man said nearly two centuries ago to express his own individual feeling, may be heard to-day from many a lip, and may be found unuttered in still more hearts.

But now we are met with the serious question, How do we know? This is the modern query, and however much we may

try, it is impossible to escape it. At every turn we are asked how do we know the great facts, the mighty realities of the universe and of life? how do I come to a knowledge of God who is the source and content of reality; in other words, what is the way unto God, unto a knowledge of Him and His truth?

The modern answer to this question seems to be *the way of experience*. Experience is the royal path unto knowledge, unto truth. What we can experience ourselves, can be known by us, and what we can not experience ourselves, can not be known by us. The trans-empirical must necessarily be beyond our ken. It is one of the articles of the Kantian philosophy that of a trans-empirical God we can know nothing. Kant's dictum is true beyond a doubt. But is it true that the Father of all men is beyond and does not enter into their living experiences? Is not that a true knowledge of God which we attain by the interpretation of the natural, moral and spiritual realities around and within us? Surely we may know God from the great realities of life, for what are these realities but the forms of expression of the very being and life of God. This is revelation. This is the way of God disclosing Himself to man in terms of human life and experience. Every new experience is a new revelation, for what is *revelation* from the side of God is *experience* from the side of man.

This great fact the theologians for a long time were slow to recognize and slower still to appreciate. For a considerable period the experimental was considered a foe, rather than a friend, to the cause of truth. The way of experience was hissed from the stage of human strivings after truth. 'There are some even at the present day who become irritated to the very core by the mere mention of the term. Anything that smacks of experience must not be tolerated for it is unbiblical and unchristian; it is misleading to say the least. Their reason for such attitude is readily apparent. There was a time when the advocates of this way unto God and truth put forth false claims for it. Even to-day we find such whose minds seem to be full of nonsensical and unreasonable notions

about it. There is a wide difference to be recognized between a spasmodic nervous excitement on the one hand and a continued experience on the other: the former is characterized by its lack of the rational, the latter by its full possession of reason. And there is no doubt as to the fact that this way of rational experience is the way by which knowledge of God and His righteousness is attained. The scientist and the modern theologian are of one mind on this point, and consequently have given each other the hand of mutual interest and peace. The scientist makes account of the work done by his brother, the theologian, and the theologian, in turn, uses the material furnished him by the arduous efforts of the man of science. Say what we will, we can not deny that the old time enmity and hatred, that existed for so long a time between these two classes, and were the source of much confusion and trouble, are things of the past. The sword is sheathed; the hatchet is buried. It is truth we are after; it is knowledge of reality we are seeking, and it matters not who brings it or from what section of God's universe it comes, just so we may grow more enlightened and better in its presence.

This way unto truth, sanctioned and trodden by scientists and theologians alike, is not a new way, in the sense of having never before existed. It dates from the beginning of God's self-revealing activity. Nor is it possible to be otherwise for the Infinite can and does really disclose himself only in terms of finite life. Life is the light of the world. This is the law now, it has been the law of the past, and it will be the law of the future. Let us try to follow this law as it operated in parts of that divine revelation which came through what is known as "a selected line of life," through God's chosen people. In the light of this principle what must be said of the moral code of the Old Dispensation? Were its laws delivered into the hands of Moses, ready made, all at one time and in a miraculous way? or are we to conceive of them as the product of a progressive interpretation of the great events and experiences in the history of the Hebrew nation? We have a right

to suppose that these historical occurrences acted as sacred stimuli upon the receptive soul of the lawgiver who, because of the superior development of his own moral nature, could trace out for these people the will of the righteous God. Every one of the laws of God as delivered by Moses has been contained in principle in his own nature, in the divine image in which he was made, and all that was necessary was a living contact with the realities of life to unfold his nature so that its hidden principles might take on outward form. The moral being of the creature can not be different in kind from the moral being of the Creator in whose image the creature is formed, nor can the requirements of the Creator be different in kind from those that are demanded and commended by human nature itself. Moses expressed his own will to the people and through it also God's will, for, if it were possible for Moses to commend the tendencies and longings of his own nature when at its best, he had a perfect right to the conviction that the same tendencies and longings are characteristic, though in an infinite measure, of his Creator and God. He could write with propriety and truth over the whole realm of law as delivered by him, "God spake all these words."

This very law is also clearly evident from the work of the prophets. How did these old preachers and teachers get to a knowledge of what they again taught as the secret counsel and will of God? They were students and it was by hard application that they came to possess the truth of the living God. No one would say of these prophets that they passed their time away, idly and leisurely, in the shadow of some terebinth, or in the crevices of rocks while they waited for the appearance of some special theophany. They were close students of the realities of life. Theophanies were all around them. The God within them recognized and knew the God without. They heard His voice in nature, in history and in life. For them also the way of life and experience was the way unto God and His righteousness. And what shall we say of the greatest of all prophets, Jesus of Nazareth. In Him we have the highest

and best revelation of God. The fullness of God dwelled in Him; hence He could perceive and reveal the fullness of divine life and truth. Human nature in its entirety becomes perfect in Christ, the divine image in man receives its finest expression in Him who is called the "express image of God." Humanity and divinity are one in Jesus, so that "no one knoweth the Son save the Father, and no one knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whom soever the son willeth to reveal Him," Jesus is, therefore, the Ideal Man and as such "must be the perfect representation of God." And out of the depths of His own nature and experience He saw into the very heart of His Father. Hence to know Christ is to know the Father also. He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.

It seems plain enough that the revelation of God, that the knowledge of truth, as we find these in the Bible came in terms of human life; that the rich and manifold experiences of the holy men of old led them into the inmost sanctuary of all truth. But are we led into this same holy of holies by the same or by a different way? Are we dependent solely upon the experiences of past generations for our knowledge of God, or does He continue to reveal Himself to us through our own life? Does the Heavenly Father still disclose Himself as of old? Dr. Adolf Bolliger, professor of theology in Basel, in a book entitled "The Way unto God for our Generation," writes that years ago on a Sunday after Whitsuntide he heard the message from a certain pulpit: "Gott hat einst zu Abraham und den Propheten geredet. Aber yetzt schweigt er. Ya, Gott schweigt." The Doctor makes the following comment on the message: "Diese Todesnachricht war mir recht betrübend: glücklichlicherweise wusste ich, dass Gott heute so deutlich redet als ye in den Prophetentagen, un dasz es nur an den Ohren fehlt." God is not dead but He lives and He speaks as the eternally living. We may hear His voice and know His truth like men of old. The whole universe is one grand revelation of the ever-living Father, and man himself is the grandest of all His revelations. W. P. Merrill observes this fact when he

says: "God makes himself known through human lives and thoughts. He sends men to their own natures to find the picture of the divine." It is impossible, it seems, to get away from the fact that God always has been, is and always will be a living, speaking, working, revealing God. And as man's nature develops, and his experiences deepen and broaden, will he know truth better and love God more?

But in view of all this what of the Bible? What place does it fill in man's effort after truth? This makes way for the other question, What is the Bible? No longer do we regard the Bible as a miraculously prepared and given book. It contains the record of real human experiences. It conveys to generations a knowledge of God attained through human life. Dr. Abbott says, "The Bible is the record of the experiences of devout men struggling toward that knowledge of God which is life Eternal. Devout men are struggling to-day for the same prize. Like Jacob of old they are wrestling and would not let go until a blessing has been bestowed—the blessing of a wider and a deeper knowledge of the divine." In this struggle after truth the Bible truly has its place. It is to help us to the interpretation of our own experiences. The Holy Scriptures are not the end but means to the end. Through the work of higher criticism, says Dr. Gordon, "the Bible has been reduced from the position of Master to that of servant; and this reduction from a false eminence is in the interest of its permanent influence." The importance of the Bible to religious knowledge has never been more emphasized. "For work, the Bible is mightier than ever." Jesus Christ, who is the central figure around whom the contents of Scripture revolve, must always remain the Great Teacher of mankind, guiding and inspiring them in their blessed work of knowing the Father. Man is placed in the great laboratory of nature and life, there, under the guiding hand of the great Master, to discover for himself so that he himself may know and possess the truth. Such acquisition by man is real knowledge, for it is the product of his mental activity. Knowledge means struggle and effort. In

an address to the students of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published in the *Outlook* March 8, 1902, President Henry S. Pritchett declares: "We know truth when we reach it of our own effort and make it our truth. The politics and the religion which a man inherits, without thinking and without effort, count little toward his political and spiritual development." Bishop Spalding also must have had in mind the same fact when he drew his fine distinction between *learning* and *knowledge*. He says, "Learning is acquaintance with what others have felt, thought and done; knowledge is the result of what we ourselves have felt, thought, and done." And in our own Church, in our own seminary from no less a scholar than Dr. William Rupp we have the following observation upon certain principles of the philosophy of knowledge: "We only know what we have learned to know by our own mental activity."

In view of such representative observations what must be said of much that passes under the name of knowledge of God, of truth and righteousness? Do we really know God, have we a real knowledge of His love when we passively accept what the writers of the Bible present to us? Would this not be mere learning, an acquaintance with what others have felt, thought and done? We question not their knowledge nor our learning but our knowledge. As an illustration let us take St. John's profound statement that God is Love. John knew it and it was inspiring knowledge too. He knew it out of the depths of his own experience. Trained as he was in the light and fellowship of the Perfect Life, seeing as he did the streams of love issuing from the completed human nature, and conscious of the mighty stirrings of love within his own bosom, the Apostle could well know that the Fountain which maketh possible such a condition must also be love—Infinite Love. For us to know that John knew, it is not enough that we be able to repeat what the Apostle said. Such parrot-like ability is not knowledge. Not until we ourselves have loved and thus given expression to the most commendable element in the whole

nature of man, may we claim that God whose image we bear is Love. In this way the Bible becomes a true *Authority* for mankind, for I know its truth through my own nature and experience. The man who thus finds a way unto truth entertains no fears for the Bible. He stands convinced that its truths are everlasting. That there are errors in its contents must be expected, for all human efforts are imperfect and liable to mistakes. But we know that, while its errors may be sought out and destroyed, the word of God in the Bible will endure and last. We might just as well attempt to destroy human nature as to attempt to destroy the Word of God. Heaven and earth shall pass away but my Word shall not pass away. For it is written upon something more indestructible than the printed page; it is graven in living characters upon the very nature of man.

This nature of man has been unfolding itself through the ages of the past and will continue to do so throughout the future. And with every advance in this unfolding process will man become conscious of more and greater truths. As our capacities enlarge so will our knowledge of the Highest increase. The recognition of this law means a growing conception of truth, a theology that is not dead but alive, that itself grows and is never fixed, that is willing to modify itself and advance with the progress of thought. As the God in us grows, so will we recognize and know the God out of us. The German philosopher and poet, Goethe, presents this truth very beautifully when he says: "The eye must itself be sunny that would see the sun." The amount of truth we may possess is determined by the capacity in us for it. Along this line we may, therefore, have no difficulty in conclusion to join with Newman Smyth in what he says in his recent book, "Through Science to Faith." In the concluding remarks of the second chapter of his book he says: "As Christian history progresses and religious experience broadens, not only on the one hand is the truth more largely brought to light, but also Christian hearts and minds may be selected and formed, and still more

finely trained to perceive it and to become bright in it. In accordance with the first principles of natural revelation, spiritual revelation, the manifestation of supernal truth to the spirit that is in man, has never ceased, and it shall continue to increase until the full day shall come. The Church as the centuries pass may gain a more seeing eye, a truer mind and a happier heart, for the ever-enlarging manifestation of redeeming Love; until at last there may be found on earth the pure heart for the vision of God."

V.

HIGHER CRITICISM.*

BY REV. DR. JACOB COOPER.

The term "Higher Criticism" has lately become notorious as the designation of a system whose methods would destroy the Bible and with it all supernatural religion. It proceeds upon the principle that there is nothing settled as to the sacred text except what each critic determines from his inner consciousness ought to be true, and therefore there is no plenary inspiration save what he himself possesses. There is here a free fight where every man's hand is against his fellow. As in the retreat of the Midianites the hostile forces are fighting each other; but if, in the meantime, they can destroy the Bible, there will be no basis for a supernatural religion, and of course no need for any defenders.

There are several curious phases of this critical system. The most prominent is the confidence of each critic that "he knows it all," and therefore nothing is left for any other to know or do. They are the men and wisdom will die with them. It never enters their thoughts that they could be mistaken or that any one else could be right. Like Descartes when seeking a solid basis for Philosophy who doubts everything except that he thinks, so they doubt everything save their own thoughts. Of the infallibility of these they are convinced, but on their principles nothing else is settled. The uniformity of nature's laws, the Pythagorean Demonstration,

* The following article is published with the understanding that, as in other cases, the editors are not responsible either for its matter or spirit. The REVIEW is open to articles of opposite views on all subjects of present interest, provided they are free from personalities. We shall be glad now to publish articles either from or in behalf of the Higher Critics.—Eds. R. C. R.

Newton's Binomial Theorem, and the Multiplication Table must pass through the fires of higher criticism.

Another phase is the irreverent manner they deal with the Sacred Text. It is to be treated just as any other book. They take for granted that it is not a supernatural revelation—a clear case of *petitio principii*. It deserves no reverence as the accredited Word of God, the palladium of the Church on earth, and the basis of all civilization. These critics question not only whether God has spoken, but if He could, or would speak: determining for Him both the necessity of a message, and the kind to be sent. In any case the message is not to be received with docility, nor the methods of its deliverance handled with reverence. The Book, its Author, its message, and its use are all called in question. As the culprit is found guilty in advance there really seems, on the critic's assumption, no need for a trial!

There is a legitimate criticism. But in order for there to be such we must admit in advance that there is something to be criticised that has a reality, and will leave some residuum after passing through the alembic. It is said that the investigators in any science should have no predilections but let the facts speak for themselves. Here is the crucial test of a genuine inquirer. If he expects to find nothing he will not waste his time nor allow himself to be disappointed. The agnostic, whether in science, philosophy, or religion, comes not with a prejudice for, but against, the reality of his subject.

Is there then a genuine criticism? Yes, and there is a common sense as well. It is not enough to know the minutiae of grammar and be able to decipher palæography to constitute a judge of the genuineness and meaning of a writing. As a proof it is enough to advert to the discrepancies between the judgments of those who consider themselves most skilled. Common sense must admit that in dealing with the Bible there have been scholars as learned, minds as brilliant, and spirits as honest who believed in constructive criticism as those who find their pleasure in destruction. The former handled the

word of God with reverence; and with painstaking care transmitted it to us as a message bearing proofs of genuineness in its letter, and certifying to its truth by the effect it has had on the destiny of the world. The temper of the critic makes all difference. Every true inquirer is reverential. God has left marks of Himself in the natural world for those who have eyes to see. So in this Word He has spoken to those who have ears to hear. In either case if the inquirer approaches his subject with doubt he will neither see nor hear.

That there is a genuine criticism of all writing whether contemporaneous or past, is true. That there is a higher criticism will depend upon the abilities and temper of the critic. There are all grades of sagacity in the discernment of truth and the skill of interpreting its expression. But the term as currently used is arrogated by those whose methods are only destructive. Their invasion of the field of inquiry is that of a hostile army swooping down upon an enemy's country, not for conquering a peace but for devastating a people; not to show how much ought to be saved, but how much can be destroyed, so that if possible the whole may be depopulated.

We have a Book which purports to come from God. This fact is asserted on every page, and has been accepted by all who have been instrumental in building up the church, Jewish or Christian. It has been the basis of action, the equipment offensive and defensive in advancing the world's civilization. All that is now worth retaining in human progress, in morality theoretical or practical, can be traced to it directly or indirectly. To-day it is the exponent of the ideas and moral forces which rule the whole civilized world. We repeat. This Book purports to come from God; that it is directly inspired by His wisdom, and for the specific purpose of being an infallible guide. It claims to be a light shining in a dark place; and to point out a path so plain that a wayfaring man—the man wearily making his way through the trials and privations of this life—shall not err though he be a fool. For the ignorant as well as the learned—the former more because of his greater

numbers and needs, must have an infallible guide. He can not be a higher critic, and they must not darken or destroy his faith. Now as the Book claims infallibility and direct inspiration for itself, this claim is either true or false.

It is well to put such cases to the logical test of Contradiction and the Excluded Middle. The claim of the Book for itself makes the higher critic a false prophet, while if he be true in his destructive criticism the Book itself is false; not in one part but in all. Be honest, higher critic, here, if you can not be anywhere else. Speak out what is evidently in your minds, even if it deprive you of your vantage ground to stab the mother who bore you. Speak out though it deprive you of your official honors and the salaries attached to the defenders of Scriptural truth, not to its destroyers. If actuated only by honesty—"my lady does protest too much"—and love of truth as you profess, leave Oxford and Leyden, Andover and Union. Go out from the evangelical preserve and consort with Paine and Ingersoll, with Strauss and Hume, where you manifestly belong, and fight the Bible which you as evidently hate, standing outside the ramparts which it has built for its defence. Where you now persist in remaining for your own material advantage, you are doing more harm to the Church than they have ever done, or you could possibly do if with them. If you have any shame you should scorn to live from the contributions of those who hoped in this way to support the faith which you are doing your worst to overthrow.

It is easy to assume the high ground of mere truth seekers, and here the higher criticism claims a monopoly. But it should allow the authors of the Bible to be as sincere and truthful. The Book was written by some one who asserted that he was inspired. He said that God gave him the message. His life was a testimony to its truth. The effect which the message had on its own and subsequent ages is a voucher. This Book became the rallying cry, the nucleus of a body of believers, and the creed for a church. A polity was founded upon it. The legation of Moses, the greatest of all the codes of the world,

was formulated, was put in operation and has continued in its effects; growing constantly in influence among all civilized peoples. For it has affected directly or indirectly the codes of all enlightened nations. Such a code would from the first be guarded with vigilance. The necessary historical setting would be narrated, and would give and receive light from it. Contemporary history so far as it was influenced by, or came in touch with, such a system would testify to its genuineness.

We have all these collateral proofs in corroboration as far as the conditions of the case would warrant. There were reasons in the isolation of the Jewish people for few outside references. But no Book was ever watched over with such care as the Jewish, and their continuance, the Christian Scriptures by the natural conservators. Those men who wrote down the revelation first were presumably as honest as even the higher critics profess to be. The librarian under whose custody this Book of Books was kept, venerated it almost to idolatry. To lay violent hands upon, to mutilate, to change in a dot on the smallest letter were sacrilege. Hence the manuscripts were copied with scrupulous exactness.

This same spirit has watched over them till the time of higher criticism, which has shown the first example of all the ages to tamper purposely with the text. No book has ever been so revered, so carefully guarded and so free from the inevitable imperfections and errors which attach to anything that passes through human hands.

That this Book has remained intact is clear from several facts. Early versions as the Septuagint of the Old Testament, the Coptic, Syrian and many others of the New Testament show not a single essential variation from the text as we now possess it. Copies were preserved in sacred places, guarded as we have seen with most religious vigilance. The localities where these were kept were wide apart, so that for ages they would not be collated. The rare intercourse between many of these localities would prevent such a comparison, as well as a factitious correspondence between different codices. In this

connection we must notice the importance of Tischendorf's discoveries at Sinai. The copies of the Scriptures in the monastery in this remote locality had, in all probability, been isolated a thousand years. Hence they may be looked upon as an independent testimony. They confirm what is called the received text founded upon that of the great editor Stephens, in nearly every case where supposed discrepancies had been discovered; and establish by the strongest confirmatory proof many passages which had been considered doubtful. And it should ever be kept in view that the tendency of all newly discovered MS. proof has been to confirm, not to break down, the evidence for the substantial, or even complete agreement between the different codices. This would be wonderful if one only considered the diverse times of writing and the places of preserving the Sacred Record.

But the result is that there is such unanimity in the testimony of these different witnesses that not a single doctrine, not a single essential fact in the historical setting of the books has been invalidated. On the contrary, the evidence is cumulative and constantly increasing, both in the strictly literary and critical side for the substantial accuracy of the books; just as it is on the side of experience from the influence on human character. Slight discrepancies in testimony before a court of justice is confirmatory, rather than weakening for the establishment of a fact. Perfect agreement even in trivial particulars points to collusion between witnesses. Variations in the statement of trivial circumstances are often not capable of explanation, even at the time of their occurrence. We have a notable example in regard to a writing of our own day. Did Mr. Lincoln write his Gettysburg speech on a scrap of paper held on his knee, during his journey from Washington to the battlefield? Did he hold this in his hand while he spoke from memory? Was the speech written at all before he spoke it, and did he hold a paper in his hand while delivering this address? All these things are matters of dispute among those who were present on that memorable occasion. Yet none of these dis-

crepancies affects in the least the integrity of this greatest speech of the world's history. All agree that Mr. Lincoln made this speech, and the variations of the irrelevant matters only confirm more strongly the certainty of the vital fact. Subsequent inquiries will ratify this judgment, both on the ground that all present asserted the fact; and also because no other man of this or any other age could have made this speech. So men may argue as to the genuineness of the Sacred Books. The trivial discrepancies from what we judge ought to have been done by the actors, or slight variations of statement by the narrators of the same past act; or in prophecies touching future events, do not affect the leading facts and doctrines except to confirm them. Besides, many of the discrepancies may be factitious or entirely of our own concocting.

Again. What right have these self-appointed conservators of the Divine Message—which according to their system does not exist—to arrogate to themselves the special ability to determine whether there has been a revelation at all; and if so, what God ought to say? Are they more learned than such as have maintained the integrity of the Bible? Henry Stephens was undoubtedly the best Greek scholar that ever lived. He knew more Greek than Plato or Aristarchus, than Aristotle or Longinus. He was steeped in the very spirit, the thought, and language of this people. If ever a man knew by intuition what an author wished to say it was he. With a mind of the subtlest acuteness, with industry that knew no rest or weariness, with the best advantages possible from childhood up under his nearly equal father, he was equipped as no other man for criticism founded on common sense. This quality so lacking in the modern higher criticism he possessed in an eminent degree and it enabled him to apply his very great learning so as to grasp the truth. This edition of the Greek New Testament is his *chef d'œuvre* of critical skill; and is the basis, along with that of Erasmus—who was a worthy compeer—of all subsequent editions.

Three hundred years later Tischendorf, the ablest of all MS. readers that have ever lived, aided by the progress of those busy centuries and adding to this by unrivaled acumen and skill has given us a text which is as far beyond the reach of higher criticism as his knowledge was above their shallow and pretentious egotism. So in the labors of the long line of learned rabbis from Gamaliel to the Kimchis; in the Complutensian, Parisian, and Walton polyglots; in the critical knowledge aided by common sense of the Buxtorfs, van der Hooght, Hahn and Fürst, we have a codex of the Hebrew Bible as nearly accurate as human skill can preserve anything committed to its charge.

But the higher criticism overthrows all this work. With smaller knowledge but greater pretension; claiming greater honesty but desiring to be paid for it at the highest price in the professional market; with a zeal for the Church displayed by trying to prove that this has no Divine warrant—they approach their task of mutilation. When Isaiah falls into their hands he fares as would the living body of a Recamier in the sacrilegious atmosphere of a dissecting room. They dissect a sacred writer with a butcher's cleaver, and place the *dissecta membra* apart, head and feet with no trunk between them. For were they not present at the Divine Council and know better than the prophet what he ought to predict? They approach their subject with full knowledge as to whether man needs a revelation or not. And if he needs one, what kind? And if a revelation is to be made will God give it; and in what way, place, and time?

Nay more. They think miracles doubtful; and therefore the first question is whether a supernatural religion is possible. Warming up, or freezing up, with their subject, they doubt whether any revelation has been made. And from this the transition is easy: Whether there is a God to make it? That this is the inevitable outcome of this unholy tampering with the Sacred Scriptures is plain from such examples as Strauss and Bruno Bauer. The fundamental conception with which

they approach their subject is that the revelation we have is a fraud, since it pretends to be what it is not. Hence having no reverence for it they recklessly mutilate. They subject it to the caprices of human reason and proceed to show what it should be on their own principles. They say that a particular book cannot belong to the period to which it refers because of its style. They then inform us what its style ought to be by their own critical taste, than which nothing could be more uncertain. For the style of some writers is wholly diverse from the age in which they live. Witness Pascal, Carlyle, or Walt Whitman. Another's style is fitted for any age of the world. Among classic writers Plato preëminently, and Cicero following after. A chapter of Plato's Republic might, so far as style is concerned, have been written by Bacon or Gladstone. It would be difficult to distinguish Milton's Areopagitica from a treatise by Aristotle; and Demosthenes on the Crown sounds like a speech by Webster or Lincoln. Some writers are never new, and therefore never old. They possess the freshness of perpetual manhood.

While there may be a general spirit of the age and a *usus loquendi* at a particular period, yet there are so many diversities in this respect, that it is utterly impossible to fix a dividing line and say precisely where such an author belongs. Especially is this true if the period be long remote. For if each author is affected largely by the spirit of his age in the formation of his style, then the higher critic can not place himself back two thousand years, and say what should be the writer's style. He attempts to do himself what he denies is possible for another: thus showing that while professing himself to be wise he has proved himself a fool. For higher criticism undertakes to demonstrate who was the author of a book now, after thousands of years, better than the contemporaries; to tell how much of the book, if any, was written by the reputed author; how much by some one else; how much in one age, and how much in another.

The latest attempt we have is the pretentious undertaking by Haupt. This cuts the several books of the Bible into their supposed constituents; assigns the author and age to a nicety by various devices of coloring. This has given an appropriate name to this stupendous folly, "The Rainbow Bible." Haupt could undoubtedly tell who made the pen for the author of Isaiah, and from whose goose the quill was taken. Driver could name the man who owned the goat whose skin formed the parchment; and Briggs is cock sure, as in everything else, whether *Moses Cohen* or *Isaac Ben Lazarus* sold the ink. Such a work is a roaring farce, and makes laughter hold both its sides. The nine little tailors of this garment of many colors, we dare assert, could not look each other in the face without doing, as Cicero said of the Roman augurs when they met—laugh in secret each at the other's trifling! This is the most portentous nonsense that ever was enacted by man under the name of scholarship. This Bible will be a curiosity in the centuries to come, when stumbled upon among the rubbish in the store room of some great library, like the toys with which Babylonian children played, or the wampum by which the noble red man estimated his wealth. The impossibility of now fixing the date and authorship if it could not be done by contemporaries, or they meant to deceive, is demonstrable to common sense; and were not criticism run mad and delivered over to strong delusions, such a manifest absurdity could not be entertained.

But the attempt to decide authoritatively against portions of the same writer is equally futile. For if a man desires to conceal his authorship he can succeed even in his own generation. This was shown in the cases of *Epistolæ Obscurorum virorum*, *Eikon Basilike*, and Junius' Letters, whose authors have never been absolutely determined. The style of the same author differs not only in different periods of his own life, but in the same book. In the short compass of the *Phædrus*, Plato employs three distinct and well-defined styles. He equals the fury of Sapphō or the burning intensity of Heliodorus in

depicting love; the calm sagacity of Longinus in criticising the orator Lysias' style, and the depth of his own genius in describing analysis and synthesis. It would not be possible to find greater varieties in diction between the earlier and later chapters of Isaiah than in this brief and confessedly genuine Dialogue of Plato. And where can there be found a more intensely marked difference than in the strictly narrative portions of Thucydides and his speeches, not in different books of his history, but in the same book? The style of the speeches is as stately and difficult as Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; while the narrative is as simple and clear as Macaulay's History on Irving's Sketch Book.

Almost equally great varieties of diction may be found in Bacon's Essays and his *Sylva Sylvarum*. And, what is strange in his case and a few other very great minds, he was flowery and ornate in old age and plain almost to baldness in youth. This may be seen also in Gladstone's writings. His first work, Church and State, written before he was thirty, was severely dignified and plain. His last writing, connected with his editorial work on Butler's Analogy, contains criticisms on Matthew Arnold and others both playful and sparkling. No greater discrepancy is there between the style of the ninetyeth Psalm or the twenty-eighth of Job, and Ecclesiastes, though by different authors, than there is between Shakespeare's Hamlet or Macbeth and his sonnets. Instances might be multiplied to any extent to show that authors allow themselves the greatest latitude of expression, depending on their subject and audience—sometimes, no doubt, on the mood which happened to control them at a particular time. And yet higher criticism undertakes with no misgivings as to its infallible skill, to deftly dissect the Bible, to articulate its parts on a new system of comparative anatomy; and construct a monster with its tail growing out of its dewlap, and its eyes in the middle of its stomach!

This method of criticising has also been applied to the classic authors. It was the guiding spirit of Wolf and his followers; primarily in the treatment of the Homeric poems,

but was extended to embrace all the classic authors. From the fact that its spirit and methods if consistently carried out would leave nothing but a *caput mortuum*, it justly won the name "Destructive Criticism." With the same confidence of infallibility each critic was guided solely by his inner consciousness which determined what must be genuine and what must be spurious. While Homer and Herodotus seemed special objects of enmity, the doubting spirit spread until it attacked every writer, and threatened to make a clean sweep of all classical literature. "Herodotus swarmed with errors; a pleasant story-teller but having no more historical accuracy than Munchausen or any other professed romancer." But the excavations in Babylon, Nineveh, and Egypt have since proved the substantial accuracy of every statement in relation to these places; and the more contemporary proof is exhumed and deciphered, the greater the correspondence with this author even in minutiae. His assertion, as well as that of Homer, of the existence of pygmies in Africa—a statement at one time overwhelmed with ridicule—has been confirmed by Livingstone and other scientific travellers, including missionaries now on the ground.

But higher criticism run mad was exemplified by Nietzsche in his treatment of Homer. With the well-known infallibility of inner consciousness he wrote a book of 600 pages to prove, first that the Iliad and Odyssey were not by the same author, and secondly that the entire poems are a sort of crazy quilt. He professed himself able to show the exact small squares and figures; where they were joined; by whom composed; in what age—just as Haupt does with the Hebrew Scriptures. After proving all this to his own complete satisfaction, his inner consciousness has a new revelation, twenty years afterward, in another equally bulky volume. In this second deliverance it tells him that his previous conclusions were all wrong, and he proceeds to refute himself in every particular; thus showing not only the worthlessness of his judgment, but the essential viciousness of the whole principle

on which such criticism is based. The folly of the Homeric critics in the case of Nitzsche conspicuously refuted itself. The common sense of Mure, Gladstone, Schliemann, and Grote again prevails, and has buried the doleful rubbish of destructive criticism applied to the classics, beyond resurrection. The same would happen with this work when applied to the Bible if it were not for the natural hostility of our corrupt nature against that which reproves it. Men love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil. Hence higher criticism wishes to throw discredit on every evidence of supernatural religion whose indispensable assumptions are the ignorance and helplessness of men, and therefore the need of an infallible guide.

The amount of folly which has paraded under the name of criticism can not be estimated. It is a perishable sort of freight which spoils before it can be used. Each huckster has his own kind of wares which are in his estimation the embodiment of all wisdom. The effort seems to be not to unfold the purpose of the writer—for even a sacred author should be allowed a purpose as well as any other, but to say some new thing. This is generally to tell what the critic thinks the writer ought to mean according to the preconceived standard of criticism, not what a man inspired of God declares to be his purpose to utter. But if the critic's idea were the standard there could be no revelation. For the essential conception of the supernatural is that it transcends human ability; that it is something which man unaided could not find out, else there had been no need of a revelation from God. If we carefully examine the works of the higher critics we find that they all measure the divine communication by the standard of their own power exclusively; thus superseding the necessity of a revelation. The forerunner of what should be called destructive criticism, but which its authors call "scientific interpretation," is the "Wolfenbüttel Fragments" which were attributed to Lessing as their author or godfather. This set the keynote, and was followed by a crowd of German commentators, such

as Paulus, Kuinoel, Bauer, Strauss, and when these had been shelved and relegated to the limbo of library dust and book-worms in Germany, they were resuscitated in England and America. And as the real authors had long since been forgotten, their works were palmed off on the English-speaking public as the sublime efforts of the present generation of higher critics. But the "Fragments" published through Lessing continue the microbe which generates much of the nonsense now written under the pretentious name of criticism. An example from Kuinoel may be given as a type of all such interpretation. The miracle of the sudden death of Ananias and Sapphira receives its elucidation by reference to the violent temper of Peter. The apostle was so enraged at their falsehood that he put a quietus on them by knocking them on the head, and then gave out that the Holy Ghost had stopped their lying breath. Of course when such liberty is taken the work of exegesis is made short and easy. There is nothing supernatural, not even the lying of the sacred writers, because their temper is mirrored in that of the critic. He can see nothing wrong in representing the Revelation of the God of truth as resting upon a false assumption of infallibility. Of this the writers are fully conscious, but desire the pious fraud to continue in order to give employment to higher criticism in detecting and exposing it *for a moneyed consideration!*

What is the legitimate effect upon those who themselves are trying to prove that there is no Supernatural in Revelation? And what will be the result on the Christian world if these views are accepted by the people at large? Surely the effect in both ways must be disastrous. The critic tries to persuade himself that he is actuated by the highest sense of honesty; that he is in quest of truth for truth's sake. Nothing is so easy as self deception, especially if the desire of fame be the inspiration. It is difficult to get a great name in a legitimate way. There can be but few really distinguished scholars, as there can be few preëminent names in any walk of life. Hence the insidious craze for factitious reputation, and the tempta-

tion to take a short cut to fame. Honest fortunes are rarely built up in a brief time. Supreme talents and skill in dealing with the forces of nature, or in the direction of others' labor may enable a favored few to become rich both honestly and quickly. The same principle holds good everywhere. The scholar of meagre equipment desires to become famous, but has not the ability to do this in a legitimate way. He is bent on high position at all hazards, and takes the shorter way to fame.

For such a character to be notorious is much the same as to gain notoriety. He adopts the course of the young Athenian politician. This youth discovered that the quickest way to succeed was by attacking a statesman of established reputation, but who had enemies, as every man of distinction will have in a country ruled by parties. He brought an infamous charge against a statesman who had spent his life in his country's service, but who had necessarily made enemies among bad men whom he had thwarted. These will gladly join in the hue and cry raised by the baser sort, and *presto*, the young demagogue is on the crest of popular favor among the enemies of honest government. Precisely so with the ambitious critic. He has neither the brains nor the learning to raise him above mediocrity; and when he discovers this he casts about for means to become famous at the expense of venerable beliefs and well established truths. Plato uttered this weighty sentence: *οὐ χालεπὸν ἀμφισβῆσαι*. To find fault requires the least ability of all callings. To discover a flaw in a picture, to point out a defect in a landscape, may be done by the most ignorant and tasteless. No human character, except the Ideal Man, is faultless; and therefore the best of men are open to hostile criticism. The scent of the vulture is keen, and perceiving the dead body from afar, the scavenger passes over all the splendors of the fields and woods. He lights upon the carcass which festers in the ravine where it has fallen to death; and in his savory repast is oblivious of the grand scenery on all sides. So the critic scents his cates, and lights upon his

chosen sustenance. There is nothing perfect when it has passed through human instrumentality; and hence when a revelation is made from God, as it comes to men it must be conveyed through human means, and be subject to their limitations.

The critic finds his sphere in lighting upon what he considers defects. He can make himself notorious at short notice by pointing these out to the enemies of religion. At first he may think his motive is only truth; that he is doing God service by calling attention to errors which have crept into the revelation of His will, and that the sacred record will only shine the brighter when freed from its defects. The love of truth is foisted into the place of thirst for fame, and the critic now sees his course plain before him. The infidel and man of wicked life applaud every attack made. The satanic press join in the pursuit and hark on all the curs of low degree. The scholar who before had no more reputation than he deserved, suddenly finds himself a leader, with a wide following who applaud his efforts in this earnest quest for truth! The Bible which has condemned their immorality is put in the pillory and each miscreant joins in hurling some unsavory find of the critic at the common enemy which condemns their lives. This is the actual course of the world against the Divine Law. The worst foes have been those of its own household. If the enemy were on the outside their attacks would be expected and go for merely the expression of their hostility. But an accredited defender of the Bible when he is found acting as a leader in the devastation of that faith is welcomed by infidelity with open arms. For it is hoped by those whose wish is father to their thought, that the teachings of that Book which condemns ungodly living, will be found false, its authority undermined and its condemnation nullified. This is the true exposition of the motives and conduct of the higher critics. Those who have been leaders in destructive criticism have not been the scholars of our country. The real scholars—Robinson, Stuart, Woolsey, Lewis, Green, Alexander, and Nordheimer among critics; Edwards, Porter, Park and Shedd

among philosophers and theologians, have showed themselves staunch defenders of the integrity of the Bible as the foundation of a supernatural religion. But by constant attacks and arrogated scholarship the higher critics have kept themselves before the public continually. They have also kept the church which nurtured them in a constant turmoil; compelling prosecutions because they would not surrender the emoluments given them under the solemn promise that they would teach the doctrines for which their chairs were founded. The acme of audacity has been reached when Briggs, who has done more than any other man of our country to keep the church in a turmoil, now poses as a peacemaker with his Eirenicon! Such has been the history of higher criticism both here and abroad. The voice of our native production has been a faint echo of the foreign article, so that when Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Harnack took snuff, our *pedisiqui* invariably sneezed!

What will be the probable outcome of this movement of higher criticism? The enemies of our faith predict the speedy disappearance of the Bible as an authoritative instrument for a supernatural religion. The infidel press have already called for the services of the undertaker, declaring that the superstition of an infallible revelation is a thing of the past; that we have risen superior to all such weaknesses, and must have a religion of morality and reason. We have heard these boasts before. We have been invited to the death and burial of evangelical religion from the days of the apostles. Yet the fancied corpse was never so lively as it is to-day. Doubtless the devil was short-sighted enough to believe when Christ was put to death on the cross, and his body in the grave guarded by Roman soldiers, that the superstition of the Gospel was at an end. But the power of that religion had only begun its real work. The Church in the apostolic days was vexed continually, just as now, by false brethren who called in question its divine authority. Indeed it was predicted with the utmost clearness that such should be the fate of the Church during all the coming ages till her work is completed. This predic-

tion has been fulfilling, and is to-day applicable with as much distinctness as at any past time. The temper of heresy and higher criticism at the present in the arrogance and hypocrisy of its advocates is perhaps peculiar. But it is one of the many phases in the experience of the Church as long as she is militant, that is must fight her way against the hosts of sin. The chief foes will still be those of her own household.

But the openly expressed wish of the professed infidel and his welcome ally will not gain the desire of the one, or the natural harvest of the other. They discount this result because they will only look in the direction of their own destructive work. They will not see the progress of the Gospel among the common people who always hear Jesus gladly, nor the conquests which the missionary is making among the heathen. The Bible can endure all the assaults of open foes and the more dangerous veiled attacks of professed friends. For it has the power of an endless life. Despite the attacks of its enemies, and the fears of its cowardly friends, it is stronger in the affections of the plain people of common sense and honesty, and in the confidence of real scholarship than ever before. Newly discovered MSS. confirm the text. Excavations of Babylonian and Egyptian libraries give corroborative proof from heathen sources. The evidence of its truthfulness is cumulative from every quarter. Not a leading doctrine, not an important historical statement or scientific allusion has been overthrown. When higher criticism is mute in defence, nay rather vociferous in condemnation, the very stones with their inscriptions cry out. Every influence of truth and right living owns the Bible as its inspiration. Therefore the Book as the record of God's word to man and His dealings under a moral system, is entrenched in perfect security. Despite the oracular utterances of that chronic fault-finder Goldwin Smith, there never has been a time in the history of the Christian Church when so many revered the Sacred Book; when so many owned it as their guide and ascribed their happiness to its teachings.

There is a curious custom among the Chinese, especially their officials, when for any reason they themselves or their friends think they have outlived their usefulness. This is to disembowel themselves, to commit *hari kari*. Some do this by constraint of public opinion; others are polite enough to anticipate the expressed desire that they step out of the way. This is the true inwardness of the fad of higher criticism. Along with admiration for the books of the East, and seeking inspiration from the Parliament of Religions, they have adopted this self immolation; translating the barbarous word *hari kari* into the vernacular "higher criticism." How admirably the thing works! When the higher critic has proved to his own satisfaction and that of his followers that the Bible is not an inspired Book, that it is full of mistakes, that there is no such thing as a miracle, and even the resurrection of Christ, foretold by himself, is a myth—he has demonstrated that there is in this Book no basis for a supernatural religion. For as its claims are false, the only conclusion that an honest man can reach is that the Book is worthless as a guide to another life; and as a tissue of falsehoods is unfit to teach morality for the present one. With the collapse of the charter of religion, this with all its institutions will also fall to ruin. This is inevitable. All institutions, from the Church down through theological seminaries and religious foundations, must stand or fall with the Bible. If it is false in its grand assumptions of inspiration, infallibility, dependence on miracles which are only myths, who will care for it as a guide? There will be no ground for a Christian or Jewish church.

Possibly there may be a shrine for the goddess of reason, the shibboleth of higher criticism. This experiment was tried in the French Revolution, but with meagre success. The higher critic sees a reason for a theological seminary that he may get a salary which he could not earn in any other occupation; though no one but himself can see why he shall continue his craft. If he teaches that the Book which contains all the *raison d'être* of the Church or seminary is false, why should

students seek such a place for instruction? If they still reverence this Book they will not care to go to a place where it is mutilated and treated with contempt. If they believe what the higher critics teach there is no reason for going to a theological sminary at all. This effect is seen clearly at Andover and other places of destructive criticism. Students do not go there as formerly, and Othello's occupation is gone. He has *hari kared* himself—all accept the salary. No device has been discovered up to date for relieving the burdened conscience of the critic from the necessity of being paid for devastating the faith he has solemnly promised to support.

But there is a process of suicide in nature which though operating secretly and slowly does its work surely. Nothing can be clearer than the thesis: If the Bible is untrustworthy its falsity should be exposed. But it is equally clear by the work of the higher critics that they try to believe this to be the fact, since all their system rests upon such a basis. Now either the Bible is false in its assumptions, or those who teach that it is so are false. There is no escape from this dilemma. Why then should students who believe in the Bible as the organ of a supernatural religion go where the practical denial of this is taught? And why should there be students of theology where its voucher is proved false? For both reasons those seminaries where the Bible is not credited by the professor will not be patronized by students. The sword of higher criticism has already given its wielder the *coup de grace*!

But still further: Why should the original languages in which a revelation has been given, be studied to interpret correctly, if there is no true message to interpret? It is said that an educator of prominence, himself an author of Hebrew manuals, does not encourage the study of this language save as a purely literary exercise. For the book which has hitherto been the sole cause for the study of Hebrew, and expressly for its message, having been discovered to be a fraud in its essential claims, no earnest seeker for truth should give it attention. The Jewish Scriptures are, according to the higher critic, a

tissue of legends, having no religious value because their pretensions to accuracy have been proved to be false. The best thing therefore to do is to bury this out of sight as a book of religion; and hence there is no call to study its language for the sake of its message.

What is the warrant for preaching if the Bible is legendary and there is no supernatural religion? The pulpit has lost all its power, save as human eloquence and the personal magnetism of the speaker may give it a factitious or temporary importance. There is no gospel; there is no atonement; there is no resurrection because Christ did not rise. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." There is no Saviour revealed, and no need of forgiveness through repentance and faith. As far as the influence of such doctrines extends they utterly subvert all religion, and leave the sinner just where they find him: helpless in himself and with no hope from a higher power. Like unitarianism, which is found to be a failure because it gradually surrenders all that orthodoxy had won from the world as a *raison d'être* for a church; so higher criticism after repudiating all that marks a distinctive faith, feels the ground slipping away from its feet. There is in fact no basis left from which to wage a contest with the natural corruption and unbelief of the human heart. And where such an emasculated faith is preached there can be no earnest spirit to respond. When the Bible is discredited there is no authority to which final appeal can be made. A conscience that is awakened to its sinfulness wishes something more than negations; a soul overwhelmed with dread of divine wrath will not go to a preacher who says all such feelings are the remains of superstition. The earnest soul seeks an earnest guide. Hence pulpits filled with the advocates of a higher criticism will attract only such as look upon religion as "a respectable sort of thing which should be patronized." True religion will flee from such a formal and chilling atmosphere; and the preacher will commit *hari kari* on himself, and his people with him. Witness the descent of Everett, Conway, Swing. They

preached a religion of shreds and patches. One abandoned his calling; another was abandoned by every church to which he ever preached; and the third instructed his people so thoroughly to believe merely in himself that when he died they had no creed left and scattered by mutual repulsion. Their churches went to pieces because they had no cohesive principle. Where there was no gospel truth proclaimed there could be no awakening of faith in the hearer.

What the final outcome? The faith of many will be shaken. Theological seminaries will suspend for lack of patronage, though their professors will continue to hold their offices so long as they are permitted to draw their salaries. Churches will be closed because Zion can have no solemn feasts in such places! But these things though painful do not affect the forward movement of Christianity. Many churches, like that of Sardis, having neither the heat of true faith nor the coldness of honest reason, but the lukewarmness of a cowardly compromise, will be spewed out by Him who walks between the golden candlesticks. There will be a falling off in places, but this will not affect the Church at large, except to teach the necessity to contend more earnestly for the faith on which all Christians rest. Meantime the son of perdition is revealing himself in the reprehensible action of those who take away the staff on which burdened humanity leans, and for which robbery they give nothing in return. A common danger will compel a united front against the common enemy. Contentions among Christians are yielding to that charity which believeth all things, and therefore hopeth all things. Protestants and Catholics can stand together in accepting a Bible of plenary inspiration. Thus they can begin the new century exhibiting a bolder front against the common enemy, a greater charity toward each other and harmony of essential doctrine than has been witnessed since the Apostolic ages. The Church has had periods of passing through the wilderness when there is a falling away in doctrine and practice. Such was the beginning of last century when the atheism of the French Revolution

was transplanted to our country—just as the higher criticism has been toward the end of the same century. But the progress of the plain Gospel was constant despite all the superficial hindrances. These affected the advance of saving truth no more than the ripples upon the surface of the sea affects the swell of the great silent depths when the ocean currents move the mass of waters.

The power of the Divine Word is seen when it is preached in all its integrity. There never was a revival following the preaching of the higher critic, nor has there ever been such a critic who had the power to awaken or direct a feeling of spiritual need. He would be out of his sphere if he acted with candor, or preached a supernatural faith derived from a supernatural revelation. And if it were possible for his preaching to awaken a soul the preacher would be surprised at such a result, and at a loss to give counsel to the inquirer. He would be bewildered at the miraculous draught of a seine without ropes, floats or meshes; and would flee affrighted and leave the soul floundering in its own doubts. But when Luther or Knox, Whitfield or Edwards, Wesley or Moody preaches the simple Bible, accepting the whole as containing the Word of God sent to teach men the way to immortality, this preaching will effect the same revival of spiritual knowledge and holy living. Its truths have become petrified in the hymnology of the Church which the higher critic sings, unconscious, perhaps, of his own hypocrisy. They have vitalized the conscience of the religious world. They have become interwoven with all forms of civilized speech. Combined these form a rampart against which the foe only dashes himself to death. To the Word of God it matters not whether a destructive criticism accepts or rejects; it still works on the hearts of men of good will. But to the critic himself it is of infinite importance what attitude he assumes toward this truth. He may show the needlessness of his own work and therefore commit suicide; but the Book he tries to destroy will still remain for the world the power of God and the wisdom of God unto salvation.

VI.

THE HISTORICAL AND THE SPIRITUAL IN CHRISTIANITY.

BY GEO. B. STEVENS, PH.D., D.D.

Two constantly recurring tendencies may be observed in religious thought, the one a tendency to lay chief stress upon the historical element, the other a disposition to attach primary significance to the spiritual or ideal element in Christianity. The former view finds divine revelation in a long series of events—the acts of God in the history of our race, and, especially, in the history of Israel and of the Christian Church. It points, above all, to the historic life of Christ and finds therein the supreme and perfect disclosure of the will and nature of God. This life, with its sublime teaching, its benevolent deeds and its experience of sympathy and suffering with and for man, is felt to be a definite revelation which men can apprehend and in the light and power of which they can live and work. The other type of religious thought sees in all historical events, even those of Christ's life and work, only the veiling of a spiritual idea—the expression under conditions determined by time and circumstance, of an underlying principle which is changeless and eternal. Often this method of thought depreciates the historical in Christianity in the hope of thereby magnifying its inner spiritual content. Sometimes the two aspects of religion are regarded as opposed to each other. They were so viewed by the late Professor Green, of Oxford. "There is," he says, "an inner contradiction in that conception of faith which makes it a state of mind involving peace with God and love towards all men, and at the same time makes its object that historical work of Christ of which our knowledge depends on evidence of uncertain origin and

value" (*Miscellaneous Works*, III., p. 260). His point is that the true universality of Christianity is incompatible with its being bound up with the definite historical life and action of a particular person.

The reason why the two views named, which may be called for brevity's sake the historical and the ideal, are sometimes regarded as opposed and incompatible, is that each holds an important truth in its keeping but is defective when taken by itself. This may be seen by a glance, first, at the historical view. God does, indeed, reveal himself in and through a process of historical action. Events are the language in which he has written the record of his gracious plan and purpose for humanity; but like all language this language of events consists of symbols of underlying spiritual realities. The historic facts, even of Christ's life, are full of vitality and power only as we discover the spiritual meaning which underlies them. The Bible is a book of life only as we penetrate to the inner truths and realities of which it is an expression.

The danger of those who lay great stress on outward events, laws, ceremonies, or books as constituting revelation, always is that they will obscure or lose the sense of what lies behind these expressions of truth. Hence Jesus described the people of his time as diligently but vainly searching for eternal life in the Scriptures. The reason why they did not find it was that their whole thought and interest moved in the realm of outer words and deeds and failed to penetrate to the real sources of religious truth and life. They hearkened diligently to the outer word of Scripture but were deaf to that inner voice of God which through Scripture speaks to the heart and the conscience. It will always be so where an exaggerated emphasis is placed upon the ways and means of revelation in events and books. These media replace in thought that which expresses itself in them and an external and superficial view of the nature of religion is the inevitable result. This has happened so often and on such a vast scale in the history of religion that it cannot be thought strange that some

men should go to an opposite extreme and protest against attaching such decisive significance to any particular events or special words. The motive of such a protest may be the very laudable desire to promote a deeper sense of the spiritual nature of religion and to drive the minds of men to reflect that behind all the words by which religious truth may be symbolized and all the historical events in which it may have found expression, there are eternal principles and laws, spiritual realities whose operation in human life and history constitutes the real power of religious experience in man.

On the other hand, the tendency of the ideal view is to resolve Christianity into an abstract speculative system with few, if any, definite points of contact with the history of our race. Historical characters fade out into abstractions; historical events lose their hold on the imagination; the life of Christ even becomes a sacred drama or poem, full of beauty and inspiration for those who can grasp great general principles, but having little power of appeal to those who can only think in the concrete. Religion becomes an intellectual scheme. The shibboleth of this cult is *the idea*. The obvious tendency of this type of theory is to abandon the firm ground of fact and have recourse to the perilous flights of abstruse speculation.

Yet, in this method of thought there certainly lies a great truth. History and revelation are disclosures in time and experience of great universal principles and laws. The mistake which is made by the representatives of both the views described is that of emphasizing a truth in a onesided way and of opposing to each other two modes of regarding Christianity which belong together. Here, as in so many other cases, it is the method of comprehension which is needed.

As the fully rounded personality consists of soul and body, so all knowledge consists of two factors, the general principles of the reason and concrete experience. Mere events could never give us knowledge; they must be construed by the interpreting mind. So, mere historic facts could never give us

revelation unless we were capable of discerning in and through the facts those rational and spiritual principles, laws and forces which alone can give significance and sacredness to the facts. Just as we know the mind of a friend only through the various outward expressions which reveal the inner self—his words, acts, tones and the like—so we know God through his various self-manifestations in nature and history. We should make a great mistake to depreciate the various signs by which a friend makes his spirit known to us in the supposed interest of showing that what we prize in him is his inmost self. But how do we know that inmost self? Through its utterance in such expressions as words, deeds and kind looks. We should make an equally great mistake, however, if we were to rest content with these expressions and fail to penetrate to the soul which they reveal. In like manner it should be said of divine revelation that the historical events—especially those of the life of Jesus—are the media by which divine and invisible forces operate and disclose themselves. To set a low estimate on the former is like despising the body in order to honor the soul; to fail to see the spiritual behind and operating in the historical is like regarding man as a mere sensuous creature and forgetting that the center of his personality is the soul within.

As our life has to do with outward events as well as with inward experiences; as we are sensuous and related as well as spiritual and self-centered beings, so we need a revelation which is cast into concrete form as well as presents us with general and abstract truths. We need a revelation which appeals not only to our reflective thought but to our imagination. God must write his message in terms of our human experience. We arrive most surely at universal spiritual truths and laws through the concrete expressions which we find of them in history and experience. In such forms and measures as we can best apprehend God makes himself known.

A revelation which thus gives us the sublimest spiritual truth through the medium of the historical submits itself to

the two principal tests which we can apply to any object of knowledge—the test of historical investigation and that of philosophical credibility. We can thus test the alleged facts of Christianity in order to determine whether they are real and whether they are such as to justify the claim to embody a special revelation of God. Then we can test by rational processes the principles which are held to be involved in and disclosed by the facts. Thus Christianity continually presents itself, in both these ways, for reinvestigation by the human mind. It offers a perpetual challenge to men to inquire and see whether Christ is not a person who on the strictest principles of science and under the severest tests of historical investigation, only the presence of God in history can explain, and whether the principles which he taught and exemplified are not the highest and divinest truths of which the human mind can conceive.

VII.

THE EVOLUTION OF MAN.

BY REV. HIRAM KING, A.M.

Thus far the cosmical theory of the materialist has not been established by scientific experiment, and it still remains to account for organic life on other grounds than its origin from matter by spontaneous generation. Nor has the faintest trace of the "missing link" rewarded the quest of the evolutionist, and the alleged animal origin of man, too, remains unproven. Why indeed a thoughtful man should make the search at all is quite beyond the comprehension, since the "link" could not possibly have been lost if the evolutionary theory of creation were really based on the laws of biogenesis. Thus, on the hypothesis that the highest type of anthropoid apes produced a being still more human than itself, which in turn produced primitive man, it is quite clear that the "link" could not be "missing," but that the succeeding generations of chimpanzees must have been supplying "links" for new races of men ever since. But then it is quite certain that the jungles of West Africa (the habitat of the anthropoids) are as completely devoid of "links" and new races together as are the forests of North America itself. As the laws of biogenesis, it may be taken for granted, have undergone no change, it would therefore seem that the present non-existence of the alleged missing link demonstrates the incorrectness of the theory on which its former existence is assumed.

Then again, it is unscientific as well as unreasonable to assume the production of heterogeneous offspring (which the "missing link" would be), since, in all the ages of man's observation of animal reproduction, offspring has been homogeneous. As indeed the orders of life have remained thus

strictly identical with themselves ever since man began first to observe them, the conclusion is warranted that the higher orders did not originally evolve from the lower orders. Or is it also to be assumed that the *creative* function, with which the evolutionist really invests the sub-human orders, became inoperative with the alleged evolution of man? Such an assumption would at least be on a par with the prior assumption that the orders were *originally* endowed with the function in question.

The earthly cosmos, it is plain, must have been *ideally* complete in the mind of God prior to the exercise of the creative function. It is therefore not only conceded here, but distinctly affirmed, that the cosmical orders resulted from an *ideal* evolution. The unity of the creative idea is indeed clearly exemplified in the character and co-relations of the sentient orders, which form an inverted pyramid, as it were, whose construction, according to Moses, proceeded from the apex below and culminated at the base above (Gen. 1). So also it is recorded in geology, and it may be read on the strata of the earth as well as on the pages of Genesis.*

The physiologist, moreover, notes the distinguishing structural characteristics of the orders of life, along the ascending scale, from the protozoa at the apex of the pyramid to man at its base. He points out that, in structure, they are similar,

* It is not material to the discussion of the evolution of man whether the account of creation in Genesis is an allegory or a literal record, because, in either case, the statements made have the same significance. Thus, on the assumption that it is an allegory, it is quite plain that the things which are allegorized must be the *works* of creation, since allegory is not fiction, but *fact in simile*. The statement relating to the creation of man, for example, is that "God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2: 7). The language employed, whether it be taken literally or figuratively, manifestly affirms the divine agency in the creation of man and defines the constitution of his being. So also the statement, pertaining to the moral development of man, that he "did eat" of the forbidden fruit (3:6), is plainly the record of the fall, whether the "tree" that bore the fruit was metaphorical or not, because, in either view, the "eating" of it represents an act of *deliberate wrong-doing* (verse 3, 6).

but that, in organization, they are *graded*. In the nature of the case, therefore, organic structure becomes more complex with each rising gradation, and the complete functional equipment of man at the top of the scale, being thus *gradually* reached, exemplifies not only the culmination of cosmical organization, but also the *ideal* climax of cosmical life.

As, however, the ideal creation became actual in the creative process, each order of life, in the ascending gradation, must have resulted from a *direct creative act*, because: (1) The reproductive powers of a given order are *normal* (and therefore distinctive) to that order; (2) the reproductive powers of an order are *wholly exhausted* in the propagation of its species. Given the order of the chimpanzee itself, it is manifest that, with its reproductive energies necessarily stimulated to their utmost scope in the generative process, it could not possibly forge an additional "link" in the chain of life.

The cosmical status of man is clearly defined in the cosmogony of the Bible. At the close of the sixth "day," the "heaven and the earth were finished" (Gen. 2:1) and the creative agency ended (ver. 2). While, however, the cosmical conditions, as then existing, were adapted to the sub-human orders, and the earth was a true habitat for beasts, it is perfectly plain that primeval forests and plains and jungles could have been the habitation of man only in savagery, and primitive man, it is plain, was not savage. The cosmical *isolation* of man was indeed the necessary concomitant of his superior nature, and as the earth was "finished" with his advent, how could the *ideal* world be actualized from elemental chaos and the earthly cosmos made a true *universe*? This cosmical exigency was fully provided for in man's most extraordinary endowments. When God had made the inferior orders of life, with the perfect animal at the top of the sub-scale, He said: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" (Gen. 1:26), and He "formed man of the dust of the ground," but He "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7) and endowed him with mind, reason and will.

The purpose in making man after the divine pattern was to qualify him for the following cosmical functions: (1) To exercise "dominion" over the earth (Gen. 1:26); (2) to "subdue" the earth (ver. 28).

It is perfectly plain that this double equipment of man (for the sovereignty of the animal kingdom and for the conquest of elemental nature) made him Godlike, functionally, and therefore produced a breach in the scale of life (between the perfect animal and man) that no conceivable "link" could repair. Unlike the animal, whose environments are fixed by natural law, man should *create* the conditions of his higher nature. His cosmical function should indeed begin where that of the Creator ended, and the *world of man should be the work of man*.

How loyally this *cosmical demiurge* has wrought at world-making appears from the marvelous civilizations which he has evolved from cosmical conditions. Thus, he won dominion over the animal and has made it his "beast of burden." He subdued nature and has transformed forests into fields, the haunts of wild beasts into cities and footpaths into highways. For his subsistence and temporal well-being he tills the fields and herds the animal. He makes garments for his person and builds houses for his habitation. He procures for himself all comforts and conveniences, and he adorns his home with all the elegancies known to the arts and sciences created by his genius. For material gain he trades in every land, but his enterprise is also *subterranean*, and he ransacks the bowels of the earth for its treasures of gold and silver and precious stones. For traffic and travel he rigs his sailing craft to the winds, while, for his great propelling engines, he generates steam, and they transport their mighty burdens a mile a minute across continents and twenty miles an hour over seas. For distant communication he makes electricity his amanuensis to write a telegram, in a flash, across a continent, or a cablegram on the opposite hemisphere. Nor indeed does the separation of men debar them from *oral* communication, since they converse along a wire a thousand miles apart.

The genius of man for invention (practically a *creative* function) is indeed limitless. He not only makes the elements of air and water and electricity vastly contributory to world-building, through ten thousand forms of apparatus and machinery, but he specifically constructs industrial machines that, in the main, eliminate the economic terms, *manufacture* and *manual labor*, from his industrial vocabulary. He indeed makes the whole earth his *workshop* for world-construction, but he also applies the marvels of physical science in the mighty process, and makes nature itself his titanic *workman*. He thus frees himself from the slavery of toil, acquires leisure, and constructs the world's *upper* hemisphere. But then he also cultivates the "science of barbarians" (Bonaparte) and invents long-range rifles, thirteen-inch guns and great battle-ships for the destruction of his kind, on land and sea, with all possible effectiveness and dispatch.

As touching his intellectual and spiritual culture, the fine arts of literature, poetry and music, and his ubiquitous schools, universities, churches and cathedrals, bear eloquent and ample testimony in affirmation.

Surely, with the world of science and art and religious civilization for truer memorial, man need not have recourse to sepulchral pyramid or granite shaft for earthly immortality.

It is plain, however, that the exercise, by man, of his cosmical function is conditioned on his moral being, and that world-building can therefore proceed only at the rate of his moral growth. The mouth of all history indeed proclaims that man performs his demiurgic function only in the degree that he wins the crown of moral manhood.

The moral responsibility of man was plainly implied in his commission to the lordship of the earth (Gen. 1:28). But then, moral responsibility implies moral character, and the question rises, Who is the author of man's moral character? Is it an endowment by the Creator? No. Is it the creation of man himself? Yes.

In the region of fancy, Pallas could very well spring from the brain of Jupiter in *mail-clad womanhood*, but it is quite

certain that, in the realm of fact, man could not possibly have sprung from the mind of God in *moral manhood*. It is here also a matter of world-building, and the moral world could not possibly have been produced by *creation* any more than could the civilized world have resulted from the creative agency. It was indeed only in their original elements that the First Cause could produce the worlds in space, and it was through secondary causes that cosmical elements became cosmical constituents. Thus, the geological world was necessarily formed from cosmical elements by cosmical agencies through unrecorded ages of physical world-building. So, analogically, in ethics, the creative agency was necessarily limited to the elements of man's moral constitution (its rudimentary functions, the moral intuitions, the moral potentialities), and man himself was made functional for his moral character.

Did Adam, however, pass through the process of moral evolution *ab initio*, as do his descendants? and was he, too, without moral consciousness at the beginning of life? Yes, since the moral nature is necessarily identical with itself. But may not the common moral condition of Adam and his posterity at the beginning of existence be questioned on the ground that the former was *created* while the latter are *generated*? No, since the *mode* of the first man's origin (although by a direct creative act) could not possibly make unnecessary the *operation* of moral law for moral character.

Moral evolution begins with the primary stirrings of the conscience in the dawn of the general consciousness. The moral faculty in man (the conscience) is, however, not simply the power of distinguishing right and wrong, but also an intuitive moral impulse, a moral imperative, in fact, which makes right *mandatory* and wrong *prohibitory*. Man's moral agency, moreover, is the power of his moral self-determination, and he *chooses* the right or the wrong. And it is in the *habitual* choice of right, under impulse of the moral faculty, that the moral character is formed. As men thus *conscientiously* react on their moral environments, and meet their

moral obligations in the performance of *duty* toward God, the world and themselves, they are in process of moral evolution.

How early in the progress of the first man's moral evolution the test of his moral stability came (Gen. 3:1-5), it is impossible to ascertain. That he had already developed from moral unconsciousness to moral agency is, however, implied in the attending circumstances as well as it is to be inferred from the nature of the case. Thus, he was susceptible to evil influences (Gen. 3:6), which implies his moral consciousness. He was capable of discriminating the right and the wrong, which implies his moral perception. His wrong-doing was under ban of the moral faculty (ver. 3), which implies its prior development. He possessed the power of choice (ver. 6), which implies his moral agency.

As this early manhood of Adam was developed in his self-determination under the impulse of the moral faculty, it was clearly because his self-determination at the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was *against* the mandate of the moral faculty that he "died" (Gen. 2:17). Not only, moreover, did Adam "die" in person, but as he was generic for the race, "sin entered into the world" through this "one man," and "so death passed unto all men" (Romans 5:12).

It is self-evident, however, that the "death" of man did not result in the destruction of his moral nature, since the fall did not wholly arrest his moral evolution. But then, his moral powers were impaired and his moral manhood was not only dwarfed but also malformed. It is equally plain that man, in thus making himself functional for evil, became incapable of the *ideal* exercise of his cosmical function. Thus, instead of extending Paradise around the earth, he has barely succeeded in turning the wilderness, into which he was expelled therefrom, into its faint resemblance. And, although the world as he has built it, is like the handiwork of God, it is not only evil as well as good, but the wrongs perpetrated in it are colossal, and suggest the agency of demons rather than that of men. Man indeed arrogated "dominion" also over his

fellow-man, and, in the exercise of the manifold tyranny, has stained the world, which he has built, with his brother's blood from Abel in Eden to the martyrs to political liberty on the South African veld. As to his general character *thus out of Paradise*, it must also be charged against him that licentiousness, selfishness, cruelty, robbery, war, invasion, conquest, subjugation, slavery, oppression, constitute the dark catalogue of his crimes against the moral order.

Surely, the immorality of man not only attests the reality of his fall, but it also makes his ideal manhood in the first creation impossible.

MAN'S MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW CREATION.

1. *In the Regeneration.*—The new creation originated, not in the evolution of man, but in the incarnation of God. Nevertheless, men are *generated* in the new creation as truly as they are in the first creation. The progenitor of the race in the new creation is, however, not the "first man" who is "of the earth," but the "second man" who is "of heaven" (I. Cor. 15:47). As, moreover, the "last Adam" (ver. 45) "descended out of heaven" (John 3:13), He cannot be simply the offspring of the first Adam and a member of his race. He was indeed "born of the Virgin Mary" (Matt. 1:25) that He might partake of "flesh and blood" (Heb. 2:14). But then, unlike the ordinary descendants of Adam, He not only had a prior existence to His life on earth, but as He was "conceived by the Holy Ghost" (Matt. 1:18), His advent was conditioned on an act of *creation* quite as much as on natural generation. Nor could His generic function have possibly been derived from Adam. On the contrary, His Headship of the race was conditioned on the incarnation, and He became the "last Adam" through the constitution of His Person, in which the *order* of human life was not only assumed into essential union with God, but was also *created anew*.

As Adam and Christ are the two great founders of humanity, it follows that the distinction, now pointed out between

them, measures the vast elevation of man in the new creation above his moral status in the first creation. It is indeed true that, under the law of progeniture, Adam transmitted the elements of Godlike manhood to the race, and that man has "piled Pelion on Ossa" in his evolutionary progress, but, like the titanic rivals of the gods in the Vale of Tempe, he has, nevertheless, failed to climb into Olympus. As indeed the descendants of Adam are necessarily his duplicates, pure and simple, it is quite impossible for the race to transcend its terrestrial limitations. Besides, his moral evolution in the first creation must ever fall far short of its ideal, since not only are his moral impulses shorn of half their strength in the antagonistic dualism instituted in the fall, but his moral nature itself is, in part, perverted, and his self-determination in the exercise of his cosmical function is to evil-doing as well as to well-doing. It is indeed possible for men to be *born from below*, in the old creation, as well as to be "born from above" (John 3:3), in the new creation, and that they become "sons of the evil one" (Matt. 13:38; John 8:44; Acts 13:10) in their personal self-surrender to "lust" (James 1:14, 15).

In Adam, man is therefore but "earthly," and, through the fall, is even virtually below his normal status in the scale of the cosmical orders.

As now, the law of heredity prevails in the new creation quite as much as it prevails in the first creation, and as Christ is *God Incarnate* (John 20:28), it follows that man, generated from His Person, is divine as well as human. Do the Scriptures, however, warrant the conclusion? and do they teach the divine kinship of man in the new creation? Yes. Men "become partakers of the divine nature" through the "promises" fulfilled in Christ (2. Peter 1:4). The reference is not to the *moral resemblance* which men bear to God in the first creation (Gen. 1:27), but to the divine essence (*φύσις*) of which they partake in the new birth. They are "begotten of God" (1 John 3:9) and are therefore "children of God" (ver. 10).

As Adam was a "figure of him that was to come" (Romans 5:14) in relation to the biological heredity of his offspring (ver. 12), the question arises, Was he also representative of Christ in respect to the self-development of personal moral qualities? Yes. The moral self-development of Christ was as necessary as was that of Adam, since it was in a true conception, quite below the realm of consciousness itself, that His Person was constituted. And it lies in the nature of the case that He passed from moral unconsciousness, in infancy, to free agency, and formed His moral character, just as He "advanced in wisdom" (Luke 2:52) in His boyhood. It is true that God as such, being infinite in His attributes, can not be said to develop. But then, God in Christ is necessarily circumscribed. The incarnation, being the real union of the divine and human natures, plainly involves the *limitation* of the divine attributes. The still more important question also presents itself here, Did the moral development of Christ proceed on the same plane as that of Adam? No, clearly not. As the divine and human natures are the *constituents* of the Person of Christ, it plainly follows that His moral development, like His being itself, was not divine or human, but *theanthropic*.

As now, men are truly generated from the Person of Christ in the new creation, it is plain that, by virtue of spiritual heredity, they, too, are theanthropic. Their moral development, like that of Christ Himself, proceeds therefore, not along the plane of mere humanity, but in the order of the *incarnation*. As men, moreover, are thus at the fountain of morality in God, and as their moral intuitions and their moral powers are reinforced by the impulse of divinity itself, it not only follows that moral character in the new creation is vastly exalted, but also that moral stability must be correspondingly enhanced.

A break was therefore produced in the order of human life itself by the advent of Christ, which is quite as distinct as that produced in the scale of the cosmical orders by the creation of

Adam. The gap between the perfect animal and man resulted from man's moral equipment; that between man in the first creation and man in the new creation results from man's union with God.

Is the new creation, however, a historical fact like the first creation? and can its origin be ascertained and its progress in the world traced? Is there really a body of men in the world now, whose moral characters exemplify divine sonship? Yes. It was only at the descent of the Holy Spirit that men received "power" to perform the functions of the new manhood (Acts 2:8). It is therefore plain that the new creation was instituted at Pentecost. It was indeed at this outpouring of the Spirit that the incarnation itself first became available for men, since their generation from the Person of Christ was not possible prior to His glorification (John 7:39).

That Pentecost was indeed the new birth of man is evident, since men then began to *truly* practice the ethics of Sinai, which are the moral principles of the new creation. The "tongues," that seemed not to burn, really consumed the fatal selfishness of the natural man in his baptism "with the Holy Ghost and with fire" (Matt. 3:11), and set his soul aflame at the torch of love, which is the life impulse of the new creation. As the self-denying love, which God displayed at Bethlehem (John 3:16) was transmitted to men in their new birth at Pentecost, they ceased to be heartless and cruel and evil, and became beneficent, self-sacrificing and pure. Under stress, also, of the inherited spirit of their new progenitor, they became the *benefactors* of their fellow-men, and devoted their lives to their moral regeneration. As men thus began to exemplify the personal self-sacrifice of Christ (Phil. 2:5-2) in behalf of others (ver. 17; I. Cor. 15:31), their moral attitude became so utterly out of harmony with the old world's moral order that the natural man exclaimed in astonishment: "How these Christians love one another!"

Evidently this strange passion, which began to burn in the hearts of men at Pentecost, and impelled them to imitate the

self-renunciation and self-sacrifice of Christ for man, is the exponent of the new creation, because: (1) It is the "fulfillment of the law" (Decalogue), which is the pre-declared moral standard of the new creation; (2) it is really its exercise, by man, in his relations to God and his neighbor, that is made mandatory behind the prohibitions and injunctions of the Decalogue; (3) under its power duty is synonymous with privilege, and men become "servants to one another" (Gal. 5:13) by *choice*.

Surely, as men *voluntarily* devote themselves, in self-sacrifice, to the good of their fellow-men, and even love their enemies (Matt. 5:44) and bless their persecutors (Romans 12:14), the inference is warranted that they have been generated from the Person of Christ, and thus elevated into the order of the incarnation where He set them the lofty example.

As to the numerical growth of the new humanity from Pentecost onward, and their moral development on the plane of the new creation, these are facts of historical record and present observation. Under direction of the Author of the new creation Himself, His representatives have been "making disciples of all nations" (Matt. 28:19) ever since the descent of the Spirit, and the one third of the world's population have already been "born of water and the Spirit" (John 3:5). That, moreover, the Father's promise of the gift of the "nations" to the Son (Ps. 2:8) will be fulfilled, and that the new creation will therefore become commensurate (comprehensively) with the first creation, there can be no doubt.

As to the bearing of this higher development of man on his cosmical agency, it is plain that his moral nature is not only sublimated in the new birth, but that it is also *complemented* in its assumption into the new moral order. The moral powers in the new creation are, accordingly, *cumulative*, and it follows that the new humanity ought to exercise the moral preponderance in the world's affairs. As indeed man's general cosmical function in the first creation is not only glorified in the new creation, but becomes also *divine* in scope and power,

it would seem that the new humanity must be at the root of the world's historical evolution. Does history, however, justify the conclusion? and has the "new man" (Ep. 2:15), as against the "natural man" (I. Cor. 2:14), become the maker of history? Yes. The new order of men at once began to "turn the world upside down" (Acts 17:6); in three hundred years from Pentecost they gained the sovereignty of the pagan world's greatest empire; at the beginning of the twentieth century they are ruling every historical nation in the world except Japan.

In regard to the moral life itself, it is also plain that this virility of character in the new creation, which makes men world-conquerors in addition to world-builders, is exemplified by the *practice* of the moral virtues enjoined in the Decalogue. It is, however, true that history sets to the credit of the old humanity both purity of life and integrity of character in early national existence, but it uniformly charges the later national decadence to the moral putrescence of the social order. This latter is, at best, only natural morality enervated by the fall, and, in the end, wholly vitiated thereby, unless it is sublimated in the order of the new creation. But when the moral nature itself was created anew at Pentecost and fashioned after that of Christ, men began to practice the personal, domestic, social and public virtues as the proper fruits of the personal life, while, in the political ascendancy of the new humanity, the nations have long since abated the old-time ferocity of war, and seem now on the point of substituting international right for might, and international righteousness for diplomatic astuteness. In spite of appearances, it was no more possible for the dissenting boom of the British cannon in South Africa to dispel the historical significance of the Peace Conference at The Hague than its prototype was possible when Hannibal crossed the Alps into Italy.

Of the general cosmical function of man in the new creation, it is only necessary to say, that the world's present moral, material, social, political and religious elevation above its civ-

ilization when Greece and Rome were great, makes it sufficiently evident that this *new-born demiurge* not only builds with material, which is unavailable in the first creation, but that he also builds with a skill altogether unattainable by the natural man. It is indeed plain that he is under the tutelage of the Master-Builder Himself, for how could he otherwise have learned to build so differently in the new creation from his handiwork in the old? Thus, in the first creation, he oppressed his fellow-men; he enslaved them; he killed them; he extinguished the light on their hearthstones; he repressed their moral instincts; he degraded their manhood. In the new creation, however, he acknowledges national independence; he signs the Magna Charta; he frees the slaves; he establishes life-saving stations; his charity blesses the poor; his asylums shelter the unfortunate; his orphanages foster the parentless; his institutions develop the moral, intellectual, spiritual and physical manhood.

Beyond controversy, the cosmical function of man must have become *theanthropic* at Pentecost, that he could thus fill the world, which he had made so selfish, so cruel and so evil, with philanthropic endeavor and self-sacrificing ministration.

2. *In the Glorification.*—The moral development of man, however it may be affected by changing conditions, proceeds quite irrespective of the state of his existence. It is the law of the moral nature, in the realm of the finite, not to develop to *maturity* but to develop *perpetually*. As indeed Christ Himself is *theanthropic* (His divine nature being therefore under limitation as well as his human nature), the inference is clearly warranted that His moral development is not only in present progress, but that it will never cease.

The first stage of man's moral development began at his creation, and it ended at the first advent of Christ, because his *moral condition* was then changed in his regeneration. The second stage began at Pentecost, and it will end at the second advent of Christ, because the *state of his existence* will then be changed in his glorification. The third stage will begin at

the resurrection, but it will be eternal, because both his moral condition and the state of his existence will then be permanent.

Man's moral development is never abstract, however, but always concrete, his cosmical function being necessarily exercised in every stage thereof. Indeed the expressions, "moral development" and "world-building," are, to some extent, interchangeable, and the *world of man is man himself*. It is, in fact, his *ideal manhood* that man produces in actualizing the personal potentialities and utilizing the cosmical conditions. It is therefore certain that the cosmical function is normal to man, and that its exercise will be perpetual.

As, however, "it is not yet made manifest" how fully the "children of God" will develop into His image under existing conditions (I. John 2:15), it is clear that any present conception of man's evolution in the glorified state must necessarily be inadequate. It is indeed quite impossible for the mind to conceive of this ceaseless advance of man toward God, whose image he will ever approximate, but never duplicate.

It is, however, a comfort to know that at the inauguration of the final stage of man's evolution, intruding "Death and Hades" will be eliminated from cosmical conditions (Rev. 20:14); that, in the new Paradise, no "lie" shall betray (21:27); and that therefore the handiwork of the "new man" (Col. 3:10) shall no longer be marred by the pernicious agency of the "old man" (ver. 9).

VIII.

THE NON-CHURCHMAN ON THE CHURCH.

BY ALBERT C. DIEFFENBACH.

In observing the conditions that obtain in the Christian church it is the common tendency of thoughtful persons to consider first of all the personification of the spirit of the church—the Christian clergy. In a profound sense the ministry is the highest calling of God. The labors of the pastor and preacher are concerned with what is, and with what ought to be, in the lives of men. He stands on the pivotal point of the balance. Fall one end of the beam or the other—come immobile realism, come irrational idealism—the minister of the gospel labors in vital touch with both, yet is toppled over by neither. Other vocations are wont to be extreme in one respect or the other. For example, the industrial and commercial supremacy of thousands of our brilliant men is a dangerous temptation for them to throttle their noblest impulses. Engrossed, submerged in the hard facts of material development, their spiritual ideals are likely to be clouded. On the other hand there are the dreamers, whose besetting temptation is to lapse into poesy, with their locks unshorn and their bills unpaid. Midway, with an unabashed consciousness of what is, and a determined ambition to accomplish what ought to be, stands the preacher, the pastor, the man who moves men to do their individual, domestic, social, and civic duty.

It is the purpose of the minister to realize in his work the true idea of education. For the minister is taught that the highest glory of man consists not in success in his peculiar vocation. In other words, a man is not to be first of all a wage-earner and bread-winner. There are multifarious obligations resting upon a man which rise above his salaried labors.

Questions religious and theological, political and social, questions in art and literature and science, are continually crying for answers. To have men see this truth is to have them see Jesus, and that is the mission and the message of the minister. But that means more than to make a man understand his potential value to society, the state and the church. As President Wilson said in his Princeton inaugural address, "We are not put into this world to sit still and know, we are put into it to act." That masterly sentence, it seems to me, sounds the key-note of the needs of the Christian church. Ministers are no longer discussing how many angels can dance on the point of a needle, and other equally important subjects, but they are going forth with a simple gospel in a simple language to bring men into the church. For they have learned that there are thousands who have grown weary of the church and her members. To justify this spiritual ennui would be grossly inadequate and unjust. But to consider several of the more important reasons assigned for apathy and antipathy is manifestly candid and fair. For, in so far as there is a jot or tittle of truth in their objections to the working church, in so far as there is reason for, and obligation upon, the ministry and the laity to consider their objections and vigorously and persistently to strive to make the church to attain to the full measure of the stature of Jesus Christ.

I have moved among serious, thoughtful, vigorous and successful men, who are not regularly enrolled in church membership. I have gathered from them their reasons for non-participation in the life of the Christian church. Perhaps the greatest pleasure one enjoys in such a tour of inquiry grows out of the well-balanced ideas, the well-digested expressions of honest, virile men, who give a surprisingly studious attention to the affairs of God. It is remarkably true that many men, grimy with the toil of the mill, plunged in the papers of the office, have yet time for God. I have yet to hear the name of God greeted with the air of ridicule or flippant indifference. That is a great word—God! But it is not the passive rever-

ence for the shibboleth of humankind that arouses enthusiasm so much as the clearly defined, albeit simple views of God and his children that give the churchman a reasonable optimism in his work for Christ. The conscientious churchman should be glad when men differ with him, and when they point out, even though it sometimes be with acerbity, the abuses which rise for them like insurmountable barriers before the doors of the houses of God. The following reasons are necessarily composite in their character, but they are also comprehensive. It should be said at the outset that among thoughtful men the old contention that men are outside the church because of the hypocrites inside the church is considered pusillanimous. This cry is still heard, but it is obviously so gross a mark of self-righteousness, and so false as to its notion of the church's standard (*i. e.*, the character of the members instead of that of Christ), that it will not be considered. When a man urges hypocrites within the church as a reason, it is pardonable for one to take him kindly and say: "There is always room for one more." But we have gone afield. These are the subjects for consideration:

1. Denominational separatistic doctrines.
2. Unbusinesslike financial administration.
3. Smallness of manly interest.
4. Inadequacy of workaday sympathy.

Apropos of doctrines the non-churchman says, with all reverence, that Jesus expects men to think for themselves. Religion, therefore, should be reasonable, if not rational—although the second term has a heretical ring in some ears. On a number of questions men are a unit. No one, who is sympathetic with Christian teaching, has disputed the statement that the Creator is the Father of all men, the God of all truth. We, therefore, are all brethren seeking truth, inspired by the personality of Jesus Christ. His real, sinless, perfect character is the foundation of our sure belief in the Master as our Saviour. But to go further than this is to go into speculation, wherein we soon learn that all ends in mystery. Every

man inevitably works out his own theology. He may claim allegiance to this school or that. But, if he is a man, he thinks for himself with Jesus Christ as his teacher. No two men think alike. This is a patent truth. If it is true in the interests of industry, commerce, science, literature, and politics, it is none the less true in the interests of the infinite God. Should not, therefore, freedom be given for each man to develop his views from his own standpoint so far as they are concerned with speculative questions?

But the holding of opposing doctrines is only the first cause of objection. Narrowness and sectarianism lead to grosser evils. For example, one denomination, as a test of full fellowship, insists upon a particular form of baptism, as essential to true baptism. This is ludicrously inconsistent with Christian principles. Then there is the churchman who says that agreement in certain doctrines is necessary if Christians are to commune together at the Lord's table. Brotherhood is not brotherhood without agreement in doctrine—a position which is now outlived. Again, why does a difference on a purely historical subject make a line of division at the chancel, thus debarring one clergyman from the pulpit of another? Happy are we not to have in this day the heretical St. Paul, or the non-conformist Peter, or the simple Master! For though many a cathedral and church is named after each of them, it would be exceedingly unkind in consideration of their services to mankind to say to them that according to ecclesiastical provision, and notwithstanding their spiritual power and commanding works, "You cannot enter here."

It is a commonplace confession of the average non-churchman that he cannot speak intelligently on theology. He is better qualified to talk business. And when we come to the business affairs of the church we find him at home. At the outset he is emphatic in his declaration that the same principles that hold good in the business world as such, should obtain in the business affairs of the church. Why should there be a difference between the financial management of a

church and that of a steel plant or a department store? And yet he knows that churches frequently fail to meet their obligations, and that the business operations of the church in many cases would be ludicrous, if they were not sinful. Even churchmen in business decry the lamentable state of affairs. For example, a business man, who has a warm interest in the Episcopal Church, in referring to a prominent Pittsburgh congregation said: "If the men who govern that church's finances conducted their own enterprises in like manner, they would go to the wall in a month." Another expression, coming from a large printing establishment, the head of which was a pious and sane and representative citizen, was skeptical of the integrity of the church's negotiations. "Whenever a church comes to us for a bid for publishing a paper, we 'fight shy.'" It is not necessary for one to be a keen observer in order to see that if the church fails in its business promises, it can not be powerful in its spiritual performances.

Why is it true that men of the church will permit a mission to struggle along for a quarter-century in a mean-built, ill-located edifice, when they know that a prominent location and a churchly building would insure success in half the time and with half the expense? The liberal non-churchman, who spurns meanness and shortsightedness, asks "Why?" Would it not be better to have fewer missions of a more attractive kind? Would not such a course, from a standpoint of financial investment, bring greater returns? He does not see in this lack of prudence that wisdom of the serpent, which Christ enjoined on His disciples and which the children of this world have in such a large degree.

There is a money-gathering device which the earnest man does not uphold. The church-fair is a twentieth century demon. Frequently the physical ills that rack over-wrought women, the extortionate prices "for the sake of the church," the games of chance, make a much greater counter-total than the contents of the bazaar coffers. The social life of a social institution—which the church is—may thus be promoted. But

the social life could more genuinely be fostered by gatherings, in the spirit of a large family, where the needs of the occasion would command the generosity of those who are interested in the advancement of religion. The non-churchman believes that more money, with less outlay of time, energy and Christian dignity, may be gathered by direct appeals for specific purposes.

Another objection from the outsider is the lack of manly inspiration. What does the church offer, which will interest the non-churchman—not the generic, but the masculine man? Professor Münsterberg of Harvard* says that in the Christian church in America 85 per cent. of those who do the active work are women. It is a commonplace that “women run the church.” The very nature of woman makes it impossible for her to promulgate the doctrine and life of the church. To do so would be to effeminize religion. And this is already the result in many sections. It is manifest in many effeminate ministers whose soft manners and perennial smile savor of anything but fine virility. The objections are: Lack of provision for men in the church buildings and organizations, lack of a masculine gospel, lack of masculine ministers. That is the arraignment. These are some of the statements adduced: In the building of churches the last thing to be considered is the man. There is provision for the Sunday-school until the church proper seems a mere auxiliary; there are women’s societies aplenty. But for the men there are no provisions! This is the charge. And as one who is about to build a church I am constrained to confess that in part the charge is true. An architect in his plans for the Allegheny parish had a women’s room, an infant room, a catechetical class room, a pastor’s study, the Sunday-school officers’ room, and one or two others. I remarked: “How about the men?” There was a suggestive “Ahem,” as if a great vacuum had been sounded. He confessed: “I have not made any provision for the men.”

* “American Traits,” by Hugo Münsterberg, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1902.

And even where an effort is made to reach out after the men, for example in the Young Men's Christian Associations, there is not a large-hearted provision for manly exercise and diversion. There are gymnasiums, to be sure, but one can not spend all of his leisure in the cultivation of the body. A diversion of the mind is essential. Checkers and crokinole and dominoes are harmless enough, but for the average young man they also soon grow inane and stupid. He likes bowling and billiards, for example. The non-churchman says that neither of these games would be in the resorts of evil if they were not good, healthful games. Because they attract the healthful spirit of a man, the wicked connect them with drinking and gambling. A parish-house equipped with these and kindred games would soon be a men's club of irresistible Christian influence.

By a masculine gospel a man means a logical, rational gospel. He wants facts—not the poetry of an evanescent spirit which gets its life from the clouds, far removed from the earth. He wants the economic, business, political, social and individual questions that are disturbing the world interpreted in the spirit of Jesus Christ. He wants only a minimum of other-worldly religion, because he is not ready for that. He is living in this world, and he wants a message for this world (a much-abused word). Pathos in religious enterprise has little place in the hard and fast character of the non-churchman. It is comparatively easy to stir a man's heart with a story of human suffering. But another story is necessary to stimulate his will. A man dislikes to give way to his feelings, but he delights to do a strong deed. He will act if he is given facts—hard, and yet stimulating facts. In this respect the non-churchman whom I have met exemplifies Longfellow's couplet more nearly than anything else I may quote:

"Not he that repeateth my name,
But he that doeth my will."

This demand of a manly gospel is coupled with the demand of sympathy on the part of the church with the everyday life.

That is what preacher and layman need. The only scholarship that counts in the church is the scholarship that directly lifts up men. The non-churchman does not wish, when he goes to church, to be reminded, as some church people assert, of other things than his workaday cares, but to be filled with inspiring truths which will make the daily life more real, more noble. He needs and desires the message of the Master—so beautifully preached by that sainted nobleman, Phillips Brooks—the message of the abundant life. The non-churchman considers the churchman's conception of the Christian life to be a life of abstinence and asceticism, consisting not so much in what men do as in what they do not do. This he will not have. He wants a truly human life, patterned after that of the Master. In short he asserts that the chief synonym of religion is life, and the chief synonym of life is religion. He wants one vocabulary, one code of conduct, one spirit, in both. A man therefore cannot spend too much time in the companionship of his brethren. Only such association must conduce to nobler thinking and simpler living. A churchman will be wise who has liberal sympathy for God and his brother on Thursday as well as on Sunday. He will be persistently proclaiming not a seventh-day, but a seven-day religion, a religion abounding in self-control and love in the characters of those who know what they say when they confess:

"I believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his Son our Lord."

ALLEGHENY, PA.

IX.

THE MONASTICISM OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

BY PROF. DAVID S. SCHAFF, D.D.

The Middle Ages furnish no more imposing phenomenon than monasticism. At the side of the absolute papacy, the crusades, the universities, the cathedrals and scholasticism, it stands forth as one of their distinctive features. And with all those other movements the activity of the monk was efficiently associated. He was, with the popes, the chief promoter of the crusades. He was among the great builders. He furnished the chief teachers to the universities and numbered in his order the profoundest of the schoolmen. The most brilliant periods of the papacy and the glory of monasticism were contemporaneous. When monasticism was experiencing its deepest humiliation, the Middle Ages were drawing to a close and its august institutions crumbling under the impact of the atmosphere of a new order of things.

If it be compared with the monachism of the earlier period of the church, the mediæval institution will be found to equal it in the number of its great monks and to exceed it in useful activity. Among the distinguished Fathers of the Post-Nicene period who advocated monasticism were Gregory of Egypt, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome. In the Middle Ages the list is certainly as imposing. There we have Anselm, Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus among the schoolmen, St. Bernard and Hugo de St. Victor, Eckart and Tauler among the mystics, Hildegard and Joachim of Floris among the seers, the authors of *Dies iræ* and *Stabat mater* and Adam de St. Victor among the hymnists, Anthony of Padua, Bernardino of Siena, Bertholdt of Regensburg and Savonarola among the preachers and, in a class by himself, Francis d'Assisi.

Of the five epochs in the history of monasticism two belong to the Middle Ages proper. The appearance of the hermit and the development of the eremite mode of life belong to the fourth century. Benedict of Nursia of the sixth century, and his well-systematized rule marks the second epoch. The development of the Society of Jesus in the sixteenth century marks the last epoch. The two between are represented by the monastic revival starting from the convent of Cluny as a center in the tenth and eleventh centuries and the rise and spread of the mendicant orders in the thirteenth century. Cluny was the chief reforming force of Western Europe for more than a century until Gregory VII., proceeding out of Cluny, began in 1050 to regenerate the papacy and set it on an altogether new career of prominence in the affairs of the church and the world. After that time Cluny still continued for a while to be the rival of Rome as a religious force. And then the sister order of the Cistercians continued to influence piety and the cause of civilization for a considerable time after Cluny itself had lost its original energy. In the course of its history, Cluny furnished three popes, Gregory VII., Urban II. and Paschal II. and the antipope Anacletus II. Gelasius, driven from Rome in 1118, found refuge within its walls and there he died lying on ashes and there he was buried. The cardinals who elected his successor, Calixtus II., met in its halls. Kings joined with popes in doing it honor. Four of its abbots were canonized. Its basilica was the finest in the West after St. Peters. There the long and tender poem so full of Christian hope was probably written, *Urbs Zion*, from which "Jerusalem the Golden" and other kindred hymns are taken. There Abaelard, wearied and humbled, found his last refuge and a kindly treatment, overlooking all errors and sins, from Peter the Venerable. Its rule stimulated such men as William of Hirschau in 1077, who made Hirschau in Swabia the model convent of southern Germany.

The Cluniacs belonged to one of the four main monastic families of the Middle Ages, the Benedictines. So did the

Cistercians, whose first convent in the marshes of Cîteaux, founded in 1098, became the center of large groups of convents throughout Western Europe. To them Bernard, afterwards abbot and founder of Clairvaux, belonged. With wealth and fame the monks of Cluny became lax in the observance of their rule. And the *carta charitatis*, the rule of love, adopted by Stephen Harding and the monks of Cîteaux, once more emphasized the strict observance of the rule of St. Benedict, which combined manual work with services of piety. They effected a more compact organization of its houses than was in vogue among the Cluniacs. The attack of St. Bernard upon the loose habits of Cluny is famous in the annals of monasticism. He held up the simple life at Cîteaux, though to be sure, as he said, there was no excess of spirituality among the Cistercians, "who filled their bellies with beans and their minds with pride." Nevertheless, the Cluniacs were to be condemned for their self-indulgence in meat and drink, their small talk and jocularity. Dish was added to dish at the table, eggs were served, cooked in many forms and more than one kind of wine was drunk at a sitting. Candelabras and altar cloths were elaborate. Gold and silver were freely used. One of their number, he (Bernard) had seen attended by a retinue of sixty horsemen. In spite of this arraignment Peter the Venerable, the noble abbot of Cluny, was not angered, but wrote back that he and Bernard belonged to the same Master, were the soldiers of one king and confessors of one faith. As different paths led to the same land so different conventual customs might lead to the Jerusalem above. Cluniacs and Cistercians should admonish one another in love.

The other three main families of mediæval monks were the Augustinians, the Carmelites and the two great Mendicant orders. The history of the Carmelites, founded in 1156 on Mt. Carmel during the Crusades, has been marked by much internal division and bitter controversies with other orders. As against the Dominicans they used to claim special right to the rosary, but Pius IX. and especially Leo XIII. in his frequent encycli-

cals, from 1883 on, commending the use of the rosary, has emphatically ascribed its first use and the revelation of it to Dominic. There is no doubt, however, about the scapulary as being a distinct institution of the Carmelite order. That outer garment, given by Mary, insures the wearer deliverance from purgatory the first Saturday succeeding his death. So at least John XXII. solemnly declared in 1322 in the famous bull *Sabbatina*.

The Augustinians had a character between the secular cleric and the strict monastic. This is true of the Augustinian canons, not of the Augustinian friars to whom John of Stau-pitz and Luther belonged. The so-called rule of St. Augustine, which they both followed, appeared first in the twelfth century. It served the purpose of the priests belonging to the large churches or forming the cathedral chapters. These clerics, at first living apart though ministering in the same church, felt strongly the tendency to a communal life in which all should sleep in a common dormitory and eat at the same table and have a common dress. We find here and there groups so living together in the twelfth century, and they came to be called *canons regular* in distinction from the *canons secular*, a distinction which, Denifle says, does not appear before that century, as in fact the terms themselves do not appear before that time. There was no close organization between these different groups of canons. The Augustinian friars lived in convents strictly as monks.

Augustine left no rule, and the rule which is ascribed to him was a fiction. His example, however, gave a pattern for the semi-monastic communities of canons. He had his clergy living under one roof and eating at one table. The Premonstrants and other orders adopted the Augustinian rule.

The Carmelites, Augustinians and the numerous other orders followed the monastic impulse of the age. The two great Mendicant orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans, gave a new monastic and religious impulse to their age. Scarcely ever in religious history has so powerful an impetus been given

to the religious life as was given by them, say from 1210, the date of St. Francis' first rule. In their first period they quickly obtained the esteem of scholars, princes, popes and people. Dante praised them. Men, like Grosseteste of England, welcomed their advent as the dawn of a new day. Louis IX., the Crusader, would have divided his body between them. It is true that it is matter of doubt whether the good services which they rendered in their first years are not more than counterbalanced by the ill activity and example of their latter years before the Reformation. They came to be the chief representatives of obscurantism. They offered obstruction to all progress. Their convents became synonyms of idleness and useless living and they aroused the well-merited hostility of the secular clergy by their extravagant assumption of privileges, conferred of pope though they were.

There can, however, be no question that the appearance of Francis d'Assisi and Dominic of Spain was one of the momentous epochs of the Middle Ages. Monasticism was started on a new career and the two orders fulfilled well the double mission of strengthening the papacy and counteracting the heretical sects which were making their appearance through Western Europe. It is, however, not to be understood that the methods adopted by the Franciscans were in the mind of the good founder of the Franciscan order. That order was manipulated by the papacy even while Francis was still living and a character given to it which was against his mind. It was the purpose neither of Francis nor of Dominic to revive existing orders nor to revive the rigor of rules half obeyed. They were heralds of new methods to meet new conditions. Francis was bent on leavening the world, upon transforming society, by new obedience to what he regarded as the simplest rules of the Gospel on the part of the people as well as a clerical class. It is probable he had it not in mind to form an order. The devotion of these two orders, especially the Franciscans, to practical ministries in society was so novel a phenomenon that people looked on in amazement and

the old monks resisted. From the day when St. Anthony went to the desert, the monkish ideal was to flee into solitude. The monk wanted to get away from men and their corruptions. The Black and Gray Friars, as the new monastics were called, went into the beaten pathways of the great world and the busy market places of the cities. They made open warfare upon the world without, as well as upon the sin within their own bosoms. They had an ear for the complaints and an eye to the struggles of the tempted and oppressed. "Of one thing," says Trevelyan in his "England in the Age of Wycliffe," "the friar was never accused. He is never taunted with living at home in his cloister and allowing souls to perish for want of food." Of course, he is speaking of the more degenerate days.

Passing away from the history to general characteristics, the mediæval convent appears as a very different institution from the cell of the ancient anchoret. The spirit is still ascetic but not altogether morbid. The monk is not always a recluse, dwelling in inaccessible seclusion. He does not abandon himself wholly to an artificial scheme of religious ritual carried on apart from the world's utilities. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) distinctly combines the active with the contemplative in the monk's life. It must be remembered, however, that he wrote after the establishment of the Franciscan and Dominican orders. The mediæval monks were the Puritans and the Methodists of their day; the Pietists and Evangelicals. All of these classes of Christians have this in common, that each stood in his age for an efficient religion.

The times were favorable for the development of monastic communities. If this is the age of the laic, that was the age of the monk. Society was unsettled and turbulent. The convent offered an asylum of rest and of meditation. Bernard, in his *de conversione*, calls his monks "the order of the Peaceful." Feud and war ruled without. Every baronial residence was a fortress. The convent was the scene of brotherly coöperation. It furnished to the age the ideal of a religious household on

earth. The epitaphs of monks betray the feeling of the time. *Pacificus*, "the peaceful"; *tranquilla pace serenus*, "in quiet and undisturbed repose"; *fraternæ pacis amicus*, "friend of brotherly peace"—such were some of them.

There were in reality only two careers in the Middle Ages, the career of the soldier and the career of the monk. It would be difficult to say which held out the most attractions and rewards, even for the present life. The well-ordered convent offered an incessant drill, exercise following exercise with the regularity of clockwork; and though the enemy was not drawn up in visible array on open field he was a constant reality. Barons, counts, princes joined the colonies of the spiritual militia, hoping thereby to work out more efficiently the problem of their salvation and to fight their conflict with the devil. The Third Lateran Council, 1179, bears witness to the tendency to restrict admission to the monastic vow to the higher classes by forbidding the practice of receiving money from persons desiring admission. The monk proved to be stronger than the knight and the institution of chivalry paled before the institution of monasticism.

By drawing to themselves the best spirits of the time, the convent became in their good days hearthstones of piety and the chief centers of missionary and civilizing agency, from the tenth well into the thirteenth century. When there was little preaching, the convent preached the most powerful sermon, calling men's thoughts away from riot and bloodshed to the state of brotherhood and religious reflection. The motto *aratro et cruce*, "by the cross and the plow," stood in their case for a reality. The monk was a pioneer in cultivating fields, and after the most scientific fashion then known, and taught agriculture, the culture of the vine and fish, and the breeding of cattle. He built roads, trained architects, painters and sculptors, wrestled with the deep problems of theology and philosophy, copied manuscripts, and when the universities arose the convent furnished them with their most renowned teachers. The work done by men like William of Hirschau,

Bruno and Norbert of Germany, Bernard and Peter the Venerable of France and St. Francis of Italy cannot be left out in any account of the onward progress of mankind. Much as we may decline to believe that monasticism is a higher form of Christian life, we must give credit to these men or deny to a series of centuries all progress and good whatsoever.

So popular did the monastic life become that religion seemed to be in danger of running out into monkery and society of being transmuted into an aggregation of convents. The Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III., 1215, met the demand for measures to repress the luxuriant increase of distinct orders, and in its thirteenth canon forbade the establishment of new orders. But no council was ever more ignorant of the immediate future. Innocent was scarcely in his grave before the Franciscans and Dominicans received full papal sanction at the hands of his successor, Honorius III.

It was in the eleventh and twelfth centuries that the important change went on, whereby all monks received priestly ordination. Before that, it was the exception for a monk to be a priest. Extreme unction, however, had been performed in the convent and also absolution administered by unordained monks. This Dr. Lea has sufficiently shown. With the development of the strict theory of clerical sacerdotalism, these functions were forbidden to the unconsecrated monk, as by the Ninth Œcumenical Council, 1123. The synod of Nismes, thirty years earlier, 1096, thought it answered objections to the new custom by pointing to Gregory the Great, Gregory of Tours and St. Augustine as cases of monks who had priestly ordination. The movement in the convents to take a more active part in social affairs was resisted by œcumenical councils, as for example, the Tenth, of 1139, which forbade monks becoming physicians and jurists.

Such demands and prohibitions did not indicate any depreciation of the monastic life. On the contrary, it was praised as the highest form of earthly existence. The convent was compared to the land of Canaan and described as the shortest and

surest road to heaven. The secular life, even the life of the secular priest, was compared to Egypt. The passage to the cloister was known by the dignified term conversion and the monks as converts. Bishop Otto of Freising, of the imperial family of the Hohenstaufen, in the course of a protracted panegyric of the monastic life, says that the monks "spend their lives like angels, in heavenly purity and holiness of life and conscience. They live together, one in heart and soul, give themselves at one time to sleep, lift up as by one impulse their lips in prayer and their voice in reading. They join together night and day in work with such unwearied diligence that they look upon it as godless, except during the few hours given to rest on hard beds, to allow time to pass by without occupying themselves with divine things. Yes, they go so far, that while they are refreshing the body at the table, they listen to the reading of the Scriptures, showing that even then they care more for the interests of the soul than for those of the body. They give up their own wills, their earthly possessions and their parents, and, following the command of the Gospel and Christ, constantly bear their cross by mortifying the flesh, being all the while full of heavenly homesickness."

There are probably no more attractive descriptions of earthly peace in the writings of the mediæval writers than the descriptions we have of Bernard's convent of Clairvaux. In his "Life of St. Bernard" William, abbot of St. Thierry, describing a visit to Clairvaux, says he saw "there a new heaven and a new earth. The golden age seemed to have revisited the world. At the first glance, as you enter, after descending the hill, you could feel that God was in the place, and the silent valley bespoke, in the simplicity of its buildings, the genuine humility of the poor of Christ dwelling there. The silence of the noon was as the silence of the midnight, broken only by chants and the noise of garden and field implements. No one was idle. And yet, though there were such a number in the valley, each seemed to be a solitary." The novice Peter de Roya wrote from Clairvaux that "there the monks had found a Jacob's

ladder. Their song seems to be little less than angelic and much more than human. It seems to me that I am hardly looking on men when I see them in the gardens with hoe, in the field with forks and rakes and sickles, in the wood with axe, clad in disordered garments—but that I am looking on a race of fools without speech or sense, the reproach of mankind. However, my reason assures me that their life is hid with Christ in the heavens.” This enthusiastic advocacy of the monastic life may be explained in part by two causes, the turbulent conditions of society in that day and the lack of careers to serve as a stimulus to human enterprise, but only in part. There was underlying all the sincere quest of the soul after religious satisfaction.

There is scarcely a letter of Anselm in which the superior advantages of monasticism are not emphasized. It was not essential, he declared, for one to become a monk to reach salvation, but who, he writes, “can attain salvation in a safer or nobler way, he who seeks to love God alone or he who joins the love of the world with the law of God?” He loses no opportunity of urging laymen to take the vow. He appeals to his kinsmen to become his kinsmen in the spirit, *conspirituales* as well as *consanguinei*. Bernard was not satisfied until he had all his brothers behind cloistral walls, and finally declined longer to see his married sister until she gave promise to take the veil. Kings and princes desired to be clad in the monastic habit as they met death. Even that great foe of the papacy, Frederick II., it is said, died clad in the garb of the Cistercians. At Morimond, Otho, son of the Margrave of Austria, stopped over night with fifteen companions, and was so impressed by the sound of the bells and the devotions of the monks that they prayed to be received into the brotherhood. Henry, son of Louis VI., was so moved by what he saw at Clairvaux that he determined to take the vow.

Severe enough were the conventual rules for those who practiced them. St. Bernard, it is said, prayed standing day and night, and his knees, made infirm by fasting, and his feet by

standing, were no longer able to sustain his body. His diet was bread and milk or a concoction of herbs. The monk's treatment of the natural relationships of life followed the abnormal pattern set by the old anchorets. The attitude of Bernard to his sister has been spoken of. Francis d'Assisi, not only treated his father with what we would regard as conduct unworthy of any son as he went forth into the monastic life, but is loudly praised for aiding Clara, the founder of the Sisters of St. Damian, and her sister to escape from their unwilling parents that they might take the vow.

The miraculous belonged to the monk's daily food. He was surrounded by spirits. Visions and revelations were frequent. Companies of devils were roaming about at all hours of the day and night, in the air and on foot, to deceive the unwary and to shake the faith of the vigilant. Peter the Venerable gives a graphic picture of how these restless foes pulled the bedclothes off from sleeping monks and, chuckling, carried them to a distance, how they impudently stood by making fun while the modest monastic attended to the necessities of nature, and how they threw the faithful to the ground, as at night they went about through convent precincts making "holy thefts of prayer." Cæsar, of Heisterbach, in his book on miracles, joins with Peter in recording the pranks and misdemeanors of these fell foes of the mediæval recluse.

The assaults of the devil were especially directed to induce the monk to abandon his sacred vow. Writing to a certain Helinand, Anselm mentions the four kinds of assault he was wont to make. The first was the assault through lusts of the pleasures of the world, when the novice, having recently entered the convent, began to feel the monotony of its retired life. In the second he pushed the question why the monk had chosen that form of life rather than the life of the parish priest. In the third, he pestered him with the question why he had not put off till late in life the assumption of the vow, in the meantime having a good time, and yet in the end getting all the benefits and the reward of monkery. And last of all, the devil

argued why the monk had bound himself at all by a vow, seeing it was possible to serve God just as acceptably without a vow. Anselm answered the last objection by quoting Ps. 76: 11 and declaring the vow to be in itself well pleasing to God.

It was well understood that convent walls did not of themselves make men holy. Jerome, Gregory of Nyssa and especially Augustine had said the same before. Ivo of Chartres (d. 1116) condemns the monks who are filled with the leaven of pride and boast of their ascetic practices, referring to such passages as Rom. 14: 17 and I. Tim. 4: 8. The solitudes of the mountains and forests, he says, will not make men holy, who do not carry about with them rest of soul, the Sabbath of the heart and elevation of mind. Peter the Venerable wrote to a hermit that his separation from the world would not profit unless he built a strong wall against evil in his own heart and that that wall was Christ the Saviour. Without this protection, retirement to solitude, mortifications of the body and journeyings to distant lands, instead of availing, would bring new temptations, only more violent. Every mode of life, lay and cleric, conventual and eremitic, has peculiar temptations of its own.

Gifts of lands to the monastic institutions, especially during the crusades, were common. He who built a convent was looked upon as setting up a ladder of ascent to heaven. Most of the monastic houses which attained fame began with humble beginnings, and severe discipline. The colonies were placed often in lonely regions, places difficult of access in valley or on mountain or in swamp. So it was with Chartreuse, with Cîteaux, with the convents along the wild frontiers of north-eastern Germany. The Franciscans set a different example by going into the cities and haunts of population. The beautiful names, often assumed, showed the change which was expected to take place in the surroundings, such as Bright Valley, Good Place, Happy Meadow, Crown of Heaven, and Path to Heaven. Walter Mapes, the Englishman, writing in the last of the twelfth century, lingers on the fair names of the Cistercian con-

vents which, he says, "contain in themselves a divine and prophetic element, such as House of God, Gate of Salvation," etc.

With wealth, came the great abbeys of stone, exhibiting the highest architecture of the day. The establishments of Cîteaux, Cluny, the Grande Chartreuse and the great houses of England were on an elaborate scale. No pains or money were spared in their erection and equipment. Stained glass, sculpture, embroidery, rich vestments were freely used. A well-ordered house had many parts, chapel, refectory, calefactory, scriptorium, hospital. Not one structure, but an aggregation of buildings, was required by the larger establishments. Cluny in 1245 was able to accommodate, at the same time, the pope, the King of France and the Emperor of Constantinople, together with their retinues. Matthew Paris says Dunfermline Abbey, Scotland, was ample enough to entertain, at the same time, three sovereigns without inconvenience the one to the other. The latest conveniences were introduced into these houses, the latest news there retailed. A convent was, upon the whole, a pretty good place to be, from the standpoint of worldly well-being. What the modern club house is to the city, that the mediæval convent was apt to be, so far as material appointments went. In its vaults, the rich deposited their valuables. To its protection the oppressed fled for refuge. There, as at Westminster, St. Denis and Dunfermline kings and princes chose to be buried. And there, while living, they were often glad to abide, as the most notable place of comfort and ease they could find on their journeys.

The conventual establishment was intended to be a self-sufficient corporation, a sort of socialistic community doing all its own work and supplying all its own stuffs and food. The altruistic principle was supposed to rule. They had their orchards and fields and owned their own cattle. Some of them gathered honey from their own hives, had the fattest fish ponds, sheared their own wool, made their own wine and brewed their own beer. In their best days the monks set a good example

of thrift. The list of the minor officials in a convent was complete from the cellarer, to look after the cooking, and the chamberlain, to look after the dress of the brethren, to the cantor, to direct the singing, and the sacristan, to care for the church ornaments. The custom began in the eleventh century of associating lay brethren with the monasteries, so that these institutions might, in all particulars, be completely independent. Nor, it may be said, was the convent always indifferent to the poor. But the tendency was for it to center attention upon itself rather than to seek the regeneration of those around about its walls.

Like many other ideals, the ideals of peace, virtue and happy contentment and the ideal of holiness aimed at by the convent were not reached, or if approached in the first moments of overflowing ardor, were soon forfeited. For the method of monasticism is radically wrong. Here and there, no doubt, the cloister was "the audience chamber of God." Contemporary history gives the names, to say the least, of no better men than the names of monks. But arrogance, idleness and loose morals invariably followed prosperity. If Otto of Freising gives unstinted praise to the cloisteral communities, his contemporary, Anselm of Havelberg condemns the idleness and gossip of monks which he found within and without convent walls. Elizabeth of Schönau and Hildegard of Bingen, prophetesses of the convent in the twelfth century, rebuked much that was far from being ideal in the lives of monks and nuns. There is a *chronique scandaleuse* of the monastery as dark and repulsive as the *chronique scandaleuse* of the papacy during the pornography and under the last popes of the Middle Ages.* The convent of Brittany over which Abaelard was placed as abbot, and of which he tells us in his biography, reveals a rude and shocking state of things. After 1300 things got to be worse. Teachers of the universities like William of St. Amour (d. 1270) had scathing words for monkish arrogance and profligacy.

* Albert Hauck gives a number of instances of the moral degeneracy of German convents in his "Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands," Vol. IV., pp. 401 sqq.

gacy. Did not a bishop during the Avignon captivity of the papacy declare that from personal examination he knew a convent where all the nuns had carnal intercourse with demons? The revelations of St. Bridget of Sweden (d. 1375), approved at the councils of Constance and Basel, reveal the same low condition of monastic virtue. Nicolas of Clemanges (d. 1440), wrote vigorous protests against the decay of the orders and describes their decay in darkest colors, their waste, gluttony, idleness and profligacy. He says a girl going into a convent might as well be regarded as an abandoned woman at once. It was true, as Cæsar of Heisterbach had said in a homily several centuries before, "religion brought riches and riches destroyed religion." Pure as the motives of the founders and a multitude of the inmates of convents undoubtedly were at the first, the ideal was a one-sided one and involved the fruitful germ of selfishness, the care for oneself by seclusion of self from one's fellowmen. If the institution of monasticism came to be the synonym for superstition and the irreconcilable foe to human progress, it was because there is something pernicious in that method of attempting to secure holiness. The monks crushed out the heretical sects and set themselves against the renaissance. They became the chief champions of the papacy and Franciscans were the active promoters of rebellion and discord against Frederick II., against whom and whose house the papacy had declared irreconcilable war. They became the pope's agents in England and elsewhere for extorting papal revenue and for weakening the power of the episcopate. Chaucer's description of the prior was taken from the life of his age—

"He was a lord full fat and in good point."

And yet we would do wrong to forget the services which the monastery did at a certain period in the history of mediæval Europe or to deny the holy purpose of their founders. It will not do for one age to condemn another for the methods it pursued in meeting its own problems. Nor would it be generous to deny the great obligation of the church at the present time to the monasteries for preserving the older literature both

classic and ecclesiastical and preparing theological volumes, hymns and rituals which still contribute to our thought and church service. A contemplation of the imposing spectacle of mediæval monasticism should stir the church to humbleness of spirit and to zeal in the prosecution of her work to-day. We study the movements of the past, not to find fault, but to learn and become better equipped for grappling with the problems of our own time.

LANE SEMINARY, CINCINNATI, O.

X.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

We take pleasure in announcing to our readers that hereafter Professor G. W. Richards, D.D., will be associated with the undersigned in the editorship of the REVIEW; which we are sure will add much to its future efficiency and value. Further statements on the subject must be deferred to a future occasion.

WM. RUPP.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL QUESTION AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

The attitude of the Catholic Church towards the public schools in the United States has never been peaceful and friendly. In the earlier days the schools were declared objectionable because the reading of the Bible was tolerated therein. In consequence largely of the opposition of the Catholics, the Bible was banished from the schools; and now the schools are declared *secular, Godless*; and the Catholic opposition is fiercer than ever. What Carthage was in the eyes of the Roman citizens in the old times, namely, an object that *must be destroyed*, that the American school system is now in the eyes of the Roman Catholic Church. During the current year the *Catholic World* has contained a number of articles bearing upon the subject. Some of these have lately been gathered together and published in pamphlet form for wider circulation. We have seen articles on the subject also in other Catholic publications. The schools must be destroyed, at least so far as their relation to the Catholic Church is concerned, is the sentiment which usually runs through these publications. And we give these Catholic writers credit for sincerity of purpose. They seriously consider it an outrage that they should be compelled to pay tax for the support of a school system

which they will not patronize, and which their priesthood declares to be an abomination of desolation. And they seem to flatter themselves just now with the idea of their *ability* to get rid of the abominable thing. They count much on their political power. They claim that there are ten million Catholics in the country, with a school population of at least one million. They believe in the righteousness of their cause. "Would you compel one million of children to attend Godless schools to which their parents object?" they ask. And then they talk mysteriously of their power and of what they might do, if they were driven to desperation. What they might be willing to attempt to do in such circumstances can only be inferred from their past history in France, the Palatinate, and elsewhere. We believe, however, that they overestimate their strength; and we believe also that the Catholics misunderstand the present temper of the American people. That some of their prelates seem to have free access to some high officials in the government does not prove that their influence is very great. At any rate one repetition, on however small a scale, of *the Night of St. Bartholomew* would very quickly put an end to Catholicism in America.

We believe, accordingly, that this present agitation of the school question is unwise. The Catholics can get up any amount of trouble for themselves and for the American people, but they can not change the American policy. The American school system has been devised for the American people, nine-tenths of whom are still Protestants. Originally the proportion of Protestants was much larger than it is now. The Catholic population has gained much in consequence of the indifference or magnanimity of the Protestants; but should a question ever arise as to a radical change of the religious policy of the country, the Protestant population would stand together solid; and what that would mean it would not be difficult to foretell. The American people are now, as they have been from the beginning, a Protestant people. Our government is based upon Protestant principles. Our institutions

rest upon the idea of the separation of church and state, religion and politics; and those who go about disseminating contrary doctrines here are not welcome. We will render allegiance to no foreign ruler, and be governed by no foreign laws no matter under what pretence they may be commended to us. We may have no law of *præmunire* on our statute books, but the principle is deeply written in the hearts of the Anglo-Saxon people; and any serious infringement of our traditions would very quickly make our people all Anglo-Saxon. Now the public school system is an important part of our American institutions. To support it is a part of our patriotism; and the American people will never consent to sacrifice it at the behest of any class of religionists who acknowledge allegiance to a foreign temporal prince and obtain their laws from any foreign source.

The charges which are brought against the schools are numerous and grave. It is charged, for instance, that the schools are inefficient, and do not yield results commensurate to their expense—in other words, they cost more than they are worth. Like every thing else they are said to have come to be exploited for private ends. Now, it may be that our schools are not perfect. Some of these charges may be true. Nevertheless, so long as we have nothing better offered in place of them, so long our people will do well to defend what they have. And we maintain that for popular education our schools are not excelled by any in the world. Much as we have heard of the famous *Volkschulen* of Germany, we are convinced that American children get a far more thorough, more comprehensive, and more practical education than children of the same class do in Europe. Our schools are not class schools; they are popular schools in the best sense, and their intention is to afford the children of all classes an equal chance of acquiring such an education as will fit them for the struggle of life. But, it will be asked, are not our schools *secular*? Do they not relegate the important matter of religion to some other department of life than the school? And how can you have

complete and thorough education without religious instruction and training? In order that intellectual training may be of much account for the benefit of the people—for the safety of society, the stability of the government, the security and freedom of the citizen—it must not be sundered from morality and religion. There can be no national welfare without national morality; but morality, it is said, has its sanctions in religion, and religion is impossible without a church; but there is no true church except the church of Rome, built upon the rock of St. Peter. That is usually the reasoning in which the Catholic, and some Protestants, too, begog themselves in regard to this matter of the public school question.

Now we, too, believe that education and religion can not safely be divorced. Morality, religion, and education must be duly combined in order to yield the best results. Mere intellectualism is not education. The Protestants recognized this fact about as soon as the Catholics did; and as the first step in the alliance of religion and education, they recommended the reading of the Bible in the schools. This proposition the Catholics opposed with all their might. They claimed that a religion based upon the Bible alone would be virtually the religion of the Protestants; and that, in the opinion of the Catholic, would be worse than no religion at all. It was the Catholics who, as we have just seen, kept the Bible out of the schools. But we are far from being convinced that that was an unmixed evil. It left the schools free from all sectarian dogmatism, and from all jangling about the most sacred of Christian books. But did it, therefore, keep religion out of the schools? Not so long as the American people are a religious, a Christian people. We venture to say that there is more religion in the schools of Pennsylvania and of Massachusetts than in those of France and Italy. The training of the young is not necessarily graceless and Godless because the schools do not inculcate the tenets of a religious sect. There are thousands of men and women employed in the schools, who will exercise a Christian influence upon the hearts

and minds of their pupils, whether they formally teach them Christian doctrines or not. They breathe into their pupils the inmost quality of the Christian life, in fact without knowing it; but we agree with the leaders of the Catholic Church that the religion growing out of this influence will not be Catholicism. But this fact, which condemns it to them, is what commends it to us. And besides there is no obstacle put in the way of teaching the dogmas of religion in the family, the Sunday-school, and the church. So that neither the children of Catholics nor of Protestants need to go without Christian training because this is a work that can not be performed by the schools.

The fact, we apprehend, is not so much that the Catholics are afraid that the young are getting no religious training, as that they are getting a training which they do not want them to get. These pupils trained in Protestant schools will not be without consciences and sensibilities; they will have consciences and religious sensibilities well marked; but they will perhaps not be the consciences and sensibilities that can be swayed by the mere will of a foreign religious teacher or agitator. And it is for this reason that Catholics now usually appeal for a division of the school fund. The schools are managed impartially and fairly; and offer to the children of Catholic parents the same chance of a preparation for life which they offer to the Protestant children. But fairness is not what the Catholic wants. He wants advantages in favor of his own system which are more than fair, and which he has sometimes gotten, but which we do not believe that the American people are any longer in the humor of granting. These Catholic agitators will no longer be widely listened to when they propose a division of the schools and of the school funds, allowing each denomination and narrow sect to manage its own schools. That might do, the American people will be likely to say, if the adherents of the different sects could be divided off from each other, and each be allotted its separate dwelling place; but as it is, Catholics and Protestants must dwell among

each other; and the Protestants, who are the majority, want to be assured that their Catholic neighbors are not only educated, but, educated in such way *that they can be trusted* to be good, honest, loyal, and patriotic citizens. The Protestants have read history; and they would have read history totally in vain if they did not demand on the part of their fellow citizens an education that might enable them to presume in them the same essential conscience and the same moral and religious feelings as in themselves. They are not deaf to the appeal for equal religious right and justice. But they can not forget that the Catholics never listened to such appeals in other times and other lands, when they were powerful and when the victims of their oppression and tyranny were few and weak. They tell the public that their children of school age are a million or more in numbers; and the public will rightly say, that that is too large a number of young people to be educated without some sort of public supervision. The object of public education is not to train theologians, nor even to prepare men and women for an abode in the kingdom of God, but for honest and upright citizenship of the state. And hence the education of the young man can not be committed to any other body than the state itself.

The Catholic proposition of a division of the school fund, and of the schools, and of the separate education of Catholic and Protestant children, is therefore a proposition which the state can not consider for a moment. The future security of the state and of the peace of society may not be endangered by a weak yielding to the specious appeals for justice which Catholics are now pouring into the ears of Protestants. Protestants love justice; but Protestants have memories, too, and they will recall what their ancestors suffered in England, in Holland, in France, in the Palatinate, and elsewhere; and they will not be minded to put power into the same hands again to commit similar crimes. And here we are bound to refer to a fact which might otherwise be forgotten, namely, the Catholic claim to *infallibility*. Other institutions which admit the pos-

sibility of progress and change, might be trusted to act differently now from the way in which they acted three hundred years ago; but not so the Catholic Church. She never changes. If she encouraged the murder of heretics three hundred years ago, there is reason to believe that in similar circumstances she might do so again. She has never uttered any expression of regret for the part she took in those dreadful scenes of murder and blood, which the Protestant can not forget. She has never recanted any thing. To recant would imply that she once made a mistake. And to change her conduct with reference towards the "heretics" now, would likewise imply a confession of error, which she will never make. There are a few crimes of the same kind on the hands of the Protestants. The burning of Servetus, for instance, was a damnable murder, and its enormity is not diminished by saying that it was in the fashion of the times. But there is this difference between the Protestants and the Catholics: the Protestants long since confessed their crime and owned the shame of it, and they may be trusted not to do the same thing again; while the Catholics have never confessed any wrong and every young generation of Catholics is brought up to believe that their church never made any mistake, even when she made the churches of Rome ring with *Te Deums* on the murder of twenty thousand Huguenots.

In view of these circumstances, then, is there any doubt as to how the Protestant should answer the Catholic agitator on this school question? The Catholic says to the Protestant, in effect: "You hold one theory of education, we hold another; we are both brothers in a common cause, namely the defence and advancement of our common country. We have no right under our form of government forcibly to impose our views of religion upon you; neither have you any right to impose your views upon me and my children. Let us then agree to disagree. You instruct your children as you deem proper; and we will do the same with ours. Then let the state distribute the school funds impartially between us according to

the results obtained in the prescribed branches of instruction, and we will confidently abide the result." This is the plan which a writer in the *Catholic World* for June of the past year propounds as a "theory that would satisfy the Catholics." Well, may be it would; but he would be a very shallow Protestant who would be satisfied on his part by such a clumsy arrangement. Here is a proposition, for instance, with which no intelligent Protestant can be satisfied: "The religious training of the child and the development of its moral character," says the writer already referred to, "belong to the parent; therefore the state can not interfere in this domain—as it now does so officiously and tyrannically under the present system, and say that religion and morals shall not be taught to those children." To all this the Protestant will answer: "We do not wish to interfere with your or your child's conscience, so long as it refers to matters purely religious as such; but there is a domain where religion and personal faith on the one hand and political and social matters on the other are in close contact; and therefore it is important that the state ought to have some influence over the formation of the conscience and over the kind of a conscience that is formed. All citizens of the state must be loyal to its government and laws, and must respect the life and rights of all other citizens. And as there have been occurrences in history which we Protestants have not forgotten, and which the Catholic Church has never condemned, it is not proposed that the state should give up its control over the civil and political teaching of its children. No, we want to have something to say to the political education of our neighbor's children as well as of our own."

We could, then, not agree to this proposition of dividing the school funds and separating the Catholic and Protestant schools. It is a proposition that to us seems to be full of peril. If the schools were divided, and the Catholic schools put into the care of Jesuits and nuns, whose consciences have never been considered free from partisan bias, how then could it be known that *anarchy* was not taught under the guise of history, or that

subjection to the pope of Rome or to some Catholic monarch was not taught as a "moral duty"? How could we know that these separate schools would not be used as propaganda for the introduction and dissemination of foreign theories of government and citizenship? Pius IX, in the Syllabus of Errors, No. 55, declares it to be an error to "say that the church ought to be separated from the state, and the state from the church." We presume that that is a doctrine which would be taught in the Catholic schools. The same authority has taught also that it is an error to "hold that in the present state it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship." This means that the Catholic religion should be considered as the only religion of the state. And this is doubtless what Catholic schools would teach. In the Encyclical of Leo XIII, issued in 1885, all freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press is condemned, Protestantism is declared to be no better than atheism, and to demand freedom of worship for Protestants is declared to be a grievous error. And this sort of stuff would undoubtedly be taught the Catholic youth in the Catholic schools. Who can doubt that, with such teaching in a part of our schools, there would soon be an end in this country of religious and social peace? And it is, therefore, the solemn duty of Protestant teachers and statesmen faithfully to watch over the peace and freedom of religion purchased with the blood of our fathers in this and other lands.

It has long been a habit of our Catholic fellow-citizens to denounce Protestants as *heretics*—persons who are not Christians, and have no hope of mercy from God, and are not entitled to any mercy, or even right, from men. And when it was possible the common rights of life were denied them by Catholic rulers; and when that was not possible they were *cursed*. Does not any one reading the proceedings of the Council of Trent feel that the very air is heavy with the *curses* of the "holy fathers" who there pretend to be defending the

true Christian faith? Now these curses have lost much of their meaning. What has emptied them of their significance in the minds of ordinary Catholics, has been the fact that they have known too much of the character of Protestants to believe them to be the wild beasts which priests have painted them to be. And for this condition the schools have been largely responsible. In the schools Protestant and Catholic children have associated on terms of equality, of confidence, and of friendship. The Catholics especially have learned that the Protestants are not such monsters as the representatives of the pope have reported them to be. And this fact makes these Vatican curses for the most part fall harmless at the feet of Protestants. Protestants have never feared the influence of Catholic curses upon *heaven*, but they have often had reason to fear their effect upon ignorant and fanatical Catholics. And for this reason they would not be willing to see the common schools abolished, and the children of each denomination sent to separate schools. These separate schools would inevitably become training camps for opposing armies. The Catholic population would inevitably grow fiercer in their hatred of Protestants. The old habits of "banning and cursing the heretics" would be revived. Instead of respect they would awaken in young Catholics hatred for Protestants, that could not long remain passive. They would sooner or later break out into the flames of a civil war, the results of which could not be doubtful. "It is," as Rousseau has said, "impossible to live in peace with those whom we firmly believe to be devoted to damnation; to love them would be to hate God who punishes them." And that would be the effect upon the mind of the Catholics of a complete separation of them in the schools. It would be in a short time to convert our American society into a very hell. But, it may be asked, what will be the effect ultimately of the free mingling of Protestant and Catholic children in the schools? Will it not tend to undermine, sooner or later, the foundations of the churches? We answer, if it does, then in God's name let it do so, and let it do

it quickly. Any church that can not stand the light ought to go down. And this is evidently what the Catholic is afraid of in this school matter. He is afraid that his church can not stand the strain; and to be candid, we are bound to say that we believe that he has reason to fear. Any institution that has behind it the moral record of the Roman Catholic Church can not be the sole institution of salvation for the world; and it is as much to the interest of the Catholic to know the truth, as it is to the interest of the Protestant. What is the use in believing things the reality and truth of which can not be maintained in reason and conscience?

THE CHRISTIAN POINT OF VIEW.

The standpoint of a theologian determines the character of his theology. The difference between the conservatives and progressives is due to a difference of standpoint. Both may be equally devout and scholarly, yet their theological interpretations seem to be diametrically opposed. This fact appeared so clearly in the controversy stirred up in the publication of Harnack's "What is Christianity?" The conservative Lutheran professors of Germany condemned it, not only as heretical, but even as diabolical. The radicals of Germany hailed it as a work equal in its epoch-making significance to Strauss' *Leben Jesu*. Why should earnest, thoughtful scholars reach so widely different conclusions? It can be accounted for only by differences, in the method of the study of the Scriptures, in the interpretation of church history, and in the theory of knowledge. These three factors enter into every theological system and determine largely our conception of Christianity. So long as men do not agree in adopting the same method of studying the Bible, say, for example, the historico-critical method, or the allegorical and dogmatic method, they can never agree in their conclusions. No amount of argument will reconcile opponents. It is not argument, but change of standpoint, that is required before agreement in theology is possible.

It is evident that the new division, or line of cleavage, in Protestantism, and for that matter, also, in Romanism, is caused by the application of the scientific method to the study of the Scriptures and of church history. The Bible is treated as literature and must, therefore, be tested by the laws of literary criticism. Its contents, however, can only be known truly by those who have the spirit of the sacred writers. The history of the apostolic age and of the patristic church is studied with the same historical method as the history of any other institution in the ancient world. Instead of reading history through the preconceived notions of a later age, we try to base our notions of an age upon the facts which are found in the sources. The Bible, too, is read in the light of the environment in which its respective books were written. Its principles are deduced from an accurate knowledge of the purpose, surroundings, and standpoint of the authors. Thus an effort is made to let the Bible testify for itself instead of suborning theological, philosophical, or mystical witnesses, who are to testify for it. Still there are differences in the conclusions of the critical scholars. Yet it matters little what their conclusions are on questions which can only be critically discerned, so long as they agree in method of study. They are members then of one school and in the end will reach practically reliable results. Far greater are the variations in the systems of the reformers, or of the Greek and Latin fathers, who were under the influence of philosophical systems, allegorical interpretations, and dogmatic tendencies, than are the differences in the present day theologians of the historico-critical school.

This statement is illustrated in a booklet entitled, "The Christian Point of View." It contains three addresses, delivered within the last academic year at the Union Theological Seminary. They were prepared by three of the professors of the faculty, without prearrangement, and were presented on different occasions. The first address is on *The Problem for the Church*, by George W. Knox, professor of the philosophy

and history of religion; the second, on Theological Reconstruction, by Arthur C. McGiffert, professor of church history; the third, on The Religious Value of the Old Testament, by Francis Brown, professor of Hebrew and the cognate languages. The authors represent departments in theology not closely allied, and yet there is a remarkable agreement in their views. The fact that three original and thorough scholars so nearly coincide, in their views on the questions of the day, in their conception of Christ and his place in Christian thinking and living, and in their theory of knowledge by which they separate Christian theology from natural religion, philosophical systems, and metaphysics, calls for comment and consideration. They do not simply speak for themselves; they voice the opinions of many of the leading scholars on both continents. Their conclusions are positive, practical, and, above all, thoroughly Christocentric. Jesus Christ is magnified by the philosopher, the historian, and the Semitic scholar. They meet at the feet of Jesus and from Him receive the words of eternal life. This augurs well for the future and indicates that the period of reconstruction has begun. Christ will still be the chief cornerstone. The lamb will be the light in the new temple of truth.

In analyzing the addresses we observe that they agree in the following points: they refer to the unrest in the church at present and assign reasons for it; they then state the questions at issue; and, finally, they propose a solution by an application of the teachings of Jesus.

Dr. Knox sees the signs of unrest in the agitation for a change in the confessional statements of the Presbyterian Church. Even in the Church Universal there is discontent and a feeling that "the times are out of joint." The slow progress made by the Church in winning the world unto Christ is an index of weakness in the bearers of the Gospel message. Dr. McGiffert, also, refers to the "great theological unrest." "Many Christians, men and women, are complaining that they do not know what to think or what to believe, and even some

ministers seem to be all at sea, and quite without a positive and definite, and clear-cut message to bring to their people." He believes that as a consequence "the progress of the gospel is seriously impeded in many quarters." Dr. Brown, in a similar strain, writes: "Everything is now questioned, and with Christ made at home in the world, and his place in Christianity emphasized, it is impossible that critical inquiry should not be directed toward the phenomenon that the early Christian writings are bound in a volume more than three quarters of which was written centuries before Christ appeared." No one, who is in touch with our age, can deny the existence of agitation and unrest in Church and State. Men may differ, however, as to the significance of it. Some regard it as the spirit of unbelief, apostasy, and anarchy. Others consider it the evidence of new life, deeper comprehension of truth, and a heroic effort to actualize the new ideals in social, ecclesiastical and theological forms. The position of the writers will appear as we consider the reasons they assign for the restlessness in the church.

In the first address the fundamental reason for the unrest in the Christian Church is the want of a Christian conception of God; God as revealed in Christ Jesus. The question, which confronts the church and which must be answered by its members, is, What think ye of God? But why can we not keep the idea of God which has prevailed in the church for centuries? The God of the theologians, from the days of the Greek fathers to the German philosophers, has been the God of nature, rather than the God revealed in Christ. "Theology has sought to go up through nature to nature's God, to God as creator of nature, his wisdom and power seen through nature, his attributes described and analyzed by a method learned in schools far other than those of the apostles and prophets. Thus, it has been the God of reason and nature first, with proofs from nature, at most supplemented with Scripture texts. And the revelation of Christ, if it appear at all, has been given an inconspicuous place, the lesson he teaches made an appendix to a natural theology."

A little reflection upon this assertion may open our eyes to the fact that we owe more to the Neo-platonists, the scientists and mystics, for our idea of God than to Jesus Christ. It, furthermore, shows us why there is a felt need for a change in the conception of God. In proportion as men know Jesus and behold him only, they will feel that their theology is not in accord with his revelation of God. Again, since our theology has been based on a view of nature and of man, on physics, metaphysics and anthropology, every modification in our theories of nature will demand a corresponding change in our conception of God. It is a truism that the old philosophy of nature is passing away. "The old logic no longer convinces man, the old philosophy no longer controls his thoughts, the old problems no longer interest. With a new reason and a new soul, man looks out upon a new heaven and a new earth. Our fathers two generations back were nearer to the men of Greece and Rome than to ourselves." To build, therefore, a theological system upon natural science, Greek philosophy, or Christian experience is to build on shifting sand. The rock, which is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, is Jesus Christ.

Dr. McGiffert states the reasons for the necessity of reconstruction in other language and as a historian. Yet in substance there is little difference in the views of the two professors. "The existing difficulties are due to various causes, among others to the modern critical philosophy which has made the old Platonic and Neoplatonic view of God and man, that prevailed for so many centuries within the church, impossible to many leaders of theological thought; still more to modern science, which has changed entirely traditional ideas of the world, not among theologians simply, but among the masses as well; in part, also, to modern missions, which have broken down forever the old comfortable and selfish doctrines of election and the old narrow interpretation of the gospel, and have set many to wondering whether a knowledge of Christ is really necessary to salvation, and whether Christianity is really God's only revelation to men in these latter days; and

finally, and just now most potently, to modern historical criticism, which has destroyed the old view of the Bible, and has thrown multitudes into dire confusion as to where to look for religious authority, and as to what to believe on all sorts of religious questions."

This is certainly a clear statement of the causes of ferment in the church. It is a question, now, whether Christians have a right to recognize them as coming from the spirit of truth working in the mind of the church, or whether they are to be condemned as the product of the spirit of error and darkness. When one is confronted by multitudes of men and women, who are conscientiously and intelligently grappling with these questions, and whose Christian piety is indisputable, whose sacrifices for the gospel are well known; then, indeed, it becomes difficult simply to denounce and put under the ban such inquirers. They can only be met in the same earnest, candid, and scholarly spirit, in which they appear. Perchance, they are an important factor, in the providence of God, to bring out the fullness of truth in Christ Jesus.

While Dr. Knox does not give in detail, nor does his subject demand it, the reasons for difference in regard to the Old Testament, the tenor of his address proves him to be in full accord with his colleagues. He defines two parties who take opposite sides on the question, "Are the Old Testament books really Christian Scriptures?" "One party denies that they are. The Old Testament antedates Christianity and is on a lower plane. The Old Testament may represent a stage of the human journey on the way to Christ, but it is a stage to which we do not revert when we have reached Christ himself. Christ gives a new revelation of God, so original, so profound, so penetrating, that it is practically a new God whom he reveals." The other party goes to the opposite extreme and "affirms not only that the Old Testament books are Christian Scriptures, but also that they are fully on a par, for the Christian religion, with the books of the New Testament." The author regards both of these positions extreme and contrary to the facts in the

Bible itself. He proposes a middle ground between the two extremes. The relative value of the teachings in the Old Testament must be determined by the Christian standard. "Whatever in it accords with the teachings, purpose, and spirit of Jesus Christ has religious value for us. Whatever does not accord with these lacks religious value, whether it stands in the Old Testament or in day before yesterday's sermon."

After the problems have been stated and the causes for their existence, we are naturally most interested in the solution. The age is seeking an answer to the new questions, which may be as authoritative and convincing, if not more so, than the solutions of the past. In presenting their solution the three writers come to a point of agreement in their appeal to the historic Jesus. The idea of God, which Christians are to hold and which time, even, can not change, must come from Jesus. The principle of theological reconstruction is the life purpose of Jesus. The test of the religious value of the writings of the Old Testament is the standard of Christ.

But what do they mean by their appeal to Jesus? Has not the church in every age done likewise? Are we then wiser than the fathers who have gone before us? We have heard much about Christocentric theology, but have never heard a clear definition of it. There are evidently Christocentric theologies and Christocentric theologies. These addresses, however, are very explicit in the definition of this point, which they call the Christian point of view.

Dr. Knox gives his conception of the revelation of God in Christ by way of contrasts. "Natural theology leads us to a God perfect in wisdom and power, omnipotent and omniscient, it says; philosophy leads us to a God all-perfect in being, or to a God who is perfect thought, or infinite, eternal will. Theology joins these together and adds the holiness of the ancient prophets of Israel's God and declares God is perfect; then God is a spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. As the sonorous words echo in our ears, our souls are filled with won-

der, reverence, and awe." However profound, sublime, and true such a definition of God may be, can we draw nigh to Him in the spirit of adoption, crying, Abba, Father?

The God whom Christ reveals is not described in such language. He says, "Be ye therefore perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." These are not terms of science or of philosophy. "No word must be translated when uttered to the babes and sucklings in the faith." Jesus continues his picture of God, saying, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be children of your Father which is in heaven." "And there rises before us the image of one whose visage was marred, who was cursed, hated, despitefully used and persecuted, who, led like a lamb to the slaughter, opened not his mouth, and on the cross prayed for those who slew him. And we understand in his light, saying: We have seen the Father."

Jesus revealed God in social language, in the terms of the family, and the relations of men in society. His parables are taken from that sphere and the sermon on the Mount breathes the spirit of fatherhood and brotherhood. The church of later generations translated the revelation of Jesus into the language of Greek philosophy, Roman law, or modern science. It was, however, less of a translation than of a substitution. Instead of preserving the simple social and ethical language of Jesus, which is adapted to every age and every condition of men, they used the language of the schools, which was comprehensible only by the scholars. Who, for example, knows what a *logos* is? Who can believe in a *logos*? Who can love a *logos*? Yet for centuries that term was the name applied to Jesus, overshadowing in significance His whole historic life. The God of Jesus, if men are to love Him and believe in Him, must be described in the simple terms of the human family.

Dr. McGiffert says the proper basis for a Christian theology "is the historic figure Jesus Christ and the revelation which He has brought." He then summarizes the historic theologies

of the past which have not been based upon the life and work of Jesus. "They have been, in fact, almost everything else but genuinely Christian theologies. In the system of the Alexandrine theologians the eternal Logos, not the historic figure Jesus Christ, had the place of prominence; in the system of Augustine the twofold conception of God as the alone source of good and as absolute will was dominant, and Jesus Christ was quite unnecessary; to the medieval theologians only His relation to the sacramental system and to the treasury of merits was important; to Calvin the sovereign decree of God was the constructive principle, and the figure of Jesus occupied a subsidiary place. And so in recent days we have had theological reconstructions based upon the conception of the church as the perpetual incarnation, the mystical body of the Son of God; upon the doctrine of the divine immanence; upon the theory of evolution, and most recently of all upon the principle of personality. We have had plenty of reconstruction upon all sorts of bases, but upon the basis of Jesus Christ's revelation we have had very few."

He then continues to point out the valuable work of Luther, Schleiermacher and Ritschl. The significance of the last named is "that he followed Luther in calling the church back to the historic Christ." Yet the work of reconstruction has only begun. It may require centuries before it is completed.

To make Christ the basis of Christian theology is not to build upon a theory of his person or on the incarnation. Nor are we to interpret simply the great events in his career, his birth, death, resurrection and ascension. It is rather "the life purpose of Jesus," which must be the controlling principle of theology. That purpose was "to impart to others or induce in others the life which he was living—the life of freedom from fear and sin, the life of complete victory over the world through faith in God his father and through devotion to his will—and so to establish on earth the kingdom of God."

This will at once be criticized as too narrow and indefinite a principle for a Christian theology. If such a theology in

the future is to answer all the questions belonging to a speculative philosophy, giving us a philosophy of God, man, and the universe, the criticism is valid. But did Christ come to reveal these truths of philosophy? Does their discussion properly belong to a distinctively Christian theology? Cosmogony and cosmology, evolution and creation, human freedom and divine authority, are interesting subjects, which men will continue to answer in the light of new discoveries, but which should be kept apart from Christian theology. They belong to philosophy, anthropology, and metaphysics. Christian theology has to do only with the systematizing of the principles of the Christian religion, the principles which underlie and govern the Christ life. It means, indeed, a great reduction in the scope and contents of purely Christian theology. Yet it means, also, an elimination from theology of that which does not belong to the distinctive religion of Jesus and can not be comprehended by the life of faith.

We shall still have left the central truths of the Christian system. "The Christian view of God, as Christ's Father and ours; a God of love, whose purpose of love for His children is realized in Christ's life of service; a God who is ever giving Himself for His children, even as Christ gave Himself for His brethren. We get also the Christian view of the world, that it belongs to God, and that for the child of God it is a field for service, for conflict, and for victory. We get also the Christian view of men: children of God and brethren one of another. We get also the Christian view of salvation: victory over the world and sin and death, and the conscious fulfilling of the purpose of God. And we get also the Christian view of Christ: the one who has given us His faith in God His father, and so has brought God to us and given us the victory over the world and sin and death which was His." There remain after all great positive truths, which men in all ages have tried to formulate, but with them they joined so many other problems that the central Christian truths were eclipsed. For instance, the writer says: "The creation of the world, the

origin of man, the historicity of Adam, the fall, the deluge, Jonah, the nature and attributes of the absolute—with all these Christianity has absolutely nothing to do, any more than with astronomy or geology, or mathematics." By this he does not mean that these subjects are not to be studied, but that they belong to other departments than that of Christian theology. The scientists will discuss the origin of the world, and the historicity of Adam; they will have to compare their scientific results with the biblical conceptions and assign each their relative value. The student of comparative religion, of historic documents, and of metaphysics will have to deal with other problems. But the future Christian theologian will confine himself to the life purpose of the historic Jesus.

We have reviewed these essays to present the positions of an extensive school of modern Christian scholars. Upon the fundamentals, here sketched, they are practically agreed. It is, also, one of the clearest and briefest statements of the Christian point of view that we have yet read. Men may differ from it, yet they must recognize the loyalty of these men to Jesus Christ. What they exclude from the sphere of Christian theology are the very points upon which Christianity has been divided. Metaphysics and philosophy have been the cause of the great divisions in the church. The insistence that men should hold and agree on points which Jesus never touched in his teachings has been the stumbling block in the church. If it is possible to construct a theology upon the basis here outlined, it would be the greatest motive for closer Christian fellowship and unity that has thus far been proposed in the church's history. Christianity would be expressed in simple Christlike forms, which the child could accept and which would satisfy the mind and heart of the sage.

G. W. R.

LANCASTER, PA.

XI.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[Any books noticed in this REVIEW can be purchased, at the lowest prices, of the *Reformed Church Publication Board*, 1306 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa.]

THE STUDY OF RELIGION. By Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D., Professor in the University of Pennsylvania. Pages 451. The Walter Scott Publishing Company, Paternoster Square, London. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 153-157 Fifth Ave., New York. 1902. Price, \$1.50.

This volume belongs to the *Contemporary Science Series*, at present in course of publication under the general editorship of Havelock Ellis. The subject of which it treats is one of intense interest to all intelligent persons, whatever may be their profession or their religion, and is ably presented by the learned author of this volume. Religion is not something accidental in the life and history of humanity. It is the necessary product of the spiritual nature of man. Men are bound to be religious by the necessary constitution of their nature; and if any are ever found without religion, that is a condition which must be set to the account of a one-sided or perverted culture. Religion, moreover, has entered profoundly into the development of human life and history; and no man's education can be said to be complete who is totally ignorant of this important factor in the process of human evolution. But religion is more than an historical interest. It is a personal interest, and concerns the life and happiness of all men. And hence it appeals to the thoughtful interest of all scholars. Men may, indeed, be religious without much knowledge of the philosophy and history of religion. The old lady who knows "her Bible true," and knows nothing else; it has been said, may know more than the most cultured Frenchman does. Religion is an interest of life. It is a state and activity of the heart, which may not be associated with much knowledge. But after all there is an advantage in knowledge. It has been said of language that "the man who knows but one, knows none." And the same is true of religion. The man who knows but one religion may enjoy that and be happy; but his religion can not be to him what it would be if he knew it in comparison with other religions. The man of liberal culture, and especially the Christian minister, or the religious teacher and guide of any community, can not properly discharge his functions, if he knows no religion but his own. An intelligent understanding of his own requires a comparative knowledge of all. And to this end this volume of Pro-

fessor Jastrow's offers very important aid to the earnest and serious student.

This volume, however, does not claim to be a complete treatment of the comparative science or of the philosophy of religion. It is rather elementary and introductory to the study of religion than itself a complete study of the subject. That subject would be entirely too large to be treated in full in so small a volume as this. What Professor Jastrow proposes to do is rather to show his readers how to approach the study of religion and what method to pursue in such study, than to furnish them with all the knowledge now attainable. Of course, in carrying out this design the author furnishes much substantial information. He lays the foundation of a comparative study of religion, but he does not carry on the building to completion. He affords the student much positive and valuable information, but only to make him long for more; and then shows him how to proceed in order to get more. He regards religion as a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the human heart. The science of religion, accordingly, is a natural science, and must be pursued by a natural and historical method. "I take my stand," says the author in the preface, "as an advocate of the historical method in the study of religion as the *conditio sine quâ non* for any results of enduring character, no matter what the peculiar aspect of religion it be that engages our attention." The first chapter of the volume, accordingly, treats of the *history and character of the general study of religion*. How has the subject been approached and treated in the past? Has it been treated as a legitimate object of study, like psychology, or language, for instance, or as something supernatural that defies all natural or rational investigation and explanation? "To have recourse to supernaturalism," says the author, "is to confess our inability to solve the problem on which we are engaged." There can be no science of the supernatural in the sense in which that term is usually employed, namely, the sense of the *miraculous*. Religion is not a miraculous phenomenon in the life of humanity, and is therefore a legitimate object of scientific and philosophical study, and has been so regarded by the profoundest scholars who have treated of the subject, Herder, Hegel, Carlisle, Max Müller, Pfeiderer, Tiele, Réville, and a host of others. And the first chapter of this volume contains a review of the methods and contributions of these scholars.

The book is divided into *three parts*; the first part, after the historical introduction, containing chapters, respectively, on the *classification*, on the *definition*, and on the *origin* of religion. This part is entitled *General Aspects*. The *second part* is entitled *Special Aspects*, and contains seven chapters, headed respectively, *the factors involved in the study of religion*, *religion and ethics*, *religion and philosophy*, *religion and mythology*, *religion and*

psychology, religion and history, religion and culture. The third part, entitled *Practical Aspects*, treats of the general attitude in the study of religions, the study of the sources, the historical study of religion in colleges, universities, and seminaries, and museums as an aid in the study of religion. This is followed by several important appendices, by a valuable bibliography, containing lists of the most valuable books on the subject, and by a complete index, making the work convenient for reference.

One of the most important questions in the study of religions is the question of classification. The old classification of religions into true and false, or into supernatural and natural, can no longer be entertained by the philosophical student. The genealogical classification proposed by Max Müller, according to which religions, like languages, are arranged into three divisions, namely, Semitic, Aryan, and Turanian, and the morphological classification proposed by Professor Tiele, of Holland, according to which religions are divided into nature religions and nomistic religions, with various subdivisions are set aside by Professor Jastrow as inadequate. He holds that all religions, in their history, pass essentially through the same progressive stages; and that there is no sufficient reason to adopt any division based upon natural or race peculiarities of different peoples; and he himself adopts the following fourfold division based upon the progressive advancement in the religious history of mankind: "1. The Religion of Savages; 2. The Religions of Primitive Culture; 3. The Religions of Advanced Culture; 4. The Religions which emphasize as an ideal the coöxtensiveness of religion with life, and which aim at a consistent accord between religious doctrine and religious practice." There may be no question that this is one legitimate method of classification, based upon the true principle that all religions pass through progressive stages of development. But we believe that the genealogical and the morphological methods are equally legitimate, the latter in fact involving the principle of historical development no less than does Jastrow's method. And to the legitimacy of the genealogical method Professor Jastrow himself bears witness, in the chapter on *Religion and Philosophy*, where he shows that the fundamental ideas of the Semitic and Aryan religions respectively are the *theocratic* and the *theanthropic*. The Semitic religions are theocratic; they emphasize the divine transcendence and sovereignty, and the essential separation between deity and humanity. The Aryan religions, on the other hand, are theanthropic; they emphasize the idea of the divine immanence, and of the essential kinship between deity and humanity. This idea prevails in all the Aryan religions, from India to Germany. And this is an idea that depends not merely upon the degree of development of the religious life, but upon essential peculiarities of different races, and

which may therefore, very properly be chosen as at least one principle for the classification of religions. It follows, therefore, that Christianity is the outgrowth not merely of one class of religions, but of several. The idea of the divine sovereignty and holiness may be said to come from Semitism; the idea of the divine fatherhood and kinship from Aryanism. The Classical student will remember how constantly Zeus is said to be the Father of Gods and men, and how intimate are the relations into which he enters with men.

In the chapter on definitions Prof. Jastrow adopts Cicero's etymology of the word religion, namely, *relegere*, which he defines as "having a care" for the gods, but remarks that Lactantius' etymology comes essentially to the same thing, which however he defines, not as *binding back*, or *rebinding*, but as *binding to*, forging a link between mankind and the gods. The term, therefore, contains no allusion to a fallen condition and recovery, but to a constant strengthening of the bonds between gods and men by a religious and moral life on the part of the latter, and especially by acts of cultus. On the subject of definition Professor Jastrow regards as inadequate Kant's definition which makes religion to consist in the recognition of duty as a divine command. Professor Jastrow presents, first, Max Müller's definition, "as a mental faculty which independent of, nay, in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names, and under various disguises." Reville's definition is also given, as follows: "religion is the determination of human life by the sentiment of a bond uniting the human mind to that mysterious mind whose domination of the world and of itself it recognizes, and to whom it delights in feeling itself united." Professor Jastrow's own definition reads thus: "Religion consists of three elements: (1) the natural recognition of a power, or powers, beyond our control; (2) the feeling of dependence upon this power, or powers; (3) entering into relation with this power or powers." The definition is made so broad in order to include all possible forms of religion. We doubt, however, whether it is quite sufficient. Religion is more than a mere feeling of dependence upon a higher power, or of a relationship to this power; it includes also a mode of action, involving worship and conduct, determined by this feeling.

In discussing the origin of religion, Professor Jastrow considers successively, and sets aside, the "animistic" and "ghost" theories of Herbert Spencer. He rejects also the theory that fear or hope makes gods. The theory of priestly invention is only mentioned to be rejected. With Max Müller and Professor Tiele, Professor Jastrow places the root of religion in "the sense of the infinite." "Briefly put then," he says, "the origin of religion, so far as historical study can solve the problem, is to be sought in

the bringing into play of man's power to obtain a perception of the Infinite through the impression which the multitudinous phenomena of the universe as a whole make upon him." Man, then, possesses a religious sense, or instinct, which however needs to be "impressed" or stimulated by the power of the Infinite, in order that it may develop into the actual sense of religion. These definitions are supposed to apply to Christianity as well as to other religions. Professor Jastrow would smile at the distinction sometimes made between *religion* and *Christianity*, as though the one were something essentially different from the other—*subjective* in contrast to *objective*, or *law* in contrast to *redemption*, etc.—and such trifling may perhaps be worthy of a smile. But Professor Jastrow's own view is in our opinion not quite satisfactory either. He treats the subject, of course, from an evolutionary point of view. All religions, and of course Christianity too, are the product of evolution. But that does not prove that Christianity stands just on a level with other religions, as Professor Jastrow seems to imply. Humanity is the product of a process of evolution, too, in the physical world; but humanity nevertheless stands at the head of the animal world, and essentially transcends it. So Christianity grows out of the evolution of religion, and yet now is the absolute religion and will never be superseded by any other.

On the chapters contained in the second and third parts of this volume we have not room to speak in detail. There is much interesting material contained in these parts. The chapter on ethics and religion is replete with interest; and on this subject the reader will find some new and unusual positions. Ethical feelings, he holds, are not conditioned upon religion, and it is possible to conceive of religious men that do not foster morality. But both ethical and religious feelings are innate in man, and exercise a mutual influence upon each other. They are like two streams which have their beginnings in separate sources but at last, in their course, flow together. Many will perhaps demur to the author's statement that no religion is free from mythology, not even those of the Old and New Testaments, but most people will probably consent to the proposition that in religion there is emotion as well as thought, and that its value is not conditioned upon the literal truthfulness of the statements of its sacred books. The chapter on religion and psychology contains much important matter, but we have no space for particulars. We can simply mention that, in the third part, the author maintains that, in order to success in the study of religion, it must be pursued with a sympathetic mind, must be studied in the sources, that is, in the original languages of the sacred books, and should be made a part of the curriculum of school, college, and university education. And not only should one religion be made an object of study, but

at least two or three. We cordially commend this book to our readers. They will find it exceedingly fruitful and suggestive of new thought on the subject of religion, such as now prevails in the best informed circles of scholars; although they may not agree with all of the author's positions.

W. R.

THE TEMPLE BIBLE.

THE BOOK OF JOSHUA AND THE BOOK OF JUDGES. A. R. S. Kennedy, D.D., Editor. Pages 178.

THE FIRST AND SECOND BOOKS OF KINGS. J. Robertson, D.D., Editor. Pages 246.

THE FIRST AND SECOND BOOKS OF CHRONICLES. Archdeacon A. Hughes-Games, D.D., Editor. Pages 240.

THE BOOK OF JOB AND THE BOOK OF RUTH. W. C. Addis, M.A., Editor. Pages 152.

THE BOOK OF PSALMS. A. W. Streane, D.D., Editor. Pages 256.

PROVERBS, ECCLESIASTES, AND THE SONG OF SOLOMON. D. S. Margoliouth, M.A., Editor. Pages 154.

ACTS, and the Pastoral Epistles TIMOTHY, TITUS, and PHILEMON. B. B. Warfield, D.D. Pages 144.

The Later Pauline Epistles, ROMANS, EPHESIANS, PHILIPPIANS AND COLOSSIANS. Lord-Bishop of Durham, Editor. Pages 149.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE SCRIPTURE. Lord-Bishop of Ripon, Editor. Pages, 152.

J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, Pa.. Price per volume, 40 cents, net. 1902.

The volumes here noticed complete the TEMPLE BIBLE, which has been published by the J. B. Lippincott Company, of Philadelphia, in connection with J. M. Dent & Co., of London. These volumes possess the general merits of those which have preceded them. They manifest the same typographical art, and present the same excellent style of paper and binding. Each volume begins with a fine reproduction of some famous painting, opposite the title page. Each book of the Bible is prefaced with a clear and scholarly, though succinct, introduction, discussing the purpose, principle, authorship, and time and place of composition. The language adopted is that of the Authorized Version; geographical, ethnological, textual, and linguistic difficulties being explained in a series of *notes* at the end of the volume. "Biblical References in English Literature," Maps, tables of weights and measures, and tables of synchronisms of ancient history are contained in most of the volumes. About one-fourth to one-third of the size of each volume is devoted to such explanatory material, which will greatly aid the ordinary intelligent English reader in understanding his Bible. In fact this edition of the Bible will help the intelligent English reader to read his Bible in the light of the Christian scholarship of the twentieth century.

All readers of the Bible have heard of the *higher criticism*, and of the light which it has thrown upon the Bible. This subject has been discussed for several decades of time, in periodicals, reviews, and in the religious and secular papers of the country. These discussions have perhaps frightened some good Christians, shaken the faith of others, and helped that of many more by clearing up difficulties which were pressing upon them more and more heavily. This is an age of general intelligence, which can not be satisfied with the slurring over of difficulties in its sacred books. These must be honestly resolved; and where that can not be done, the failure must be honestly acknowledged. The modern Christian consciousness of the masses will not be put off with obscurities instead of explanations of difficult passages; it will not tolerate it that "men should speak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for Him," or for any supposed dogmas of revelation, any more than Job would. And this *TEMPLE BIBLE* is an honest effort to give to the masses of English Christians the honest truth as it is now known and understood in the best informed circles of Biblical scholarship. And those who have been led to believe that modern Biblical science is dangerously rationalistic, and that the Higher Criticism especially is full of deadly poison for simple Christians, will be glad to learn from the helpful pages of the *TEMPLE BIBLE* that they were needlessly alarmed. The Higher Criticism is not so bad. Instead of undermining, it strengthens the faith of serious students of the Bible, as the readers of these volumes will doubtless be glad to testify.

The editors of the various parts of this Bible have been chosen from various denominations, and from various schools of learning, in England and in this country; and, of course, they represent various tendencies and modes of theological thought. We have here, for instance, Professors Marvin R. Vincent of Union Seminary, and B. B. Warfield of Princeton, beside the Bishops of Durham and of Ripon. In these circumstances, one would, of course, not expect perfect agreement; but in the main the editors of the *TEMPLE BIBLE* agree in adopting the general conclusions of what has been called the *Higher Criticism*, or of modern critical and historical study of the Bible; so that the modern Bible reader has now before him the substantial results of the most advanced Biblical scholarship, and the advanced preacher need no longer be afraid that his congregation will not understand when he presents to it the truths of the Bible as understood in the beginning of the twentieth century. *THE TEMPLE BIBLE* is essentially the Bible as known in the light of the historical and critical method of study now pursued by the brightest scholars in Europe and America.

The remark just now made may be illustrated by examples. We take our first example from the Introduction to the Book of

Joshua. According to Dr. Kennedy this book is of one piece with the Pentateuch; and the historical picture therein presented does not agree with that presented in the succeeding book of Judges. The story of the conquest of Canaan as presented in Joshua does not impress the Biblical student as a literal historical composition. But what then? Is it, therefore, without religious value for the present, as for past ages? No; Dr. Kennedy speaks of it as follows: "The Book of Joshua is not a history in the strict sense of the word, but rather the religious interpretation of history for practical ends. History, we are taught, is not a series of fortuitous happenings, but an orderly revelation of the Eternal Mind." And that purpose is served by the Book of Joshua as well as if it were an exact photograph of a series of historical events—nay, far better, for it gives us more of the divine life and breath of history than such a photograph could give. The Books of Kings and Chronicles are treated in the same spirit. We refer only to one circumstance: David's bodyguard of "Cherethites and Pelethites" are in a note, p. 188, declared to have been "Philistines." This is in agreement with most critics; but it is one of those slight indications which impress us with the necessity of forming an essentially different picture of the life of David from that which has been customary generally heretofore. The Biblical student who believes that David's bodyguard were Philistines, can no longer hold the traditional ideas of David's canonical sanctity. In essential harmony with Dr. Kennedy's view of Joshua is what Dr. Warfield says of the historicity of the Book of Acts: "It is no ordinary history that it offers us. In the strictest sense it is sacred history. It is even obviously written less in the interest of pure history than in those of religious edification. The interest Luke feels in the events he recounts, the emotions they arouse in him, communicate themselves to his narrative. He clearly seeks to produce the same emotions in his readers, to set before them examples for their imitation, to communicate to them a religious view of the history he narrates. The book takes its standpoint not from earth but from heaven. It essays to inform us not how the Church spread from Jerusalem to Antioch, and from Antioch to Rome, but how the risen Christ has established His Church in the world and is fulfilling His promise to be with His followers to the end of time." Dr. Warfield may perhaps not be willing to accept what we consider to be the full bearing of his language; but the language will speak for itself, and will to many at least convey a meaning more consistent with critical than with traditional views of the Bible. We deem it due to add that Dr. Warfield stoutly contends for the complete Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles, for this purpose assuming, without discussion, the theory of a second imprisonment.

But worthy of more particular notice is the volume of *Introduction*, prepared by Rev. W. Boyd Carpenter, D.D., Bishop of Ripon. This volume contains clear and strong, though brief, discussions of all the questions that are now agitated in regard to the Bible. The range of these discussions may perhaps best be indicated by naming the headings of the *fifteen chapters* into which the book is divided. They are as follows: *The Bible and its Truth; Spiritual Truth and Questions of Time; Criticism Inevitable; The Bible and the Literature of Israel; Some Words on Poetry and Prose; Some Methods of Interpretation; The Growth of the Bible; The Idea of God in Israel; Inspiration; Revelation in the Bible; Criticism no Novelty—Some Features of its Progress; The Historical Value of the Bible; The Gospel and the Christ; The Gospel of the Eternal Christ; The Spirit for Bible Study.* The author's own general attitude on the questions in regard to which opinion is now divided, may be learned from the following sentences from the introduction. "I make no secret," he says, "of my own conviction that the time has come when Christian people must endeavor to understand these critical questions. I make no secret of my own conviction that, though some critics have been rash and unskilful, the general results of what is called the higher criticism and its scientific methods will come to be accepted; but as one who, though not pretending to be in any sense an expert, has not closed his eyes to the advance of knowledge, I write with an increased conviction that the Divine character of the message in these books has been rendered more intelligible by what has happened." These are words of truth and soberness; and in this spirit this little volume is composed. We wish we had space for more extensive quotations. We should like to refer to the phrase current among the Jews in our Lord's time, "We shall eat the Messiah," which probably gave rise to the mysterious words of Jesus at Capernaum, and to the most stupendous superstitions in the Christian Church. We should like also to repeat what the author says of "filling up the Bible silences with imaginary material, and then using this imaginary material as though it governed the interpretation of the existing narrative." Who does not remember how the silence of the forty days after the resurrection has been used for dogmatic purposes both by Roman and Anglo-Catholics? It is our earnest conviction that the careful study of this *Introduction* by our ministers and people, and in general the faithful use of this *TEMPLE BIBLE* would be most fruitful of good results.

In conclusion of this notice we would state that it is the intention of the publishers to issue an experimental volume of the Apocrypha, viz., *Ecclesiasticus*—"which will be followed, if the public so desire, by the remaining Apocryphal books."

W. R.

THE ANCIENT CATHOLIC CHURCH. *From the Accession of Trajan to the Fourth General Council. A. D., 98-451.* By Robert Rainy, D.D., Principal of the New College, Edinburg. Pages 539. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1902.

This volume is one of the series in the International Theological Library. The historical volumes, already published, are the History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age by Mc. Giffert, a History of Christian Doctrine by Fisher, and Christian Institutions by A. V. G. Allen. The volumes in preparation are another volume by Rainy on the Later Catholic Church and the Latin Church by Robertson. Thus, when completed, we shall have a new church history extending to the Reformation. The work is divided among specialists and comes in monographs, which distinguishes it from the general church histories by Giesseler, Schaff and others. For some unknown reason no provision has been made for the Reformation and the modern period. This, it seems to us, is a defect in the plan, which can still be remedied.

The history of the old Catholic Church has claimed the special attention of historians since the publication of Baur's "Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderte," about the middle of last century. He traced the origin of the Catholic Church to the synthesis of the views of opposing parties in the Apostolic period—Jewish Christianity and its antithesis Pauline or Gentile Christianity. Under the influence of this theory, he studied the New Testament and post-apostolic writings, assigning them to one party or the other, according to their tendencies in a Jewish or Gentile direction. He broke away from the School of Neander and became the founder of a new school. Ritschl, his pupil, in his second edition of "Die Entstehung der Altkatholischen Kirche," differed from Baur in advancing the theory that Jewish Christianity became comparatively uninfluential in the first century, and that the liberal Jewish Christians were absorbed, and overshadowed, by Gentile Christianity. Gentile Christianity, not so much by its union with Jewish Christianity, as by its contact with the Greco-Roman philosophy, religion, and government, was gradually embodied in the forms of the old Catholic Church. In this respect Ritschl became the leader of a school among whom are some of the leading German, English, and American historians. It recognizes, more than any historians of the past, the impact of the Greco-Roman Empires upon the forms of the Church. It makes earnest with the historic method, studying the organism in its relation to the environment. Some of the leading historians of the school are Harnack, Hatch, and McGiffert.

Dr. Rainy is in sympathy with the Ritschlian theory. His first chapter treats of "The Environment." Among the Jewish Christians he distinguishes two parties, "one, which claimed for its

members the right to keep the law, but did not seek to impose the yoke on Gentile Christians; another, which insisted that the law was binding on all believers. The former could be owned as brethren; the latter cut themselves off from fellowship, and became alienated from the church in doctrine as well as in practice. The liberal Jews were absorbed; the bigots hardened into a sect, known as Ebionites. "The view that a distinctively Jewish party carried on into the second century the flag of Judaism as against a Pauline or Gentile version of the faith, and powerfully affected the subsequent development can be maintained only by signalising as distinctively Jewish features which were common to the Christianity of the whole church."

In the course of the discussion of the leading subjects of the period the author shows a thorough knowledge of the sources and the ability to put his conclusions in clear and concise form. In this respect he is the equal of McGiffert and worthy to continue the work into the subsequent centuries. He accepts the historic origin of the episcopate, regarding it none the less divine in its time, because it arose gradually according to the needs of the church. "Churches at the opening of the second century existed independently; so far, therefore, little republics—each regulating its own affairs." There were, however, invisible ties which bound all churches together, as well as duties which each owed to each. There was no external bond by which the internal unity was expressed. Here were the conditions for the church of the bishops, which came forth about the end of the second century. From the above circumstances one might find arguments to show that the early church was congregational in polity, as well as episcopalian, while the fact is, it was neither. Nor do we any longer go back to the early church for any form of church government, which depends largely upon the circumstances of the age in which it exists. Before the Bishops came into the church, the author claims, there were certain functions which were performed by the Spiritual men, the elder brethren, men of experience and authority. These functions became offices, with officials. The Bishops and Presbyters were at first identical, but became separated during the second century. Herein he differs from the Hatch-Harnack theory, which teaches that Bishops and deacons were two allied officials, and the Presbyters were different from them in the beginning. The Gnostic and Montanistic Controversy, and the passing away of the Apostolic persons, brought out the Bishop's prerogatives more prominently. He became the guardian of tradition, as well as keeper of the funds. Later, in the third century, he became the minister of discipline, and the priest, holding the right of ordination and the administration of the Sacraments. These functions were the prerogatives of the congregation, but were gradually resigned to the Bishops. The church was originally democratic, but it became aristocratic.

Dr. Rainy is at his best when he treats the theological controversies. He devotes two chapters to the leading controversies of the second century—Gnosticism and Montanism. His delineation of the principles and aims of the Gnostics is a remarkably clear statement of a vague and misty subject. He recognizes the influence of Neo-platonic thought on the theology of the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries. In a few pages he gives the leading characteristics of this last school of Greek philosophy. In the chapter on Christ and God, he states the leading Christological theories of the early church and prepares the reader for the full development of the several schools in the Arian and Christological Controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries.

In the third division of the book we find chapters on Monasticism, the Nicene Council, Arianism, and Christological Controversies. He concludes with a careful study of Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy.

While this work differs from Schaff, it does not supersede his second and third volumes. It is an excellent sequel to this more general history. It presupposes that the reader is acquainted with the history of the period and, therefore, deals with principles, the causes and effects in the movement. It is not an historical narrative, but a philosophic presentation of facts and events. The student will find it a desirable work for the continuance of his historic studies in the ministry after he has finished his seminary course. Both this volume and, we are safe in saying, the historical volumes of this series, will be among the most satisfactory works on Church history, now published in the English language.

G. W. R.

THE REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE BIBLE. By George Matheson, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E., formerly Minister of the Parish of St. Bernard's, Edinburg. Pages 369. A. C. Armstrong and Son, N. Y. 1902

Dr. Matheson has won for himself a wide circle of readers in the English speaking world. He is one of the leading devotional writers of this generation. Among his works, which are found in many a pastor's study, are *Voices of the Spirit*, *Moments on the Mount*, and the more scholarly volume, *The Spiritual Development of Paul*. He combines the meditative, the scientific, the philosophic, and the poetic minds in a remarkable manner. He has distinguished himself as a hymnist. He is the author of the famous hymn in the "Scottish Hymnal" entitled, "Oh Love that Will not Let Me Go." Some one has said, "Since the death of Principal Caird, the most eminent Scotch preacher has been Dr. George Matheson: who has been practically blind since his twentieth year." From such a one the public will welcome a book on so interesting a subject as the "Representative Men of the

traditional authors of books or Psalms, nor by changes in the time of composition. These variations can no more affect the spiritual truths, than the changes in the conception of the origin and motives of the solar system affect the light of the sun.

The plan of the book appears in the table of contents. Sixteen leading characters are discussed in so many chapters. The subjects are the following: Adam the Child, Abel the Undeveloped, Enoch the Immortal, Noah the Renewer, Abraham the Cosmopolitan, Isaac the Domesticated, Jacob the Aspiring, Joseph the Optimist, Moses the Practical, Joshua the Prosaic, Samuel the Seer, David the Many-Sided, Solomon the Wise, Elijah the Impulsive, Elisha the Imitative, Job the Patient. Each character is treated as a type of manhood, which repeats itself in every age and in all nations.

His treatment of the subject, Adam the Child, will illustrate his method throughout the volume. It is somewhat fanciful at times, yet very suggestive. Adam he regards as "the figure representative of all childhood—always, everywhere." . . . "You ask if it is historical. I answer, it has been again and again historical; it has been repeated in your history and in mine. This child is not dead; it lives in the experience of every human soul." Concerning Adam's hereditary qualities he says, "He leads upon the stage of time no *vacant* soul, no empty life. He is the first of the race, yet there is in him a long stream of heredity. The child Adam comes into this world with two worlds already in his heart. Two elements are in him—not necessarily diverse, but different and capable of conflict—the dust of the ground and the breath of the Father." In these hereditary tendencies he finds the primitive desires of every child—desire for food, love of the beautiful, and craving for possession.

What was Adam's transgression? Transgression literally means a stepping over into another's ground. Adam saw the trees of the Garden and said, "They are mine." But a voice responded, "They are not *all* yours: it is a divided ownership." Hence came the first possibility of transgression—of stepping into another's field. God, accordingly, appealed to the child to be just and abide by that which belongs to him. "We parted this field between us, you and I, let us keep to our contract." The first sin was not disobedience—resistance to Divine authority: but injustice—interference with Divine possession. "The fall of young Adam is his fall from the *height* of justice." Injustice is an emotion, a full fledged spirit and, therefore, can be propagated from generation to generation. "I cannot understand why an act of disobedience should have been propagated, for the simple reason that it is an act. Deeds, as such, are not transmittable; my blood *alone* can flow in the heart of my descendants." An act of injustice only comes when the spirit of injustice is full grown.

Bible." In his preface he says, "I offer this volume by way of experimental instalment. Should the volume meet with acceptance, I may exhibit a second row (of characters) contemporaneous with the first; and ultimately, I should like to extend the line into the New Testament."

The first thing, which attracts our attention in reading his preface and introduction, is his position in regard to the contents of the Old Testament. He is well versed in the critical work of the present day. He neither rejects nor accepts the conclusions of higher criticism. He is trying to find the spiritual principles in the biblical narratives, which are not affected by questions of authorship and time of composition. He says, "These studies are not historical, they are not critical; they are an analysis of the Portraits *as we see them*—without any attempt to inquire how or when they came." He expresses his assurance that there is a historical basis for the patriarchal life—not to speak of lives further down the stream. "But I have been actuated in the meantime by the desire to find ground that is neutral to the two extremes—the Higher Criticism on the one hand and the Old Orthodoxy on the other." They, who differ as to data and origins, can meet in the recognition of a spiritual beauty.

In our judgment the author has the true idea of the value and use of the Old Testament narratives for present day instruction. He separates the eternal truth from the framework into which it has been cast. He separates these elements, not by the apparatus of criticism, but by the intuition of a truth-filled soul. The same spirit who inspired the prophet must interpret the prophet. Therefore he rightly says, "We will endeavor to detect, not the evidence of local coloring, nor the vestiges of a special culture, not the indications of a life that has passed away, but the element in them which is abiding, permanent, the same yesterday and to-day and for ever. It is precisely where these Portraits desert the sphere of history that they are *great*. It is precisely where the environment of the man is dimly seen that the universal element in the Picture shines out most clearly and most resplendently."

His conception of revelation is well worth repeating, since it comes from a man whose orthodoxy is beyond question, and whose piety is of the purest type. He has outlived the old theory of verbal inspiration and has found a theory far more satisfactory and true to the nature of man and to historic facts. "A revelation from God is not a statement of what men *once* did; it is a statement of what men *always* do. *There* lies the power of the Bible! It is not the revelation of something which was once revealed to a little band of worshippers; it is a revelation of how God *always* reveals. It tells not how He spoke *once*, but how He speaks *always*." When one has reached that view of the Old Testament, he will not be disturbed by critical researches, which change the

It presupposes a long train of dishonest thoughts. Adam first looked at the fruit, then touched it, and finally took it. The act was the consequence of an internal process; a spirit, which is transmittable through the blood from age to age.

The reader will find something novel and suggestive in this discussion of Adam and his fall. The same originality and freshness runs through the other chapters. Each chapter closes with a short invocation or prayer, resembling the meditations in "Moments on the Mount." The style is chaste, crisp, and clear as crystal—a well of English undefiled. For pastor and layman this volume will be a great boon.

G. W. R.

BROOKS BY THE TRAVELLER'S WAY. By J. H. Jowett, M.A. Pages 205. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. 1902.

This book contains a series of religious addresses, which were published in the *Examiner* in England. They were widely read in that form, and, in answer to requests from the readers, they have been republished in a volume. The addresses are based upon scripture passages selected from different books of the Bible. They are brief, covering on an average less than eight pages. They might be called sermonettes of an expository and a devotional character. Some of them were evidently stronger when spoken before an audience with the living personality behind them, than when read in the silence of the study. Many of them, however, are excellent reading, and would be an aid to the preacher, in suggesting new texts and throwing new light on old texts.

Among the twenty-eight subjects discussed are the following: Man's Setting and God's Setting; Things Concealed; Spiritual Culture; My Need of Christ, Christ's Need of Me; How Much More; Beauty in the Heights; Dying, We Live; The Forces of the Kingdom; Feverishness, Strife and Vain Glory.

In the address, "How Much More," he combines three texts; "If ye then being evil . . . how much more shall your Father, etc.; If God so clothe the grass . . . how much more, etc.; If the blood of goats and bulls . . . how much more shall the blood of Christ," etc. He shows how the writers of scriptures began on the plane of the human and reasoned upward to the Divine. "We are to exercise the powers of observation in the common ways of life. We are to interrogate the common heart, and find there the elements of our thinking, and with these we may then begin to shape our conception of the Divine. We are to search among ourselves for alphabetic hints and suggestions, and with these we may partially determine the ways and the thoughts of the Eternal mind." We find many gems of truth, which stir the mind to think and the heart to feel, interspersed throughout the book.

While it is not what we should call a scholarly work, nor even a

masterpiece of expository writing, it is an excellent presentation of practical and personally experienced truths, taken from the Scriptures, to quicken and refresh the life of faith of the pilgrim, like the fresh water brooks by the way, that quench the thirst of the traveler. As such we recommend it to the busy pastor and to the thoughtful layman.

G. W. R.